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Abstract 
During a digital forensics investigation, it is often necessary to identify ‘related’ files and 
log records for analysis. While this is typically achieved through manual examination of content, 
recent advances in storage technologies pose two major challenges: the growing volumes of digital 
evidence; and the technological diversity in storage of data in different file formats and 
representations. Both these challenges call for a scalable approach to determine related files and 
logs from one or more sources of digital evidence. In this thesis, I address some of the challenges 
involved in identifying associations that are inherent among the sources of digital evidence, via 
their metadata.  
 Metadata pertains to information that describes the data stored in a source, be it a hard disk 
drive, file system, individual file, log record or a network packet. By definition, metadata as a 
concept is ubiquitous across multiple sources and hence presents an ideal vehicle to integrate 
heterogeneous sources and to identify related artifacts. I develop a metadata based model and 
define metadata-association based relationships to identify ‘related’ files, log records and network 
packets, using metadata value matches. 
While there are many tools that allow the extraction of metadata for examination (using 
only a small fraction of the available metadata), the analysis step is left largely to the individual 
forensics investigator. In this thesis, I present a consolidated review of such tools and identify 
specific functionalities that are essential to integrate multiple sources for conducting automated 
analysis. Besides, I develop a framework and design the associated technology architecture to 
integrate these functionalities. In this framework, I define a metadata-based layer for automating 
the analysis – called the metadata association model which identifies the metadata value matches 
across arbitrary artifacts and organizes them based on the association semantics into meaningful 
groups. I have built a prototype toolkit of this model, called the AssocGEN analysis engine, for 
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identifying related artifacts from forensic disk images and log files. I evaluated this tool on 
heterogeneous collections of digital image files and word processing documents and successfully 
identified doctored files and determined the origin of artifacts downloaded from the Web. 
Apart from associations in digital evidence that arise out of metadata value-matches, time-
based sequencing is an essential part of forensic investigations. Timestamps are an important part 
of metadata that correspond to events that transpired. Sequencing these timestamps gives rise to a 
timeline. However, generating a timeline across heterogeneous sources poses several challenges; 
timestamp interpretation is one such. To address this issue, I develop a provenance information 
model and the associated technology architecture to incorporate timestamp interpretation while 
generating a unified timeline across multiple heterogeneous sources. The provenance information 
model can also validate time-based assertions by comparing semantically related timestamps to 
establish evidence consistency. I have built a prototype toolkit of this model, called UniTIME, to 
generate unified timelines from files, logs and packet captures and successfully evaluated it on 
datasets containing FAT file systems and ZIP file formats. 
In summary, this research develops a framework for identifying associations in digital 
evidence using metadata for forensic analyses. I show that metadata based associations can help 
uncover the inherent relationships between heterogeneous digital artifacts which can aid 
reconstruction of past events. I also show that metadata association based analysis is amenable to 
automation by virtue of the ubiquitous nature of metadata across forensic disk images, files, 
system and application logs and network packet captures. The results obtained demonstrate that 
metadata based associations can be used to extract many meaningful relationships between digital 
artifacts, thus potentially benefitting real-life forensics investigations. 
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1. Introduction 
Digital forensics, as a branch of science, involves the application of scientific principles to the 
interpretation of digital evidence during a criminal investigation. It spans acquisition, 
examination, analysis, documentation and presentation of digital evidence in a court of law. With 
the increasing use of computers and the Internet, the challenges associated with forensic 
investigations involving digital evidence have become formidable [67, 69]. As a consequence, 
issues facing the field today include the intrinsic technological diversity
1
 (heterogeneity) and the 
increase in the number of sources of digital evidence (volume). 
Traditionally in computing environments, hard disk drives were the dominant source of digital 
evidence and as a result analyses were largely confined to files. Today, however, in addition to 
hard disks, data is also found on volatile memory, log files and network packets, all of which are 
in different formats. As a consequence, system and application logs, volatile memory images and 
network packet traces have become equally important to investigators.  
During a digital forensics investigation, each source of digital evidence is examined using one or 
more forensic tools to identify the artifacts contained in them which are then analyzed 
individually [50, 67]. When multiple heterogeneous sources of evidence are analyzed in this 
traditional manner, redundancy in processing the evidence becomes unavoidable, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.1. In fact, even among multiple sources of the same data type, redundancy results. 
Processing digital evidence in the traditional manner contains four parts; source, process 
(examination and analysis), outcome, and consolidation. For each one of the sources that require 
processing, the artifacts need to be examined and analyzed individually for generating relevant 
                                                          
1
 I henceforth use the terms diversity and heterogeneity interchangeably. 
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reports that are corroborated in the final step. The workflow described hitherto underlines the need 
for a cohesive approach to analyze diverse sources of digital evidence to arrive at a consolidated 
outcome. 
 
Figure 1.1 Traditional method for conducting forensic analysis on different sources 
  
In this thesis, I posit that it is beneficial to group the artifacts (available across sources of 
digital evidence, irrespective of their forms and formats) to enable an examiner to identify 
relevant evidence. I achieve this goal using the metadata that is inherently present in digital 
evidence and identify the associations
2
 between the artifacts. Interestingly, metadata based 
associations in digital evidence exist both at syntactic as well as semantic levels. 
1.1 The Heterogeneous Nature of Digital Evidence 
During a digital forensics investigation, evidence is acquired from four different types of sources 
[43, 44, 64], viz., hard disk drives, memory dumps, system and application logs, and network 
packet captures, each of which can also internally vary in formats. For example, in file systems 
alone there are dominant and often-used variations such as FAT, NTFS, EXTx and HFS+. The 
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files, in turn, may be stored in different file formats and therefore, file analysis often requires 
multiple utilities to elicit evidence relevant to the investigation at hand. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1.2. This complexity is compounded by several usage scenarios, two typical examples of 
which are explained in the sequel. 
 
Figure 1.2 Some of the heterogeneity found in digital evidence 
  
 
Scenario 1: When the same file is used across heterogeneous file systems  
Today it is common for people to use multiple computers as well as multiple storage 
devices during their day-to-day work. Such storage devices may be formatted using the 
FAT32, NTFS, EXT2/3 or other such standards. If a user created a file on an NTFS file 
system and transferred the file to an EXT2 file system using a FAT32 formatted USB 
flash drive, then differently-formatted copies of the file may be present on all three file 
systems. Beyond this, if the user modified the file on the USB drive or the EXT2 file 
system, it is possible that content similarity or the provenance of the modified file may 
not be apparent. One can contend, however, that in such cases the metadata associated 
with each of the files, when analyzed in unison, can provide a better perspective and 
insight into the file’s origins, thus providing valuable evidence for a digital forensics 
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investigator. The research challenge is thus to identify such relationships across 
heterogeneous sources and devise a method to group them in order to aid a forensics 
examiner (assuming, of course, that the user does not meddle with the metadata). 
Scenario 2: When an activity sequence relating to a given file spans heterogeneous 
sources 
Consider another scenario where a user downloads a set of digital photographs from the 
Internet, edits them and markets them as originals. This would normally be construed as 
IP theft. Garfinkel notes that no existing tools can enable a forensic examiner to detect 
such related activities [69, 165]. While tools to detect whether or not an image has been 
edited are available, they fall short of detecting the activity sequence, which is necessary 
to create evidence linking copies to the original photographs while making a case. In 
order to do so, it is essential to find the original photographs from the user’s computer 
and group them with the edited duplicate. One may also be faced with a situation where 
the user deleted the original files. While deleted files can be recovered using an approach 
known as data carving [50], trace-evidence of the user’s online activity can also be 
obtained from the corresponding browser logs or network packet captures. If one were to 
use the metadata from files and the log attributes and determine related items, it can help 
relate these sources of digital evidence to establish provenance. The research challenge 
here is to identify log records that are directly related to the duplicates stored on a user’s 
computer and to group the relevant pairs together to aid the forensics examiner. 
The two scenarios described above highlight the challenges faced by a forensics examiner when 
dealing with heterogeneous data sources. In the first scenario, the challenge was to establish file 
similarity and provenance. In the second scenario, the challenge was to establish provenance and 
authenticity verification. 
In both scenarios, the traditional method of analysis (based on the DFRWS report [50])  requires 
that the sources of digital evidence be analyzed individually and sequenced using timeline 
information. However, this requires that the conclusions cannot be arrived at until after all the 
sources are exhaustively analyzed. On the other hand, if one were to use the metadata that is 
present in all digital evidence sources, it has the potential to aid a forensic examiner to arrive at 
the same conclusion without having to exhaustively analyze all the files. Moreover, this approach 
can be designed to be technology-agnostic with ability to scale across heterogeneous sources. 
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In this thesis I present a model, methodology and a demonstrable toolkit to automatically identify 
associations in digital evidence at the syntactic and semantic levels using metadata. For example, 
if we consider my earlier description of Scenario 2, my approach can identify associations 
between different data sources based on metadata to elicit evidence, which could involve files that 
have been downloaded, evidence relating to the origins of the downloads and doctoring of digital 
photographs, and Internet browser logs and network packet traces. In the following section, I 
elaborate on this motivation further. 
1.2 Motivation for Finding Associations in Digital Evidence 
Digital evidence is ubiquitous in cyberspace today. As observed earlier, rapid advancements in 
digital technology over the past decade, the multiplicity in file formats and log formats of the 
artifacts have rendered forensic analysis a formidable challenge. Besides, applications also create 
multiple temporary files and logs hand-in-hand with regular files. In fact, in most computing 
applications, each and every stage of an activity is recorded at multiple levels, from the 
application down to the operating system level; these are often stored in different formats. Despite 
the differences in file formats, all files on a file system can be classified using common file 
system metadata like the filename, file size, MAC
3
 timestamps, etc. Still, files cannot always be 
(readily) associated with log records. Under these circumstances, in order to get a holistic 
perspective, during a forensics investigation, it thus becomes necessary to examine all these 
related files and logs along with the regular files. This is highly laborious and error prone, so a 
scalable method for analysis is needed. 
In the literature, classification has mainly been used to group forensic artifacts belonging to the 
same source [17, 18, 109, 113]. The groups are then presented in some ordered form, e.g., 
alphabetical order or time-sorted, and analyzed for patterns. This approach seems to work well for 
homogeneous sources [27, 65, 69], however, when confronted with heterogeneous sources, even 
across file formats, classification requires an additional step by the examiner in “linking up” the 
groups so identified. In practice, one may have to classify the artifacts repeatedly, using different 
parameters, before a pattern emerges [17, 18]. 
To extract associations such as those illustrated in the scenarios described in the previous section, 
it is necessary to examine how the artifacts from heterogeneous sources are ‘connected’ in order 
to corroborate a fact [19, 130]. This can be achieved in two different ways: (i) using the actual 
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content in the artifacts and identifying matches across artifacts; or (ii) using the attributes 
describing the artifacts, or metadata, and identifying matches in them. The former is 
computationally intensive and is often used in the literature whenever a deep file analysis is 
needed [98, 158]. On the other hand, the latter approach remains largely unexplored. I therefore 
focus on attributes and develop a framework to determine metadata based associations across 
heterogeneous sources. More specifically, I identify value matches that lead to associations that 
“link up” evidence. This naturally opens up a new regime of semantic understanding based on 
associations across artifacts. Figure 1.3 illustrates my approach.  
 
Figure 1.3 My approach to forensic analysis by identifying associations across different sources of digital 
evidence 
  
In this thesis, I use metadata to identify those artifacts which contain overlapping contexts and 
group them to be analyzed together. As such, the grouping eliminates the repetitions which are an 
inevitable part of traditional analyses. In the sequel, I define a digital artifact and metadata. 
Further, I illustrate the role of metadata in digital investigations and describe the use of metadata 
to determine associations. 
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1.2.1 Concept of a Digital Artifact 
An examiner is often confronted with the problem of aligning different sources to corroborate 
digital evidence by correlating the information between them. Since all types of digital evidence, 
notwithstanding their type, have abundant metadata [22, 67], it can act as the common medium to 
discover the inherent relationships that often exist in digital evidence. Carrier and Spafford [29] 
note that metadata can be treated as the characteristics of a digital object. Every digital object is 
evidence of at least one event and the metadata is a partial representation of the state of a digital 
object. In my work, I refer to the digital object with its associated metadata as a digital artifact. 
The metadata associated with these digital artifacts can correspond to events and thereby enable 
reconstruction of events and their sequence. For example, creation of a file on a file system is a 
type of file-event, accessing a file is another type of file-event and visiting a webpage is a type of 
Internet-event and so on. This abstraction of a digital artifact allows my work to focus on not only 
syntactic value matches but also the semantics that links these matches. Analyzing one or more 
digital artifacts can thus help in reconstructing the set of events that generated these artifacts. 
1.2.2 Metadata in Digital Investigations 
Metadata refers to data about the data that is stored in digital media. Metadata is the information 
about the data contained in a source, be it a file, folder, hard disk drive, logs or network traffic and 
is independent of the content it describes. For instance, metadata for a file contains information 
regarding the filename, location of the file, file size, content type, application type, ownership, 
access privileges, date and timestamps and so on. (Similar descriptions exist for log file related 
metadata.) 
Metadata can be considered as sets of name-value pairs. It is common to all digital data stored in a 
digital storage medium, albeit in different forms. As metadata describes attributes regarding the 
data, and as these attributes can have values in common across similar digital artifacts, it is useful 
to group digital artifacts with the same values for attributes together in order to analyze them 
holistically. 
Timestamps are one such kind of metadata that has been extensively used in the literature and 
timestamp analysis has played an important part in digital forensics so far. Timestamps are used to 
generate a timeline of activities relevant to an investigation. Sequencing timestamps generates a 
sequence of events, and this process is referred to as digital time-lining. Some of the challenges 
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pertaining to timestamp analysis are synchronization [184], clock skew and drift [23, 171], and 
timestamp interpretation [8, 34, 120-128].  
Interestingly, metadata contains certain types of situational information as well. In other words, 
the information relating to who, how and when the digital artifacts were created, modified or 
accessed are present in their metadata. During forensic analysis, focusing on metadata enables us 
to understand the evolution of artifacts and their relationships with other artifacts. 
1.3 Using Metadata to Determine Associations in Digital Evidence 
In conventional systems of forensic analysis [50], content is analyzed for describing and 
understanding the artifacts. Such content analysis is carried out using “searching”. When 
searching a file or for a file, use of keywords is normally the norm. When the exact words are not 
known, one may use a regular expression search which supports searching for a set of keywords 
that fit a pattern. If a suitable search pattern too is unknown, a forensics examiner may have very 
little to go by during analysis and will need to resort to an exhaustive search. (A similar argument 
can be extended to log files as well.) 
Metadata, on the other hand, contains information that can be used to achieve the same objective, 
but more efficiently. Metadata based search is amenable to automation by virtue of its ubiquitous 
nature. This property of metadata can potentially benefit digital forensic analyses, as there is 
always a need to identify all types of associations that exist between the digital artifacts. The 
research objectives of this thesis are to show how this can be done. 
1.4 Objectives of this Thesis 
In view of the challenges posed by heterogeneous sources and the growing volumes of digital 
evidence, I focus on the following three objectives in my research: 
1. While there have been general advancements in the development of forensic tools, the 
abstraction of functionalities for an integrated analysis of heterogeneous sources of digital 
evidence is required. In my research, my first objective was to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the complementary functionalities of current forensic tools in order to 
integrate them for examining heterogeneous sources of digital evidence. 
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Metadata is ubiquitous across heterogeneous sources of digital evidence. Naturally, metadata can 
become a vehicle for integrating the examination of different sources. The understanding gained 
from the first objective led to the development of an architecture which integrates the 
functionalities of complementary and specialized tools. To build a metadata based platform to 
integrate the examination and analysis of heterogeneous sources, I identify associations in digital 
artifacts that are present with the different sources based on metadata. I validate this 
understanding by developing a prototype toolkit for extracting metadata and identifying metadata 
associations across different sources. 
When identifying metadata associations in digital evidence, I believe that it can be important to 
distinguish between a value match resulting in a syntactic association between two digital artifacts 
and the semantics of the association between them leading to a forensic context. I believe that the 
ability to identify syntactic associations can aid in automation, and the ability to identify semantic 
associations can aid in answering one or more of Casey’s (six) forensic questions [32]. 
2. To cultivate such a distinction, my second objective was to develop a model to represent a 
metadata association and a method for identifying (i) a syntactic metadata association 
between two or more artifacts, and (ii) a semantic metadata association between two or 
more artifacts. 
The understanding gained from the second objective led to the development of a framework to 
identify the semantics related to the associations of metadata in the context of forensic analyses 
and to group such related associations. This is motivated by the fact that metadata consists of 
several fields (called tags or names). In my work, I refer to these fields as metadata names.  
When digital artifacts are associated based on metadata, it is possible that a single digital artifact 
can be associated with an artifact on a particular metadata name and at the same time be 
associated with yet another artifact on a different metadata name. In regards to forensic analysis, 
when the same artifact contains multiple associations, it requires consolidation. 
3. Our third and last objective was to incorporate such consolidation by grouping the related 
associations among digital artifacts. 
Based on the understanding gained from the second and third objectives, I developed a model to 
represent metadata associations both at the syntactic and semantic levels for artifacts of arbitrary 
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type. I validated this model by applying it to existing classes of artifacts and successfully inferred 
the existence of higher order relationships.  
In the sequel, I present an overview of the research method used to achieve these research 
objectives. 
1.5 Overview of the Research Method  
In this research I adopted an iterative method [49, 61]. An iteration of the research method 
consisted of several steps. The first step was the definition of an overarching research goal. In my 
case this was the establishment of a framework for identifying metadata based associations across 
heterogeneous sources of digital evidence. The second step was the development of a framework 
to define the scope and solution design needed to address the research goal. The third step 
involved an implementation of my design which resulted in a research prototype. The fourth step 
was to conduct experiments using the prototype to test my hypotheses concerning the use of 
syntactic and semantic metadata associations in digital evidence. The fifth step involved an 
evaluation of the experimental outcome based on which I qualified the results and derived 
inferences. When the outcome addressed the research goal adequately as measured during the 
evaluation, I proceeded to the next research goal. If, however, the evaluation demonstrated that 
the solution was inadequate to address the research goal, I returned to the second step and refined 
the design to address the deviation in expected behavior. Thereafter, I proceeded with the method 
as outlined above. This process is shown in Figure 1.4. 
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Figure 1.4 Iterative Research Method 
  
The research method employed in this work is known as “experimental computer science” [49, 
61, 130, 149, 186]. The output at the end of the second step resulted in a model that described the 
metadata associations empirically derived through experimentation. During evaluation, I tested 
this model to evaluate its adequacy. The third step creates the infrastructure via which the 
hypotheses pertaining to the use of metadata associations are tested, in the form of a research 
prototype for the design. The elaborated version of this research method as applied to my research 
is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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current forensic and analysis tools with regard to their treatment of metadata and the methods 
adopted in grouping the artifacts. To conduct such a review, I applied a survey method and 
identified a list of forensic and analysis tools that are used in the examination of different sources 
of digital evidence. The outcome of this survey was the identification of the levels of abstraction 
presented by these tools while handling digital evidence. 
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context. Hence I adopted the grounded theory and applied metadata matches to files. In this study, 
I illustrated heterogeneity in file formats by identifying intra and inter metadata matches among 
application files such as digital image files and word processing documents. Such application files 
were frequently encountered during digital investigations that necessitate the grouping of related 
files to conduct forensic analysis. It was therefore necessary to understand how such files are 
‘interconnected’ and assess their relevance to an investigation. 
In order to achieve my third objective, it was essential to gain a “grounded” understanding of how 
to group the associated artifacts in a manner that can aid in answering forensically relevant 
questions. In this study, I group the associated digital image files and word processing documents 
based on ‘source’, ‘ownership’, ‘timestamps’ and structural  application metadata concerning the 
file formats to determine answers to the questions posed by Casey [32].  
Having outlined the research methodology in my work, I list the contributions from this research 
in the sequel.  
1.6 Contributions from this Research 
In the context of the research challenges outlined in this chapter, the following were the salient 
contributions from this research. 
1. An understanding of the functionalities of contemporary forensics and analysis tools to 
examine digital evidence and to use the metadata for analysis. This is demonstrated 
through the development of a functional forensic integration architecture to identify 
associations across heterogeneous sources of digital evidence, using metadata.  
This contribution addresses the first research objective. my work on this research objective 
has resulted in the following publications: 
i. Raghavan S. (2012)., Digital Forensic Research: Current State-of-the-Art, CSI 
Transactions on ICT, March 2013, Volume 1(1), pp. 91–114, Springer Publishers, 
Berlin Heidelberg. 
ii. Raghavan S. and Raghavan S. V. (2013)., A Study of Forensic & Analysis Tools, In 
Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Systematic Approaches to 
Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE 2013), Hong Kong, China, Nov 21–22, 2013, 
Accepted Aug 2013, In Press. 
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iii. Raghavan S., Clark A. and Mohay G. (2009)., FIA: An Open Forensic Integration 
Architecture for Composing Digital Evidence, In Forensics in Telecommunications, 
Information and Multimedia, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, 
Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 2009, Volume 8(1), pp. 83–
94, Springer Publishers, Berlin Heidelberg. 
2. An understanding of metadata associations between digital artifacts when two or more 
artifacts exhibit (a) a syntactic metadata association resulting from a value match or 
similarity between corresponding metadata; and (b) semantics of a metadata association 
interpreted in a forensic context. This is demonstrated through the development of a 
metadata association model for identifying metadata-based associations among the 
artifacts in digital evidence. To validate this, I identified metadata associations across 
collections of digital images and word processing documents that were obtained from 
diverse sources using metadata matches.  
This contribution addresses the second and third research objectives in a conceptual 
manner. My work on this research objective has resulted in the following publications: 
i. Raghavan S. and Raghavan S. V. (2013)., AssocGEN: Engine for Analyzing Metadata 
Based Associations in Digital Evidence, In Proceedings of the Eighth International 
Conference on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE 
2013), Hong Kong, China, Nov 21–22, 2013, Accepted Aug 2013, In Press. 
ii. Raghavan S. and Raghavan S. V. (2009)., Digital Evidence Composition in Fraud 
Detection, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics 
and Telecommunications Engineering, 2010, Volume 31(1), pp. 1–8, Springer 
Publishers, Berlin Heidelberg. 
3. Development of a method to group the artifacts in a manner that eliminates redundancy 
and organizes them into event-related groups for the purpose of conducting forensic 
analyses. This led to the identification of related digital artifacts from heterogeneous 
sources, whether a file, a log record or a network packet, to identify the higher-order 
associations or relationships via the metadata. I demonstrated this in my work by the 
grouping metadata associated digital image files and word processing documents that 
were obtained from diverse sources.  
This contribution addresses the second and third research objectives in an experimental 
manner. my work on this research objective has resulted in the following publications: 
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i. Raghavan S. and Raghavan S. V. (2013)., Determining the Origin of Downloaded 
Files Using Metadata Associations, Journal of Communications, Vol. 8(12), pp. 902-
910, JCM ET Publishing 2013. 
ii. Raghavan S. and Raghavan S. V., Eliciting File Relationships Using Metadata Based 
Associations on File Collections for Digital Forensics, (Under Review) Submitted to 
CSI Transactions on ICT, Springer Publications 
4. An understanding of timestamp related associations in digital evidence and related 
challenges in timestamp interpretation. The analysis led to the development of a 
provenance information model to provide timestamp resilience in metadata for 
interpretation. I demonstrated these in my work using contemporary case studies involving 
FAT32 file systems and ZIP file formats.  
This contribution addresses the second research objective for unifying heterogeneous 
events through the generation of a unified timeline. my work on this research objective has 
resulted in the following publication: 
i. Raghavan S. and Saran H. (2013)., UniTIME: Timestamp Interpretation Engine for 
Generating Unified Timelines, In Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference 
on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE 2013), Hong 
Kong, China, Nov 21–22, Accepted Aug 2013, In Press. 
1.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I presented the need for identifying associations between the artifacts in digital 
evidence. Metadata, by virtue of its ubiquity, is the obvious choice for identifying these 
associations. My definition of association broadly conforms to the definition of the term 
‘association’, according to Webster’s English dictionary [198a] which defines it as “an identifier 
attached to an element in a system in order to indicate or permit connection with a thing or 
person”. In my work, metadata is the identifier and an element is the artifact belonging to the 
source of digital evidence. The act of finding metadata associations refers to the identification of 
metadata between two or more digital artifacts that exhibit a value match.  
I organize the rest of this thesis as follows:  
In Chapter 2, I review related literature and motivate the need for identifying and analyzing 
metadata based associations in digital evidence during forensic analysis. 
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In Chapter 3, I present my methodology to develop a framework for identifying metadata 
associations among digital artifacts and for grouping them for analysis. 
In Chapter 4, I develop a framework to identify metadata based associations among digital 
artifacts from heterogeneous sources of digital evidence. In particular, I introduce my functional 
Forensic Integration Architecture and define my metadata association model to determine 
associations using unconstrained combinations of metadata across heterogeneous sources of 
digital evidence. I also introduce my provenance information model to provide timestamp 
resilience in metadata for timestamp related associations and digital time-lining.  This is the 
central theoretical contribution of the research. 
In Chapter 5, I design experiments to evaluate my proposed model. I discuss the need to study the 
metadata found in digital image files and word processing documents and derive their respective 
metadata taxonomy to determine metadata associations for forensic purposes. 
In Chapter 6, I present the results of the experiments that were designed in Chapter 5 to analyze 
digital images using the metadata association model.  
In Chapter 7, I present the results of the experiments that were designed in Chapter 5 to analyze 
word processing documents using the metadata association model. 
In Chapter 8, I summarize the contributions from my research and discuss some limitations and 
identify scope for future research in the area. 
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“Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow. The important 
thing is to not stop questioning.”  
- Albert Einstein 
 
 
 
2. Related Work 
The diversity and increasing volumes of digital evidence has generated a need to determine new 
approaches to unify multiple data sources for analysis. In this chapter, I review the digital 
forensics research literature, identifying significant contributions along the way and eliciting 
current challenges in the field. I motivate the need to determine associations in digital evidence 
and how metadata plays a role in deriving valuable relationships to aid forensic analysis. 
2.1 Digital Forensics: A Multi-Staged Scientific Process 
The Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) 2001 report [50] has defined digital forensic 
science as follows: 
“The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the preservation, collection, 
validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and presentation of 
digital evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering 
the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized 
actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations.” 
Digital forensics is a multi-staged process starting with the identification of digital media from a 
scene as potential evidence until the time when the analysis results are presented in a court of law. 
The goal of a digital forensic investigation is the reconstruction of past events leading to an 
understanding of the incident being investigated. The sequence of activities [50] is illustrated at a 
high level in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1 The various stages of the digital forensic process 
  
Evidence Identification: The very first stage of the digital forensic process is the identification of 
relevant digital evidence. During this stage, one or more sources of digital data are identified as 
potential evidence. Examples of devices that can provide digital evidence include hard disks on 
computer systems, random access memory cards, USB storage devices, external sources of 
secondary storage, mobile phones, PDAs and so on.  
Evidence Acquisition and Preservation: Once a data source is identified, its contents are 
forensically acquired and preserved. Acquisition refers to the process of obtaining a binary, bit-
wise copy of the entire contents of a digital medium. The evidence is preserved using standard 
hash signatures like MD5 or SHA1 to verify its integrity. Besides such media, forensic examiners 
deal with digital records such as documents on a computer, telephone contact lists, lists of phone 
calls made, traces of signal strength from the base station of a mobile phone, voice and video files, 
email and SMS conversations, network traffic patterns, and virus intrusions and detections. The 
examiners use the actual user data, metadata associated with user data, activity logs and system 
logs. Each acquired source is duplicated to conduct forensic tests on read-only copies, lest an 
activity alters the data stored within the original sources [26, 33, 36].  
Evidence Examination: The digital evidence is examined using one or more forensic tools which 
provide multiple file system abstractions and support schemas to enable examiners to interpret and 
understand raw binary data. This stage is called evidence examination where the sources are 
examined and indexed for conducting searches. Casey [32] defines forensic examination as the 
process of extracting information from digital evidence and making it available for analysis. In 
some cases, the examination of digital evidence may reveal some hidden or otherwise not-so-
explicit information, which has to be extracted and subsequently analyzed. The act of identifying 
such information is termed evidence discovery.  
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Evidence Analysis: Evidence analysis begins when the evidence sources and the discovered data 
are analyzed to determine the sequence of events leading to the reported incident under 
investigation. Casey [32] defines forensic analysis as the application of scientific methods and 
critical thinking to address the fundamental questions in an investigation: what, who, why, how, 
when and where.  
Documentation and Presentation: The individual stages are thoroughly documented and this 
documentation is presented in a court of law. Occasionally, the digital evidence may be presented 
in court by an expert witness.  
2.2 Related Research 
Current research in digital forensics can be classified into four major categories, viz. digital 
forensic process modeling, evidence acquisition and representation, evidence discovery and 
examination and digital forensic analysis. 
Digital forensic process modeling deals with establishing theoretical models of the forensic 
process and the procedures and processes that must be in place to guarantee the integrity of 
evidence throughout an investigation [12, 26, 30, 50, 114]. The modeling process also defines 
fundamental forensic principles for the development of new tools in forensics examination, 
analysis and presentation.  
Evidence acquisition and representation deals with that branch of digital forensics concerned with 
acquiring digital data in a forensically secure manner from a variety of digital devices and 
proposing models to represent the data contained for examination [9, 131, 134, 135]. This branch 
studies the forensic scope of data from different devices and presents new techniques and tools 
(both hardware and software) to acquire data from the field. The data so acquired is then carefully 
and securely imaged for examination and discovery.  
Evidence examination and discovery deals with techniques to discover relevant data within the 
acquired sources and the software support needed to examine the contents using one or more 
forensic tools [26, 27, 39].  
Digital forensic analysis deals with post-examination evidence study to attempt to recreate past 
events [26, 30, 53, 91, 114, 117]. This branch deals with the analysis of artifacts from one or more 
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sources of digital evidence to reconstruct the sequence of events and answer the questions 
pertinent to analysis. 
2.2.1 Modeling the Digital Forensic Process 
A digital forensic examiner typically has to contend with many different types of digital evidence 
during an investigation, i.e., forensic disk images, logical images of folders and files, logs, 
network packet traces and memory dumps. Owing to the diverse nature of digital evidence 
involved, there can also be a general lack of cohesiveness in the manner in which the evidence 
acquisition, examination and analysis are handled. The Digital Forensic Research Workshop 
(DFRWS) 2001 report [50] highlighted the challenges facing the field and called for new 
approaches to develop a better understanding of the digital forensic process.  
Many digital forensic process models have been proposed in the literature. Primarily, these 
models deal with the definition of the general stages in a digital forensic investigation. 
McKemmish [114] identified four broad stages involved in a digital forensic investigation: 
1. Identification of digital evidence; 
2. Preservation of digital evidence; 
3. Analysis of digital evidence; and 
4. Presentation of digital evidence. 
Among the digital forensic process models, the important ones are the physical investigation 
process model [26], the hierarchical objectives framework [12], the Hadley IO model [74], the 
computer history model [30] and the concept of digital evidence bags [87, 190]. Of these, the 
physical investigation model and the hierarchical objectives framework both model the entire 
process while the Hadley model and digital evidence bags emphasize digital evidence acquisition. 
The computer history model attempts to model the reconstruction process. 
Carrier and Spafford [26] observed similarities in the digital investigation process with its 
physical twin; this work highlights the cross-applicability of many techniques used in the 
traditional form of physical forensics adopted into its digital sibling. Beebe and Clark [12] 
presented an objective based framework for digital forensic process, dividing it into six stages and 
proposing a 2-tier hierarchical objectives framework. The six stages defined by this work are  
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1. preparation,  
2. incident response,  
3. data collection,  
4. data analysis,  
5. presentation of findings; and  
6. incident closure. 
The framework further broke down the six stages into sub-stages (called sub-phases) and defined 
the objectives for these phases in typical investigations.  
Activities on a computer can be treated as a series of input-output sequences. The layered Hadley 
model [74] for input and output defined computer-based IO as a sequence of translations followed 
by transport of data. This model is primarily a hardware computer model for the purposes of 
identifying all I/O sources of digital evidence on one computer. The Hadley model does not 
account for digital evidence generated from information flow on computer networks, external 
storage drives, logs and various other active digital devices such as mobile phones, PDAs, MP3 
players and so on.  
The computer history model [30] attempted to formalize digital forensics using a finite state 
automaton. However, it concluded that this approach is computationally infeasible owing to the 
size of the resulting state space. Hosmer [87] emphasized the importance of chain-of-custody 
equivalents in the digital world and called for auditing every operation conducted on digital 
evidence from digital devices. Since data on digital devices can be altered, copied or erased, 
Hosmer proposed the applying following principles,  
 authentication,  
 integrity,  
 access control, and  
 non-repudiation,  
while handing digital evidence. The significance of this concept is reinforced by Turner’s digital 
evidence bags [190]. Turner focused on these four aspects from the standpoint of forensic 
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acquisition and draws a parallel from physical investigations to define digital evidence bags to 
record provenance information. 
Myers and Rogers [133] called for the need to standardize the forensic investigation process and 
presented an argument for achieving this through education and certification. Pollitt [151] 
presented an annotated bibliography of the different digital forensic models and examined the 
legal constraints of various forensic process models. Reith et al. [155] presented another 
independent examination of the digital forensic models and analyze its implications in the context 
of the challenges highlighted in the DRFWS 2001 report. 
In 2003, Mocas [130] identified three main challenges that must be overcome to advance the field 
of digital forensics from a theoretical standpoint. These challenges are: 
1. scaling forensics technology and the need to adapt scalable architectures; 
2. the need to adopt uniform certification programs and courses in digital forensics; and 
3. the need for changes in the digital evidence permissibility laws in courts. 
In this thesis, I address the concept of the need for adaptable architectures and the need for 
forensics tools to scale with the technology under analysis by grounding the forensic analyses on 
identifying metadata matches across multiple sources of digital evidence.  
Turner [190] stated that when devices become more specialized, forensic examiners require 
multiple tools to interpret the data contained. Existing digital forensic tools are typically designed 
to examine a few types of digital evidence. For instance, tools like Guidance EnCase or the 
AccessData Forensic Toolkit (FTK) primarily support hard disk images, albeit in different 
evidence formats. There are also several forensic tools in the open domain which perform 
specialized tasks like Sleuthkit [25], Volatility [195], Wireshark [42], etc.  
The Common Digital Evidence Storage Format Working Group (CDESF-WG) [43] noted 
drawbacks with many current forensic tools not being able to cope with multiple forensic image 
formats exhaustively. CDESF-WG emphasized the need to introduce a common digital evidence 
storage format across multiple sources of evidence including hard disk images, network logs, 
proxy cache data and memory dumps. 
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2.2.2 Evidence Acquisition and Representation 
Evidence acquisition deals with the identification of potential sources of digital evidence and how 
these sources may be acquired. Several national governmental agencies have recognized the 
increasing use of digital data and have participated in efforts to define guidelines for their use and 
handling in digital forensic investigations. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the 
Department of Justice (DoJ) in the United States of America have laid down principles for first 
responders [134], e.g,, where to search for evidence in a crime scene and how to go about 
acquiring data. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have developed 
several tools and tool testing frameworks [138-140 ] for evidence acquisition. The Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) [9] in the United Kingdom has published the Good Practice Guide 
for Computer Based Electronic Evidence and Standards Australia [180] has laid down guidelines 
for the management of IT evidence in Australia.  
Typically, when a digital source must be acquired, it is connected to the examiner’s computer via 
a write-blocker and a binary image of the entire disk is taken. A write blocker is a hardware 
device or a software tool that allows read-only access to the source to avoid tampering with 
evidence and thus maintains data integrity [140]. Lyle described the functions of a hardware write 
blocker [112] and described the tool testing processes defined by NIST [138-141]. The 
development of a multitude of forensic acquisition tools necessitated the development of digital 
evidence representation models which could be processed while adhering to the requirements of a 
digital forensic investigation. The digital evidence bag and the sealed-digital evidence bag cater 
to this need [170, 190]. 
2.2.2.1 Digital Evidence Bags (DEB) 
Turner [190] proposed the digital evidence bag (DEB) as a hierarchical digital evidence model 
that mirrors a physical piece of evidence. The model represents a source of digital evidence as 
data associated with tags (or metadata) that describe case information, evidence context, physical 
attributes of the source and so on. Once a source of digital evidence is tagged, it becomes 
immutable. But this posed a problem since during an examination when a new piece of evidence 
was discovered, since there was no place to record it. Therefore, DEB became monolithic and 
unwieldy during evidence examination and discovery [170].  
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2.2.2.2 Sealed Digital Evidence Bags (S-DEB) 
To overcome immutability with DEB, Schatz and Clark [170] introduced the open DEB 
architecture called sealed digital evidence bags (SDEB). Each tag in the SDEB model was 
uniquely identified with an identifier and was made immutable. When the analysis of primary 
evidence resulted in secondary evidence, a new encapsulating evidence bag was created into 
which the new details were stored. Hence, the existing evidence bags were untouched and were 
secure from unintended modifications, thus guaranteeing the integrity of the digital evidence. 
The models discussed here have demonstrated significant advances with regard to representing 
digital evidence and have provided us with different levels of abstraction to perceive digital 
evidence during the later stages of an investigation, such as examination and analysis. The 
development of such models instigated the development of different forensic image formats. 
There are different forensic imaging formats, viz., raw binary format, Encase image file format, 
advanced forensic format and so on. The common digital evidence storage format working group 
(CDESF-WG) presented a comparative study [44] of the different evidence storage formats and 
the forensic tools that support them. 
2.2.2.3 RAW Forensic image 
The raw image format is a binary image of the source; i.e., a bit-for-bit copy of the raw data of the 
source [44]. There is no metadata stored in raw Image Format files; however sometimes the 
metadata is stored in secondary files. The raw Image Format was originally native to UNIX 
operating system using the dd file copying utility, but presently it is supported by most computer 
forensic applications. 
2.2.2.4 Encase Format (E0x) 
The Encase format (E0x) is the basis of the image file format created by Guidance EnCase. The 
Encase image file format is used to store various types of digital evidence, e.g., disk image 
(physical bit stream of an acquired disk), volume image, memory and logical files. The Encase 
image file format is compressed but is a proprietary image format used by Encase forensic tools. 
2.2.2.5 Advanced Forensic Format 
Garfinkel [66] noted the need to maintain an open and extendable standard for forensic analysis 
and introduced the advanced forensic format (AFF) exclusively for hard disk drive images. The 
AFF was partitioned into two layers providing both abstraction and extended functionality. AFF’s 
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lower data storage layer describes how a series of name/value pairs are stored in one or more disk 
files in a manner that is both operating system and byte-order independent. AFF’s upper disk 
presentation layer defines a series of name/value pairs used for storing images and associated 
metadata. It presents an opportunity for an examiner to capture all the information related to a disk 
and also allows us to record case related metadata. The AFF can be processed by forensic tools 
like Sleuthkit and PyFlag. Garfinkel developed the afflib4 open source library to support the AFF 
format that has since been integrated with many open source forensic tools. Cohen et al. [41] 
proposed the AFF4 format by redesigning the AFF model to accommodate out-of-band 
information. AFF4 is a container format for multiple secondary storage devices, new data types 
(including network packets and memory images), extracted logical evidence, and forensic 
workflow.  
Since initially recognizing the need to acquire digital data and use it in digital investigations, 
research has paved the way for many acquisition techniques and tools for evidence. Many forensic 
formats support varying levels of metadata information, but this introduced concerns regarding 
completeness of the acquired evidence [43, 44]. 
2.2.3 Evidence Examination & Discovery 
Carrier’s work on forensic tool abstraction layers [27] bridged the gap between the definition of a 
forensic process model and the development of associated forensic tools in aiding an 
investigation. Since raw data from digital evidence is often very difficult to understand, the data 
are translated through one or more layers of abstraction using forensic tools until they can be 
understood. The directory is an example of a file system abstraction while ASCII is a non-file 
system binary abstraction. The abstraction layer concept has been instrumental in the development 
of many forensic tools. The tool abstraction model proposed by Carrier is illustrated in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2 Carrier's tool abstraction model  
                                                          
4
 http://www.afflib.org/ 
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Carrier classified forensic tool abstraction layers as lossy or lossless. When a forensic tool 
processed a source of digital evidence, leaving the source intact after the processing, the tool was 
supposed to provide lossless abstraction. On the contrary, if a forensic tool processing a source 
affected the source such that the source was no longer intact, that tool was said to provide a lossy 
abstraction associated with a margin of error. The abstraction layers identified two types of errors 
introduced by forensic tools, namely, tool implementation error introduced by tool design errors 
and abstraction error introduced by the simplifications used to generate the tool. Pan and Batten 
[146] studied the reproducibility of digital evidence that builds on the abstraction layer concept.  
During an evidence examination, digital evidence sources are interpreted using one or more 
forensic tools. Evidence discovery involves the process of reliably5 recovering encrypted, hidden, 
lost or deleted data from the acquired evidence for further examination. AccessData and Guidance 
introduced the AccessData FTK6 and Guidance EnCase7 forensic tool suites respectively for 
examining digital evidence. Carrier [25, 27] developed the SleuthKit8 framework based on the 
Coroner’s (TCT) toolkit. Cohen [39] extended the Sleuthkit to develop the PyFlag network 
forensic architecture for examining forensic images of hard disks, memory dumps, network 
captures and logs.  
The forensic community has also witnessed the advent of many other tools for examining digital 
evidence from hard disk images, logs, network packet captures, memory dumps, mobile phones 
and so on. Sleuthkit [25], Pyflag [39], Wireshark [42], log2timeline [111], tcpdump [185] and 
volatility [195] are a few examples9. Although tools such as Wireshark or tcpdump may have 
found their way into forensic investigations, it is interesting to note that they were not intended as 
forensic tools to examine and analyze digital evidence. Such tools are simply termed analysis 
tools. Sleuthkit and Pyflag excluded, many of the tools in the opensourceforensics website (refer 
to Footnote 9, p. 46) fall into this category, albeit for different sources. 
During evidence examination, not all data may be readily available if efforts were made to 
conceal or eliminate data. One may need to identify and extract evidence from deleted or partial 
data, and recover hidden or encrypted data. The techniques associated with these methods are 
                                                          
5
 This involves the process of obtaining data as it is represented in a digital evidence source, without having to 
manipulate or modify any information contained on that evidence source. 
6
 http://accessdata.com/products/computer-forensics/ftk 
7
 http://www.guidancesoftware.com/forensic.htm 
8
 http://www.sleuthkit.org/ 
9
 More forensic tools can be found at http://www2.opensourceforensics.org/tools. 
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known as data carving and steganography respectively. After extraction, all the data in evidence 
is indexed to enable querying and searching.  
2.2.3.1 Data Carving 
Occasionally, evidence examination uncovers the presence of deleted or partial file data that could 
help an investigation. The process of uncovering such data gave rise to the new field called data 
carving. Data carving is the process of identifying file types using a string of bytes, called magic 
numbers, from a memory image and matching them with a database of known magic numbers to 
recover deleted or partially deleted files [50]. The magic number is a constant binary stream used 
to identify a file format and is hence unique to each format. Carving is done on a disk when the 
unallocated file system space is analysed to extract files because data cannot be identified due to 
missing allocation information, or on network captures where files are “carved” from the dumped 
traffic using the same techniques. One drawback of this process on disks or images is that file-
carving tools typically produce many false positives [50]; hence tests must be done on each of the 
extracted files in order to check their consistency. A huge repository of such file types and headers 
are then incorporated into each forensic tool which then examines the section of data that need to 
be carved with the reference file signatures.  
Garfinkel proposed a technique for controlling the state space explosion when carving from AFF 
images [64]. Richard and Roussev [157] described a high performance file carver called Scalpel 
for carving files from hard disk images. 
2.2.3.2 Data Hiding and Steganography 
Evidence examination is often accompanied by discovery of new information from within digital 
evidence and this is called evidence discovery. One such evidence discovery technique is the 
discovery of steganographic content or hidden information. Steganography is the art and science 
of writing hidden messages in such a way that no one, apart from the sender and intended 
recipient, suspects the existence of the message. Digital steganography may include hiding 
information inside document files, image files, programs or protocols. Media files are ideal for 
steganographic transmission because of their large size. Hosmer and Hyde [86] discussed the 
challenges posed by steganography and proposed the saturation view technique to detect 
steganographic information from digital images. Lee et al [106] presented an approach for 
detecting image anomalies by combining computer graphics principles and AI reasoning. Image 
forgery has been classified into four categories, viz. deletion, insertion, photomontage and false 
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captioning. The approach segments a given image, computes the importance map on regions of 
importance and employs a rule based reasoning component to determine forgery status. 
Hargreaves et al. [82] described the Windows Vista format and examine the challenges it posed to 
forensics, while Park et al. [146] studied data concealment and detection in Microsoft Office 2007 
files. Pal et al. [145] proposed a file fragmentation testing method using sequential hypothesis 
testing on raw forensic images to determine all sectors of a disk image where a file may have been 
stored. 
2.2.3.3 Indexing and Querying Digital Evidence 
Alink et al. [3] proposed XIRAF, XML based indexing and retrieval of stored digital evidence for 
querying. The XIRAF architecture indexed into raw disk images storing them in annotated XML 
format. The XIRAF framework consists of three subsystems; the tool repository, the storage 
subsystem and the feature extraction manager. The feature extraction manager handles the various 
feature extraction tools and integrates their outputs into XML which are then stored in the storage 
subsystem. A query engine called XQuery was used to query into the XML database for evidence 
related information.  
In summary, over the years, researchers have devised new ways to examine digital evidence 
sources and discover potential sources of evidence using one or more forensic tools. However, it 
remains a largely manual and labour intensive process, and the growing volumes of digital 
evidence complicate this challenge. Garfinkel [67] noted that present-day forensic tools were 
designed to find new pieces of digital evidence but that the analysis continues to remain largely 
manual. There is a need to consolidate the research findings to provide a seamless transition from 
forensic examination to analysis, especially with multiple sources of digital evidence. 
2.2.4 Digital Forensic Analysis 
Digital forensic analysis involves the analysis of digital evidence (both direct and derived) using 
scientific methods to reconstruct the scenario or events. The solitary purpose of digital forensic 
analysis is the reconstruction of events by determining the answers for the six fundamental 
questions in an investigation. Studies of this nature have been carried out on different types of 
digital evidence, hard disks [26, 27, 64, 65], memory dumps [150, 167, 172, , ], the Microsoft 
Windows registry [54, , 116], log analysis [132] and time-lining from logs [90, 96, 111]. A 
generic approach to the event reconstruction problem involves the application of formal methods 
[76, 77, 91] while other techniques rely on file similarity matches in content [102, 115, 165].  
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2.2.4.1 Formal Methods for Event Reconstruction 
A formal study to determine possible reconstruction scenarios involves the analysis of cause-and-
effect sequences. In order to reconstruct the events, the digital artifacts from the evidence sources 
are sequenced using timestamps to set time windows within which the events could have 
occurred. Metadata are also utilized during analysis to determine who created or accessed the 
digital artifacts and how these were created or accessed. Gladyshev and Patel [77] proposed a 
finite state model approach for event reconstruction. However, they concluded that even a simple 
printer investigation problem has an exponential state space. Jeyaraman and Atallah [91] 
presented an empirical study of automatic reconstruction of events from logs in intrusion cases. 
Wang and Daniels [197] proposed an evidence graph approach to network forensic analysis and 
built a correlation graph using network packet captures. Garfinkel [65] studied forensic feature 
extraction using file carving across 750 hard disk images and determined cross drive correlation 
using personal identifiers such as email addresses, social security and telephone numbers. Case et 
al. [31] proposed the FACE framework for performing automatic correlations to determine static 
relations between network sockets in memory to TCP requests in packet captures. 
2.2.4.2 File Content Similarity Detection 
To identify similarities between different data files, Mead [115] explored unique file identification 
using hash signature mapping with NSRL database, and the Scientific Working Group on Digital 
Evidence (SWGDE) explored scope for digital evidence in Microsoft Windows operating systems 
[168, 169]. Garfinkel [65] developed a drive correlation technique to determine identical content 
across 750 secondary market hard disk drives. Kornblum [102] presented an approach for 
identifying similar files using piecewise hashing. Kornblum’s aim was to automate detection of 
visual similarity between two files based on similarity in hash signatures. The approach combines 
a rolling hash with the spamsum10 algorithm to compare the resultant signature and determine if 
any similarity exists. My research also explores the concept of similarity albeit using metadata 
matches leading to associations among digital artifacts. Roussev et al. [164] explored hash-based 
similarity to retain enough information to allow binary data to be queried for similarity without 
additional pre-processing/indexing. Thumbnail images can be classified according to the National 
Library of Australia guidelines [135] to distinguish thumbnail image files from an image 
collection. The guidelines contain directives that state that all digital image files which range 
                                                          
10
 http://samba.org/~tridge/junkcode/spamsum/README 
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under 160 pixels in height and/or width are to be treated as thumbnail icons. Identifying such 
image files during analysis would help an examiner to prune the thumbnail images. 
We illustrate the various developments in digital forensic research literature through the taxonomy 
in Figure 2.3. Digital forensic analysis emerged as a key area of focus [50] and my review 
establishes a need for cohesive analysis of digital evidence by grouping and conducting holistic 
analysis, possibly across heterogeneous sources. Technological diversity of digital evidence and 
the volume in terms of the number of sources involved in a digital investigation continue to push 
the frontiers of research in this area. Hitherto, classification and filtering have been the techniques 
that examiners have relied on in identifying relevant evidence during analysis. However, in order 
to further an investigation, grouping related events is needed, and to achieve this, we need to be 
able to group related digital artifacts and derive inferences from them. 
 
Figure 2.3 Taxonomy of digital forensic research literature 
  
Therefore, my research focuses on grouping event-related digital artifacts together by identifying 
associations between the digital artifacts found in forensic evidence. I identify these associations 
using metadata that is inherent to all sources of digital evidence. 
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2.3 Metadata … in and as … Digital Evidence 
Metadata contain information describing aspects pertaining to the digital objects or artifacts they 
are attributed to. Metadata provide context information that enables easy handling and 
management of the corresponding data or, in other words, for book-keeping purposes. There are 
many different types of metadata, such as system metadata, file system metadata, application 
metadata, document metadata, email metadata, business metadata, geographical metadata and 
many more. File system metadata describe attributes as recorded by a file system regarding the 
files, such as locations of files, MAC timestamps, file sizes, owners and access permissions. 
Application metadata describe attributes as recorded by the application handling the files such as 
file authors, file formats, content types, and encoding. Thus, the term metadata is an umbrella 
definition to encompass all such different types of metadata. According to the Sedona Principles 
for Addressing Electronic Document Production,  
“metadata includes information about the document or file that is recorded by the 
computer (or digital device) to assist in storing and retrieving the document or file. 
The information may also be useful for system administration as it reflects data 
regarding the generation, handling, transfer and storage of the document or file within 
the computer (or digital device).” [175, 176] 
Broadly, file system metadata and application metadata are also often referred to as external and 
embedded metadata [175] since file system metadata is stored external to the document or file it 
describes and application metadata is embedded into it.  
2.3.1 File Metadata 
Metadata, related to files, record the filename, location, file extension, size, MAC timestamps11, 
author (group), and word count, etc. Some metadata may also provide additional attributes such as 
content length, total edit time, line count, last saved and printed timestamp, author group, last 
author, creator, publisher, etc. Two important types of file metadata are file system metadata or 
metadata generated by the file system regarding that file, and application metadata or metadata 
generated by specific applications about the content stored on such files. 
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 MAC timestamps indicate when a file was created (C), when it was last modified (M) and when it was last accessed 
(A). 
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2.3.1.1 File System Metadata 
File system metadata record information that relates to the file system and helps it manage the file 
within that file system. Buchholz and Spafford [22] provide a qualitative treatment of file system 
metadata and their importance in digital forensics and briefly describe the different types of file 
system metadata found in different file systems. A comparison of some of the file system 
metadata across a few popular file systems is shown in Table 2.1. 
File 
System 
Stores 
File 
Owner 
POSIX file 
permissions 
Creation 
timestamp 
Last 
Access 
timestamp 
Last 
Modified 
timestamp 
Last 
metadata 
change 
timestamp 
Access 
Control 
lists 
Extended 
attributes 
FAT12 No No Yes Yes No No No No 
FAT16 No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
FAT32 No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
exFAT No No Yes Yes Yes Unknown No Unknown 
HPFS Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
NTFS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HFS No No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
HFS+ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EXT2 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EXT3 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EXT4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 2.1 Comparison of file system metadata across different file systems 
(adapted from Comparison of file system metadata, Wikipedia
12
) 
As Table 2.1 shows, the file system timestamps, i.e., the creation timestamp, the last modification 
timestamp and the last access timestamp are recorded by almost all file systems. Some file 
systems also record when the metadata was changed but this is not quite common. Some metadata 
like the file owner and access control are also recorded in some file systems which can come in 
handy during investigations. File systems that record access control lists are also used to record 
POSIX file permissions and extended attributes are recorded in all file systems introduced after 
FAT32. File system metadata has been critical in digital forensics and digital time-lining based on 
MAC timestamps is an integral part of a digital investigation [19, 22].  
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2.3.1.2 Application Metadata 
Application metadata is a blanket name given to information that various applications store 
regarding the files they operate on describing their attributes. The National Information Standards 
Organization (NISO) [137] categorized application metadata into 3 categories, viz., descriptive, 
structural and administrative metadata. Application metadata are strongly reliant on the types of 
files they describe, i.e., the application metadata for a text file differs significantly from that of a 
Microsoft Office document or a JPEG image file. NISO presented an overview of the different 
metadata structuring that are prevalent and describe the Dublin Core Metadata Initiative13 (DCMI) 
[20] which is an international standard (ISO 15836) since 2003. Microsoft Office documents have 
imbibed this specification into their documents which resulted in the OOXML metadata. 
2.3.2 Use of File Metadata in Digital Forensics 
Buchholz and Spafford [22] examined the role of file system metadata in digital investigations 
and noted that despite the lack of quality and quantity of information stored in file system 
metadata, it played a crucial role in reconstructing events. Willassen [200] designed a method to 
compare the MAC timestamps in file system metadata to produce ways of antedating. Buchholz 
and Tjaden [23] proposed a clock model for translating MAC timestamps to address clock drift. 
Chow et al. [46] presented a discussion on the rules governing MAC timestamps to arrive at a 
systematic understanding of NTFS timestamps in file system metadata and Koen and Olivier 
[100] used these rules to validate files based on timestamp behavior for copy or move actions. 
Agarwal et al. [1] presented a study summarizing the extent to which file system metadata has 
grown in FAT32 and NTFS file systems over a five year period from 2000 to 2004. According to 
the study, they found significant temporal trends relating to the popularity of certain file types, the 
origin of file content, the way the namespace is used, and the degree of variation among file 
systems in size and capacities.  
Alvarez [4] used EXIF metadata in digital photographs to verify the authenticity of a picture and 
determine whether or not it was altered. Kornblum [101] proposed a method to detect JPEG 
images that were processed by software based on analyzing the JPEG quantization tables. Huang 
and Fang [88] proposed a method that combines EXIF metadata with image error control codes to 
generate digital watermarks for copyright protection. Gloe and Bohme [78] described the Dresden 
Image dataset for benchmarking digital image forensics. The database aims to provide a uniform 
platform for researchers to test camera-based image forensic methods. It consists of over 8896 
digital photographs taken with over 73 camera models and stored as JPEGs. 
                                                          
13
 http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/ 
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Castiglione et al. [35] highlighted the information that can be obtained from the Microsoft 
Compound Document File Format (MCDFF) that can be relevant during digital investigations. 
They list some of the metadata in Microsoft documents that can potentially be useful in forensic 
investigations, most of which my own research incorporates for identifying metadata associations 
in word processing documents. Rowe and Garfinkel [165] developed a tool that used directory and 
file metadata to determine anomalous files on a large corpus. The tool used fiwalk [69] to traverse 
the corpus and compute statistical characteristics on the numerical metadata. The analysis 
generated multiple output files that were then analyzed to detect misnamed files and duplicate 
copies of files.  
2.3.3 Metadata for Grouping Files 
Boutell and Luo used EXIF metadata in digital photographs to classify camera types [17] and to 
perform scene classification [18]. Minack et al. [129] identified image-related metadata based 
searching as an effective solution for personal computers. In forensic investigations, examiners 
have to frequently deal with objects from personal computers and their work emphasizes the 
importance of metadata. Liu et al. [109] proposed a feature combination method to classify digital 
images that combined image content and EXIF metadata based on linear-discriminant-analysis 
(LDA) for digital photograph management.  
Bohm and Rakow [16] discussed the different aspects of classifying multimedia documents based 
on document metadata. Multimedia documents can be classified into six orthogonal categories, 
viz., representation of media type, content description, content classification, document 
composition, document history and document location. Fathi et al. [59] classified web documents 
based on author and title in document metadata and Toyama et al. [189] built a system that utilizes 
geographic information in location metadata (or geotags) to classify digital photographs with 
same location information. Denecke et al. [47] developed a classification method using 
bibliographic metadata such as author and document title. Maly et al. [113] proposed a method to 
classify documents based on layout metadata. Lerman et al. [110] described a method to label web 
services and classify them based on metadata from the web services definition file (WSDF).  
2.3.4 Extending Metadata to Logs and Network Packet Captures 
In the traditional sense, metadata are native to files that reside on file systems. However, log 
records and network packets also have some associated information that can be attributed the term 
‘metadata’. Although logs and network packet captures themselves reside as files in a file system, 
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the log entries and network packets they contain are discrete artifacts that correspond to specific 
events. For instance, an entry in the IE history log, index.dat, would correspond to visiting a web 
page characterized by a URI. The attributes describing such an entry contain the timestamp of 
web page visit, the domain, the host server IP address and so on. Similarly, an entry in a network 
packet capture corresponds to a network packet that was observed by the network capture sensor 
on a particular network belonging to a specific protocol containing a source and destination 
address. A network packet can be associated with a timestamp, source and destination IP 
addresses, and the protocol for transfer and payload size. Such information may be treated as 
metadata for a log record or a network packet, as the case may be. 
Metadata for Grouping Log events & Network Packets 
With regard to metadata in logs and network packet captures, timestamps are the most common 
metadata, used to generate timelines [19, 111, 199]. Often in network packet captures, the packets 
are organized according to the IP addresses and protocol in investigations involving network 
intrusion detection [202, 161]. Zander et al. [202] classified IP traffic based on statistical flow 
characteristics by filtering based on destination address and port. Roesch [161] introduced ‘snort’ 
intrusion detection tool that allows IP packets to be monitored and classified according to IP 
addresses. Jiang et al. [92] proposed a coloring scheme to identify a remotely accessible server or 
process to detect provenance aware self-propagating worm contaminations. This scheme 
associated a unique color as a system-wide identifier to each remote server or process and that is 
inherited by all spawned child processes. 
In summary, metadata in digital forensics is kept to authentication and determination of hidden 
information. Metadata based classification is used for the identification of file classes and 
timestamp based correlation is used to discover antedating activities by comparing the MAC 
timestamps on the file. Metadata, by virtue of recording the partial state of a digital artifact, 
contain information of forensic value [29]. During an investigation where it is necessary to 
discover all higher order associations that exist between the digital artifacts, metadata can be used 
for inferring such associations. In my research, I conduct a systematic analysis of metadata 
association to extract higher-order associations and relationships across heterogeneous sources 
and group the related digital artifacts. My model to identify associations using metadata across 
heterogeneous digital artifacts is presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
When I discuss metadata associations, it is essential to take cognizance of a particular type of 
metadata which is extensively used to derive event sequences from different sources, viz., 
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timestamps. A timestamp is the record of the time, according to some reference clock, of an 
associated event. Timestamps are an integral part of metadata associated with files, log records 
and network packets. 
2.4 Timestamps as Metadata and Digital Time-lining 
A timestamp has a physical realization and a temporal interpretation [55]. The physical realization 
is an encoding as a pattern of bits while the temporal interpretation stipulates the meaning of the 
bit pattern, the calendar date and time to which the pattern corresponds. Analysis of timestamps is 
the use of timestamps from digital evidence towards constructing a timeline of all events on a 
source of evidence and/or for reasoning with the sequence in which certain events are recorded on 
that source. Allen [2] discussed the different representations of timestamps adopted in the 
literature, including one where timestamps are logical timestamps only, merely a sequential 
numbering of events on a system. In this thesis, I adopt Dyreson and Snoddgrass’s definition of a 
timestamp [55] and regard timestamps as a record of calendar time associated with an event 
recorded on a digital device. The major challenges associated with the use of timestamps in digital 
forensics can be limited to three broad areas, timestamp semantics and interpretation, timestamps 
for causal ordering of events, and timestamp representation across different systems. I review the 
related work in these three areas in the sequel. 
2.4.1 Timestamp Semantics and Interpretation 
Timestamp semantics and its interpretation are acknowledged as complex and challenging tasks 
[19, 23, 171, 199]. Weil [199] presented a method for correlating times and dates contained in 
application metadata to the file system’s timestamps. The method attempts to standardize the 
apparent file MAC times to the actual time and concluded that increasing the number of 
independent sources enhances the reliability of the data and minimizes CMOS limitations. Boyd 
and Forster [19] described the timestamp interpretation challenges associated with Microsoft’s 
Internet Explorer web browser and time zone translations between UTC and local time. In their 
paper, Boyd and Forster described a case study where examiners were wrongly accused of 
tampering with computer evidence based on misinterpreted timestamps.  
When discussing the analysis of timestamps, it is important to acknowledge that not all system 
clocks are always accurate. Since system clocks are based on a low frequency CMOS transistor, 
the clock drifts over several charging and discharging cycles and a 1 second count no longer 
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remains at exactly 1 second. This can lead to two problems: clock drift and clock skew. Clock drift 
is when the system time continues to drift at an undetermined rate out-of-synchronization from a 
reference clock, due to the clock “ticking” either too quickly or slowly. Clock skew is the 
cumulative effect of clock drift at a singular instance in time, which results in the clock being 
offset from the reference time. Schatz et al. [171] and Buchholz and Tjaden [23] conducted 
independent studies on clock skew and clock drift to determine exact time from recorded system 
events. The conclusions from these works indicate that system clocks lose time non-linearly and 
no single, simple model can be applied to correct this. Clock skew and drift are beyond the scope 
of this thesis and will not be discussed further. 
2.4.2 Causal Ordering of Events 
Lamport [105] characterized causality in distributed systems as a “happened before” function on 
events (called the clock consistency condition) and a presented a framework for reasoning about 
partial event ordering in distributed systems. Gladyshev and Patel [76] formulated the event time-
bounding problem and proposed the sandwich algorithm for solving it when the causal order is 
known. The algorithm attempts to time bound an event between the smallest interval defined by 
predicate T
B
min ≤ timestampevent ≤ T
B
max when the event’s causal relationship is known with 
respect to other events whose timestamps are available. Willassen [200] proposed a similar 
method using hypothesis based testing on timestamps to detect antedating. 
Stevens [184] proposed the unification of timestamps from different sources by accounting for 
factors affecting the behavior of system clocks with respect to a global clock. He proposed a 
global clock model to account for clock drift and skew and simulate the behaviour of each 
independent clock. The clock models were used to remove the predicted clock errors from 
timestamps to obtain a realistic indication of the actual time at which the corresponding events 
occurred. All the timestamps from different sources can then be unified using this global clock 
model into a single time-line. In order to be able to unify all the digital events, two sets of 
information are required. Firstly, one needs to identify all the different clocks that were used and 
which time stamps were produced by each clock. Secondly, one needs to know the complete 
behaviour of each clock over the relevant time period. It is also necessary to have a full 
understanding of how time stamps are generated and their semantics. 
Stevens’ work identified the need for a global reference and addressed the problem of clock skew 
in unifying timestamps. Although Stevens’ model assumes a global reference for the timestamps, 
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the locality of timestamps is often lost if the design does not retain time zone information. Stevens 
validated the model on NTFS timestamps; however it is not readily applicable to the FAT32 file 
system or even ZIP file formats which do not record time zone information. 
2.4.3 Timestamp Representation Across Systems 
Microsoft [120, 121, 123, 124] documented the fact that the FAT and NTFS file systems have 
different time-references. Further, FAT file systems only record timestamps to the even second 
[120] while NTFS systems record up to nanosecond intervals. Consequently, when a file is copied 
across file systems, its timestamps undergo some changes [126, 127]. Koen and Olivier [100] 
discussed the information deficiency problem and the use of file timestamps from a UNIX file 
system in digital forensics. Chow et al. [46] proposed a method for systematic evaluation of 
timestamp behavior on the NTFS file system.  
One of the challenges in using timestamps is their interpretation owing to varied semantics across 
different representations. For instance, timestamps are allocated 4 bytes on the FAT32 file system, 
2 bytes each for DATE and TIME [201]. On other FAT file systems, such as FAT12 and FAT16, 
fewer bytes are allocated and hence, time is less precisely represented. On NTFS file systems, 
timestamps are represented as 64-bit values. In UNIX, timestamps were represented as 32-bit 
values but have recently been changed to 64-bit values in LINUX based systems.  
When files from these file systems are archived into one of the many archiving formats, these 
formats dictate which timestamps get carried forward. For instance, the ZIP file format, which is a 
popular archiving format, stores timestamps as 2 + 2 bytes for DATE and TIME [96]. When 
multiple timestamps are recorded on a file system, such as creation, modification and last-access, 
the ZIP format only carries forward the modification timestamp forward dropping the remaining 
timestamps. As a result, timestamp precision often suffers, for example, when files from NTFS 
are transferred to FAT32 [126]. 
These diverse timestamps representations can have a significant bearing on the semantics and 
interpretation of their values which in turn will affect their sequencing to generate a causal 
ordering. This can often result in ambiguous or inconsistent timelines, particularly across 
heterogeneous sources of digital evidence. To address this problem, my work develops a 
provenance model to provide uniform interpretation across heterogeneous systems and develop a 
unified timeline during analysis. My model is presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed the process of digital forensics and discussed related research and how 
the literature classifies the field into four main categories: digital forensic process modeling; 
evidence acquisition and representation; evidence examination and discovery; and digital forensic 
analysis. I discussed each of the categories highlighting relevant contributions and interesting 
challenges.  
Based on my study of literature, I identified the following as the gap in technology that motivated 
my research: 
1. There is general lack of cohesiveness in the use of forensic and analysis tools in the face of 
the heterogeneous nature and the growing volumes of digital evidence. This motivated my 
research on objective one stated in Chapter 1. 
2. The results from the analysis of one or more tools do not yet lend to integrated analysis 
requiring significant manual effort to establish corroboration. It requires the identification 
of associations in digital evidence and grouping the associated elements in a manner that is 
forensically productive. This motivated my research on objectives two and three stated in 
Chapter 1. 
3. The heterogeneity of digital evidence has significantly challenged the ability to generate 
unified timelines across multiple sources, often leading to ambiguous or inconsistent 
timelines. This motivated my research on objectives one and two stated in Chapter 1. 
From my review, I elicit that metadata are an important part of digital artifacts and they lend a 
valuable hand during forensic investigations. The literature tells us that classification and filtering 
are two methods used to understand yet unknown data where the grouping can yield a 
determination of patterns based on value matches. However, in regard to forensics, it is necessary 
to discover and examine other higher level associations to answer the questions pertaining to an 
investigation. This necessitates the identification of all associations between the digital artifacts 
leading to the discovery of relationships and sequencing. While filtering and classification are 
single-stream, or single parameter based, metadata, which can be treated as sets of name-value 
pairs, they can provide the dynamics that I desire. Identifying metadata value matches and 
similarities can result in metadata associations that can inform us of the existence of such higher-
order associations leading to the discovery of relationships in digital evidence.  
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Encouraged by this common thread, in my research I focused on developing a metadata 
association model based on matching metadata values across digital artifacts that result in 
association based aggregation. To investigate the implications of this approach, I apply my 
approach to analyzing two types of files, commonly examined during investigations, and study the 
relationships that emerge on multiple collections of digital images and word processing 
documents. The following chapter outlines the research method adopted in this thesis. 
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“You know my method. It is founded upon the observation 
of trifles.” 
- Sherlock Holmes 
 
 
 
3. Research Method 
In this chapter, I describe the research method adopted in this thesis to achieve the research 
objectives set out in Chapter 1. My research objectives focus on the development of a model to 
identify association among digital artifacts from heterogeneous sources to elicit the higher-order 
relationships that may exist among them, via the metadata value matches.  
3.1 Research Methodology 
The overall approach to my research was to adopt the iterative method [49, 61] outlined in 
Section 1.5. The very first step in the first iteration of this method was the definition of the 
research problem, i.e., identification of metadata based associations and unconstrained 
combinations of metadata in digital artifacts from heterogeneous sources of digital evidence. The 
second step was the identification of sub-goals or specific research objectives which arise out of 
the research objectives stated in Section 1.4. Excepting the first research objective, which 
involved a survey of contemporary forensic and analysis tools and their treatment of metadata, the 
other two research objectives were achieved by applying the iterative method using a grounded 
theory approach [188], wherein I develop the model for identifying metadata associations from 
heterogeneous digital artifacts based on empirical data. Each research objective was broken down 
into multiple research tasks with well-defined goals. The completion of all the goals associated 
with each objective led to the successful completion of the overall objective. This strategy is 
shown in Figure 3.1, as an instantiation of the general research method presented in Figure 1.4. 
62 
 
 
Figure 3.1 How my large research problem was broken down into smaller research objectives, each dealt with 
in sub-iterations 
Thesis goal: Develop a metadata based association model to 
identify associations inherent in digital evidence
Identify multiple research objectives 
to achieve the Thesis goal
Terminate
STEP 3: Identify metadata 
matches on the dataset
STEP 4: Develop/Refine a 
grounded model
STEP 5: Validate the model for 
accuracy
STEP 6: Is it 
satisfactory?
NO
NO
STEP 1: Define the metadata 
association objective
STEP 6: Is it 
satisfactory?
STEP 3: Group metadata 
matches from the dataset
STEP 4: Develop/Refine a 
grounded model
STEP 5: Validate the model for 
accuracy
YES
YES
STEP 1: Define the artifact 
grouping objective
STEP 2: Identify a dataset
STEP 2: Identify a dataset
Integrate the solutions
Second objective
Elicit relationships
Single metadata 
name-value match
Third objective
Use relationships from 
association groups
Group multiple metadata 
name-value pairs
STEP 6: Is the overall 
solution satisfactory?
YES
NO
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The first research objective involved an understanding of contemporary forensic and analysis 
tools in their treatment of metadata from digital evidence. It is common knowledge that file 
system metadata is extracted from forensic images of hard disk drives to validate the files and 
timeline the activities on that source of digital evidence [19, 22]. However, it was necessary to 
understand how the availability of other types of metadata, particularly the application metadata, 
can be used. Beside files, logs and network packet captures also contain attributes that provide 
valuable book-keeping information regarding a log record or a network packet, like timestamps, 
which are useful during analysis. It was necessary to identify the specific support extended by 
present-day tools in this regard. Besides, it was also necessary to gain an understanding regarding 
the functionalities of the forensic and analysis tools in regard to grouping the files. These 
requirements motivated us to use a survey method in undertaking this objective. I developed a 
hypothesis based survey; each hypothesis was tested in order to draw conclusions on the 
functionalities of the tools identified.  
To define a metadata based association between two or more digital artifacts, I needed to take 
cognizance of the existing types of associations exhibited by digital artifacts. To develop this 
understanding, it was essential that I used those digital artifacts which contained a wide variety of 
metadata, which can be built into my model. In that regard, I identified files as the common 
ground for developing this model since files are well-understood in the literature [26] and contain 
metadata which can be directly attributed to forensic contexts [22]. Figure 3.2 illustrates the 
various stages in my research method. 
 
Figure 3.2 The research method applied in my research 
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Digital forensics, as a field largely built on explaining the nature of stored digital data and 
reconstructing the past, is founded in a grounded theory. Kesseler [98a] argued for the need to 
develop grounded approaches to interpreting digital evidence. Jeyaraman & Atallah [91], Arasteh 
et al. [7] and Wang & Daniels [197] have also used grounded theory to reconstruct event 
sequences from logs and network packet traces. Besides this, the nature of forensic analysis can be 
qualitative [39, 32] which justifies the use of inductive argumentation to develop techniques that 
suit this cause [186]. As a result, I adopted the grounded theory [188] approach to identify 
existing associations and develop an association model that explained the observed associations. I 
outline the nature of the research objectives in regards to the methodology and identify the 
research tasks in the sequel. 
3.2 Identifying the Research tasks for the Objectives 
We have outlined the three major research objectives for this thesis in Chapter 1. my first research 
objective was to develop an understanding of the treatment of metadata in the digital artifacts and 
the grouping techniques used by contemporary forensic and analysis tools across heterogeneous 
sources of digital evidence. The nature of the task required a survey of existing forensic toolkits 
and architectures for handling different sources of digital evidence and access the metadata from 
their digital artifacts. I adopted a survey method and it involved the following research tasks: 
a. Identify a list of contemporary forensic toolkits, forensic examination tools and 
artifact analysis tools for the commonly occurring sources of digital evidence. 
b. Identify the methods used by the selected tools for extracting digital artifact 
metadata. 
c. Identify the methods used by the tools for grouping the digital artifacts based on 
the extracted metadata for the purpose of analysis. 
d. Determine if the tools can be configured to use multiple metadata for grouping the 
digital artifacts. If so, how? If so, is the configuration programmable? 
e. Develop generic abstractions for the functionalities of the tools in handling 
different sources of evidence at (i) binary data level; (ii) digital artifact abstraction 
level; (iii) metadata abstraction level; and (iv) digital artifact grouping level. 
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f. Develop a functional architecture based on these abstractions to integrate these 
tools. 
The nature of these research tasks was sequential that required one or more hypothesis based tests. 
Each chosen forensic or analysis tool was subjected to these tests using a test image identified for 
this task (refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.1). My research tested the tools using raw and logical 
forensic images, web browser log files and network packet captures. My hypotheses were 
predominantly binary in nature requiring answers of the type YES/NO, but often delving deeper 
using the same approach when a YES was determined. When a NO was determined, I proceeded 
to the next criterion or tool, as the case indicated. This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
To achieve my second research objective of developing an understanding for a metadata 
association between any two digital artifacts, it was necessary to distinguish the different types of 
associations that can exist depending on the artifacts involved. Between two digital artifacts, we 
may find 
a. a value match on corresponding metadata; and 
b. the semantics of the metadata as interpreted for digital artifacts that are deemed to 
be associated based on a metadata value match. 
In order to develop this understanding further, I identified metadata value matches between two 
digital artifacts to ascertain the existence of higher-order associations relevant to an investigation 
(refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.4). I adopted a grounded approach to develop a solution and 
evaluate the nature of syntactic metadata associations between files on a file system. To this end, I 
identified two kinds of file types, viz., digital image files and word processing files, for 
conducting my experiments. These file types, in addition to containing a variety of metadata, are 
frequently encountered by forensic examiners during investigations. My approach to achieve the 
second objective involved the following research tasks: 
a. Identify a dataset on the file types of choice and identify all metadata value 
matches between the files. 
b. Develop a grounded model for syntactic metadata associations based on the 
matches identified for the files. 
c. Evaluate the model on a different dataset and measure its accuracy. 
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d. Identify and define a set of metadata equivalences between files, logs and network 
packets. 
e. Develop a case study to justify the identification of metadata associations between 
files, logs and network packets. 
f. Develop a grounded model for semantic metadata associations based on the 
matches identified for the digital artifacts. 
g. Evaluate the model on a different dataset and measure its accuracy. 
h. Refine the models (repeat steps b-g) until the accuracy is at the required level. 
i. Develop a formal representation for metadata associations based on the models 
developed for any two digital artifacts.  
j. Evaluate the satisfaction criteria. If unsuccessful, identify the deviation and iterate 
to Step b and refine the model. 
The nature of these research tasks was experimental and iterative. I identified metadata based 
matches, maintaining matches as the criterion for association between files, and grouped the files 
containing identical values for each metadata separately. Based on the groupings so formed, I 
developed a model to represent the associations among grouped files across different file types. I 
undertook similar approaches for log files and network packet captures as well and then integrated 
the models so generated in each case at the end of my experiments.  
To achieve my third objective of grouping the associations using the digital artifacts, it was 
necessary to understand the requirements of forensic analysis. From its definition, digital forensics 
is the application of scientific methods to reconstruct the past. This activity involves discovering 
answers to questions that pertain to the creation, existence, modification and access of the digital 
artifacts in digital evidence. These questions can be succinctly listed as who, what, when, where, 
how and why [32]. In my experiments, this grouping based on metadata was used to find answers 
to the six forensic questions. For instance, questions pertaining to “the when” in digital evidence 
can be answered by grouping the artifacts based on value matches of those metadata that relate to 
timestamps. Therefore, achieving this objective involved achieving the following research tasks: 
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a. Identify the categories of metadata relevant to a digital forensics investigation, 
taken from the six forensic questions.  
b. Organize the metadata chosen in step (a), as belonging to ‘source’, ‘ownership’, 
‘timestamps’ and ‘structural application metadata’. 
c. Group the artifacts from a given source according to the metadata value matches. 
The nature of these research tasks was experimental and iterative. Using the same dataset, I 
identified metadata associations using value matches. To eliminate repetition of files, I grouped 
the associated files on metadata (refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.4). I examined each group and 
mapped the associations in order to answer the forensic questions mentioned earlier. Based on this 
examination, I derived an algorithm which can be applied to files in my datasets. Then I validated 
against a different dataset to determine if the same questions can be answered. In situations where 
there were differences, I learnt from them and modified the algorithm. I applied my grouping 
strategies initially on files that I used as the dataset for the second objective and extended it to 
group the digital artifacts belonging to logs and network packet trace. The experiments were 
conducted for two reasons: firstly, to determine the categorization of metadata with regard to the 
forensic context as defined by the six forensic questions [32] and secondly, to evaluate my 
algorithm against a different dataset. 
3.3 Evolution of a Metadata based Model 
We adopted the scientific method [49, 50, 61, 186] and identified specific problems, where further 
research was required. I evolved this method by priming it with a solution based on preliminary 
studies (grounded research). In my work, I used metadata matches to generate associations 
between files and built an association model, which was experimentally tested on multiple 
datasets. I evaluated the success of the model by identifying the number of outliers (digital 
artifacts that should have been associated with other artifacts but were not associated) and refined 
the model to accurately represent the associations in the dataset.  
Our research was completely driven by metadata, i.e., entirely depended on the availability of 
metadata in the digital artifacts that relate to the forensic questions to illustrate metadata matches 
which lead to metadata associations. Naturally, I required digital artifacts of the type that exhibit 
such characteristics wherein the metadata not only stores basic book-keeping information, but also 
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attributes which can help reveal information regarding its source, ownership and authorship, date 
and timestamps, content type, size and other attributes.  
While there are many forensic disk images to conduct such tests, most datasets dispense with the 
creation of file metadata as it is not used by contemporary forensic tools (refer to Chapter 4). As a 
result, these datasets provide only file system metadata where the scope for developing 
associations is limited. Existing datasets provide limited sets of associations particularly as they 
focus purely on file system metadata. This includes the datasets available from Digital Forensics 
Tool Testing Images
14
 (DFTT), Computer Forensic Reference Data Sets
15
 (CFReDS), Digital 
Corpora disk images
16
, ForensicKB
17
, The Honeynet project
18
, and so on. As a result, these 
datasets could not be readily used in my experiments to evaluate my model. 
In the presence of additional metadata, the nature of associations can potentially provide insights 
into a user’s activities discerned using the artifact relationships defined in this work. Incorporating 
such metadata into the existing datasets was found to trivialize the problem and did not suit my 
purpose either. As a result, I selected public data sources that provide such metadata and 
composed five datasets without modifying the data or the metadata to evaluate my metadata 
association model. 
Since I required datasets which exhibit file system metadata as well as application metadata, 
which together can sufficiently represent the attributes of a file, I therefore developed a custom 
dataset based on files and used both file system metadata and application metadata in my 
evaluation. In order to evaluate the quality of the dataset, I designed a distance metric to quantify 
the effectiveness of the metadata associations using all the metadata that pertain to the four classes 
of source, ownership, timestamps and application and determined metadata value matches to 
establish associations. This distance metric is introduced in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
With regard to using file based datasets, I needed to understand the type of metadata that already 
exists in files and identify the subset of metadata that stores information pertaining to the source, 
ownership and authorship, date and timestamps, etc. Since my classification of the metadata was 
generic, it was sufficient to use a readily available dataset for this purpose. Any common 
workstation and personal computer together can be used provided they contained several files of 
                                                          
14
 http://dftt.sourceforge.net/ 
15
 http://cfreds.nist.gov/ 
16
 http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/disk-images 
17
 http://www.forensickb.com/ 
18
 http://www.honeynet.org/challenges 
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each application type. Since the purpose of this study was to identify the subset of metadata that 
were relevant to forensic analysis, the metadata present in the files needed to be exhaustive and 
not the file contents themselves. Naturally, I identified such a dataset on which the grounded study 
was conducted.  
In addition to file based datasets, to illustrate heterogeneity in data type, I required sources of 
evidence which recorded event attributes that can correlate activities on files. Log files readily 
exhibit these characteristics and their attributes can be mapped to many metadata in files. While 
there are many different types of log files, I decided to exploit web browser attributes. Activities 
such as web logins, checking web based emails, and uploading/downloading files to/from the 
Internet generate browser log records which are described by their attributes. To corroborate 
networking related events on browser logs, I acquired network traces which provide source and 
destination IP addresses among other attributes. 
The nature of evaluation for metadata associations required that the datasets across sources can be 
related in an obvious manner so that extraction of these relationships from the metadata 
associations is straightforward. Most datasets in the literature have focused on digital artifacts of a 
specific type whereas I had to develop related activity logs on other kinds of sources. Besides this, 
as discussed earlier, files from existing datasets dispense with application metadata, thereby 
providing a restricted set of metadata to derive associations from. As a result, I used custom 
datasets and constructed browsing scenarios using case studies that included files, browser logs 
and network packet traces. The nature of the case studies included typical usage patterns that 
linked files with browser logs and network packet traces. 
3.4 Experimental Evaluation of Model Prototype 
This section presents my experimentation process and an overview of the environment. Besides, 
this section also outlines the criteria considered for conducting a successful experiment for 
evolving my research method and developing my prototype toolkit. 
3.4.1 Experimentation Environment 
Our experiments were conducted by selectively imaging file systems on workstations and 
isolating the relevant logs. A prototype implementation in software was used to validate my 
contributions. The software was multi-threaded and a separate thread was spawned to traverse a 
particular source of digital evidence. The log files and network packet captures were exported into 
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XML before it was analyzed using the prototype. The workstations I used had 2 hard disk 
partitions totaling 23.2 GB on the workstation used for constructed scenarios and 77.2 GB on the 
workstation with normal activity. Both computers were operating under Microsoft Windows 7 
with Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox web browsers and common Microsoft Office 
applications installed. In addition, several documents belonging to these applications, and audio 
and video files were stored on the hard disks of each workstation. 
3.4.2 Experimentation Criteria 
Before an experiment was conducted, my success criteria were defined by the specific research 
objective being tested for evaluation. If these criteria were not satisfied by the outcome of the 
experiment, then the experiment was repeated after revisiting the implementation. The basic 
criteria to be satisfied for an experiment to be regarded successful are listed below: 
1. Were all the digital artifacts and their metadata accounted for? 
2. Did the prototype software generate metadata associations on the provided 
sources? 
3. Did each association group contain all the digital artifacts it was expected to 
contain? 
The expected answer to Criterion 1 is yes. If the prototype software was unable to generate the 
metadata associations on the given input, an investigation was conducted with the experimental 
setup to assess what went wrong in the implementation or the experiment itself. The most 
common error that was discovered was the prototype software running into a never-ending or 
infinite loop while trying to extract metadata and appropriate exit clauses had to be incorporated 
for such cases. 
The expected answer for Criterion 2 is yes. To satisfy Criterion 2, I identified the actual digital 
artifacts contained in the sources provided as input to the experiment and enumerated the 
metadata and their values. This list was then compared against the output generated to determine 
the satisfaction status. If there were discrepancies, then the criterion could not be satisfied. The 
most common error that was discovered was the prototype software running into a never-ending 
or infinite loop while trying to extract metadata and appropriate exit clauses had to be 
incorporated for such cases. 
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The expected answer for Criterion 3 is yes, if the results generated by my prototype software did 
contain all the digital artifacts, enumerated as earlier. If there were discrepancies, the absence of 
the artifacts had to be explained. The most common programming error that resulted in such 
absences was insufficient rules to account for metadata equivalences across digital artifacts of 
heterogeneous types. This error is rectified by incorporating these metadata equivalences as rules 
for generating association groups in the prototype software code which was addressed in the 
subsequent iteration of the design before re-experimentation. If the subsequent re-experimentation 
then yielded the expected results, then this criterion is deemed to have been satisfied. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
For a given (forensic) context, my methodology was applied to develop a design for experiments 
which outline experimental procedures. In my case, the experimental procedure applied the 
associations through metadata to determine related artifacts from multiple sources of digital 
evidence. The true nature of the associations (that were determined using my software) were 
ascertained using the specific metadata matches which help in revealing the digital artifact 
relationships that are latent in digital evidence. Extracting such latent relationships can benefit in 
the consolidation of multiple and possibly heterogeneous sources. Through the process of 
consolidation that is achieved through grouping the related artifacts, I also achieve a reduction in 
the volume of digital evidence. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Applying my methodology to derive digital artifact relations using metadata associations 
  
In this chapter, I presented my research methodology used to achieve the research objectives set 
out in Chapter 1. I analyzed the nature of these research objectives and identified a set of research 
tasks for each objective. I presented my approach to achieving these research objectives and 
highlighted its relevance to this thesis. I also presented an overview of the evaluation methods that 
I have adopted in this thesis to evaluate my contributions.  
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In the following chapter, I present my framework to identify associations among heterogeneous 
sources of digital evidence using metadata and develop the metadata association model. 
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"The world is full of obvious things which nobody by any 
chance ever observes. You see, but you do not observe. The 
distinction is clear."   
- Sherlock Holmes 
 
 
 
4. Determining 
Metadata based 
Associations in 
Digital Evidence 
In this chapter I develop a new framework for identifying associations in digital evidence based 
on metadata. While there have been several forensic tools produced to examine digital evidence, 
the heterogeneous nature of the sources of digital evidence have significantly compartmentalized 
the use of such tools in analysis, as identified in Chapter 2. There is a general need for integrating 
the complementary functionalities of the tools used in this regard; to this end, I develop the 
functional Forensic Integration Architecture (f-FIA) and introduce a new layer to integrate the 
examination of heterogeneous sources of digital evidence and determine associations in digital 
evidence based on metadata. I develop this framework by abstracting the functionalities supported 
by existing tools and identifying new functionalities to integrate the examination of heterogeneous 
sources through a hypothesis based review (presented as an experiment in Section 4.1). In 
addition, I develop the metadata association model (MAM) grounded in metadata matches for 
identifying associations across digital artifacts both within and across sources of digital evidence 
and grouping them for analysis. I present a review of current forensic and analysis tools to 
examine digital evidence in the sequel. 
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4.1 Review of Contemporary Forensic & Analysis Tools 
The goal of this review is to gain an understanding of the functionalities provided by existing 
tools for examining and analyzing digital evidence. In general, there are two classes of tools used 
to examine digital evidence, forensic tools and analysis tools. The two classes are discussed in the 
sequel. 
4.1.1 Forensic Tools 
All forensic tools take a forensic image of a data source such as a hard disk drive or a memory 
dump as input and provide binary abstractions of the raw data. This allows the entire source to be 
read as a binary stream of data. In my work, I refer to this functionality as the binary abstraction. 
The tools also distinguish the different files and their application formats on the file systems using 
standard file signatures [26]. A notable feature of this technology is the development of the known 
file filter (KFF) to omit system files during evidence examination. I refer to the functionality of 
recognizing files and automatically associating them with their application in order to help parse 
the file as file system support. These two functionalities address the complexity problem in digital 
evidence [27].  
There are several software forensic tools both in the commercial and open domains. The 
commonly used forensic toolkits for analyzing file systems are Encase, FTK, X-Ways, Nuix, 
TCT, Sleuthkit, DFF, OCFA, Snorkel and LibForensics. Of these, Encase
19
, FTK
20
 and X-Ways
21
 
are commercial toolkits while TCT, Sleuthkit [25], DFF, OCFA, Snorkel and LibForensics are in 
the open domain
22
. Among these tools, most commercial varieties also support the examination of 
memory dumps and mobile device flash memories. 
The tools extract file system metadata associated with each file including the location of the file, 
MAC timestamps, file ownership, file size and so on. Typically forensic tools do not rely on 
application metadata and consequently do not extract or parse them. To provide that functionality, 
one may resort to a special set of tools called analysis tools. 
                                                          
19
 http://www.guidancesoftware.com/encase-forensic.htm 
20
 http://www.accessdata.com/products/digital-forensics/ftk#.UeTux6q6aM8 
21
 http://www.x-ways.net/forensics/index-m.html 
22
 http://www2.opensourceforensics.org/tools 
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4.1.2 Analysis Tools 
An analysis tool directly accesses a data source such as a log file or a packet capture and parses its 
contents as independent records while guaranteeing read-only access. Each record may contain 
several attributes which are parsed for analysis. This functionality can also be broadly classified 
under schema support, as part of the file system support layer. I term the ability to parse or extract 
metadata, including file system metadata, application metadata and all related attributes of an 
artifact in a non-intrusive manner as metadata parsing. 
There are a wide range of analysis tools for examining files, memory dumps, log files and 
network packet captures. Some examples of such tools are Volatility for memory dumps, PyFlag23 
for log files and network packet captures, GrokEvt, libevt and Event Log Parser for Windows 
event logs, AWStats for web browser logs, RegRipper, python-registry, Forensic Registry EDitor 
and Win32Registry for Windows Registry and Wireshark and tcpstat for network packet captures. 
Log analyzers such as PyFlag, GrokEvt, libevt, and Event Log Parser parse the respective logs 
and their attributes. Typically, the attributes in such logs contain an event description, username 
associated with the event, event timestamp and so on. Wireshark and tcpstat parse corresponding 
attributes from network packet captures. Network packet attributes can include a packet sequence 
number, the protocol for communication, source and destination IP addresses, hosts’ MAC 
addresses, hosts’ operating systems and browser applications, and so on. Keyword based 
searching and filtering is used to conduct the actual analysis. 
Based on this understanding of the two classes of tools, I conducted a review of such tools to 
develop an understanding of the support extended by contemporary forensic and analysis tools to 
examine multiple sources of digital evidence. This review is based on the hypothesis testing 
method developed by NIST [140, 141]. 
4.1.3 Hypothesis Based Review 
Our approach to reviewing forensic and analysis tools was grounded on hypothesis testing. 
According to NIST [140], a forensic tool addresses one or more gaps in technology. Therefore, 
each technology solution is posed as a hypothesis which is then validated by conducting suitable 
experiments. In my review, the hypotheses concerning the capabilities of the different tools are as 
follows.  
                                                          
23
 It is notable that PyFlag has since integrated Sleuthkit and Volatility and in that way allows the examination of 
forensic disk images and the analysis of memory dumps. 
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1. If a source of digital evidence is provided as input, the tool will successfully load the 
source; 
2. If a source of digital evidence can be successfully loaded, the tool can read binary data 
from the source; 
3. If a source of digital evidence can be successfully loaded, the tool can interpret binary data 
on the source; 
4. If the tool can interpret binary data from a source of digital evidence, the tool can 
recognize different file systems on the source; 
5. If the tool can recognize all the file systems on a source of digital evidence, the tool can 
identify the individual digital artifacts on a source of digital evidence; 
6. If the tool can identify all the digital artifacts on a file system on a source of digital 
evidence, the tool can extract/parse the metadata from the individual digital artifacts; 
7. If the tool can extract and/or parse metadata from the individual digital artifacts that reside 
on a source of digital evidence, the tool can combine/group multiple digital artifacts based 
on metadata; 
8. If the tool can extract and/or parse metadata from the individual digital artifacts that reside 
on a source of digital evidence, the tool can combine/group multiple digital artifacts using 
metadata in an unconstrained manner; or 
9. If the tool can extract and/or parse metadata from the individual digital artifacts that reside 
on a source of digital evidence, the tool can interpret the semantics of the metadata linked 
to a digital artifact. 
In order to test each tool’s ability to satisfy these hypotheses, I conducted the following 
experiment, which was applied to each forensic or analysis tool in turn. I created a forensic (raw) 
image of a volume partition containing a FAT32 file system and an NTFS file system. The file 
system contained several files created to mimic regular user behavior on a workstation PC that 
contained different word processing files (Microsoft Word documents, MS PowerPoint, MS 
Excel, Rich Text Format files, Adobe PDF files, Text files, and digital images). The files 
contained both file system and application metadata and recorded events related to activity on the 
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files. The files mainly contained blank content or random text that weren’t intended for use during 
the experiment. I also created a Windows XP SP2 raw memory dump, a browser history log from 
a web login session, and a network packet capture from the web login session on the same system 
used to create the files. My experiment involved the following tasks, each of which corresponds to 
one of the hypotheses above: 
1. Load the source files on a tool; check completion status for each source. 
2. Read the first X and last X bytes of the image and print them to the user interface. 
3. Redisplay the displayed bytes in hexadecimal and printable text formats. 
4. Identify and list the file systems on the image. 
5. Identify and list all the digital artifacts on the image. Digital artifacts correspond to: 
a. files on a file system; 
b. process control blocks on memory dumps; 
c. log records on a log file; and 
d. network packets on packet captures. 
6. On each digital artifact, parse/extract metadata from the system as well as the application. 
This corresponds to: 
a. File system and application metadata on files; 
b. Operating system memory maps and process attributes on memory dumps; 
c. File system metadata of the log file and log record attributes on log files; and 
d. File system metadata of the packet capture and network packet attributes on 
network packet captures. 
7. Identify methods to group two or more artifacts on the image using metadata using the tool 
being assessed, if possible. 
78 
 
8. Identify combinations of metadata that are supported by the tool to group two or more 
artifacts, if possible. 
9. Modify a selected file’s metadata and replace the values for Author with the number 
788755 and file size with the string “Jeffrey”. Recreate the forensic image with the new 
file and load it into the tool. Now extract the metadata and note observations. 
Since each of these tasks related to a specific hypothesis, their success corresponded to accepting 
the proposed hypothesis, and a failure corresponded to rejecting the hypothesis. For instance, if a 
tool was able to read and print the content, it supported binary data. In addition if the tool was also 
able to translate the content into hexadecimal and text, it supported interpretation. Listing the file 
system was applicable only to the forensic disk image, while on the other sources, success was 
implied by listing the digital artifacts (log records or network packets) on the source. For each 
digital artifact that was successfully traversed, the metadata was parsed for extraction.  
In the literature, keyword filtering and classification are the most common methods to group 
artifacts on a data source. To evaluate the existing tools I conducted filtering using metadata both 
explicitly and implicitly; for the explicit method, I used the values assumed by the metadata as 
specific keywords and for the implicit method, I used the metadata label to conduct searches. I 
conducted multiple sequences of grouping and regroupings to determine which combinations of 
metadata were permitted by each tool. In regard to metadata semantics, if a tool flagged an error 
for replacing expected values on the metadata, then I interpreted the outcome as yes to Hypothesis 
9. On the other hand, if the tool did not raise a flag, it implies that the tool is unable to detect 
inconsistencies in the value’s type which indicated that the tool was syntactic by design. My 
findings are summarized in Table 4.1. 
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Digital 
Evidence 
access 
Digital Artifact Traversal & Examination Metadata 
Parsing 
& 
Extract-
ion 
Evidence Composition 
using metadata 
Binary 
abstract-
ion to 
DE
24
 
File 
system 
examin
-ation 
Memory 
dump 
examin-
ation 
Log 
examin-
ation 
Packet 
capture 
examin
-ation 
Text 
indexing 
and 
Search 
 Multiple 
sources of 
DE 
(examination 
and analysis) 
Identify 
correlations 
Encase 
Forensic
25
 
      Only FS
26 
metadata 
Can group 
artifacts using 
FS metadata, 
one at a time 
 
FTK
2
       Only FS 
metadata 
Can group 
artifacts using 
FS metadata, 
one at a time 
 
X-Ways 
Foren-
sics
2
 
      Only FS 
metadata 
Can group 
artifacts using 
FS metadata, 
one at a time 
 
Nuix 
Investig-
ator
2
 
      Only FS 
metadata 
Can group 
artifacts using 
FS metadata, 
and keywords, 
configurable 
Can correlate 
from specific 
keywords 
across content 
Sleuthkit       Only FS 
metadata 
Can group 
artifacts using 
FS metadata, 
one at a time 
 
PyFlag       Only FS 
metadata 
Can group 
artifacts using 
FS metadata, 
one at a time, 
can classify 
using by 
combining 
timestamps 
across sources 
 
OCFA       Only FS 
metadata 
Can group 
artifacts using 
FS metadata, 
one at a time 
 
                                                          
24
 DE = digital evidence 
25
 These are the respective commercial product names. 
26
 FS = file system 
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DFF       Only FS 
metadata 
Can group 
artifacts using 
FS metadata, 
one at a time 
 
Snorkel       Only FS 
metadata 
Can group 
artifacts using 
FS metadata, 
programmable 
prioritization 
 
Nirsoft 
log 
analysis 
      Log 
attributes 
Can classify 
using one 
attribute at a 
time 
 
GrokEvt       Log 
attributes 
Can classify 
using one 
attribute at a 
time 
 
Libevt       Log 
attributes 
Can classify 
using one 
attribute at a 
time 
 
Reg-
Ripper 
      Log 
attributes 
Can classify 
using one 
attribute at a 
time 
 
Volatility       Memory 
attributes 
Can classify 
using one 
attribute at a 
time 
 
Log2-
timeline 
      Log 
attributes 
Multiple 
timestamps can 
be combined for 
time-lining 
 
Wire-
shark 
      Network 
packet 
attributes 
Can filter using 
multiple 
attributes; 
classify using 
one at a time 
 
Table 4.1 The respective functionalities of various forensic and analysis tools 
  
4.1.4 Classification and Grouping of Artifacts 
Typically, forensic and analysis tools can classify artifacts using the file metadata or log or 
network attributes parsed, one attribute at a time [25, 26, 39, 69] as is the case with tools such as 
Encase, FTK, Sleuthkit or PyFlag. The file owner, username, last modified or event timestamp, 
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protocol, source or destination IP address are some of the attributes that are commonly used 
during analysis [19, 22, 23, 28, 32]. However, in order to determine answers to the six forensic 
questions of what, when, where, how, who and why [32], it may be necessary to conduct deep 
analysis. When deep analysis is required, the artifacts often may require to be classified multiple 
times using different attributes to determine the relevant set of artifacts and answer how they 
relate a particular investigation. This can often entail use of multiple different forensic tools (e.g. 
Encase, FTK, XWays, Sleuthkit, PyFlag, etc) on the same source of digital evidence and 
exporting their results for analysis using other tools (e.g. Volatility, GrokEvt, Wireshark, 
log2timeline, etc.). All commercial forensic tools are monolithic and exporting results from one 
tool to another can be cumbersome. Therefore, this is a laborious task; this disparity can be more 
pronounced when the sources of digital evidence span different file and log formats or source 
types.  
4.1.5 Summary of the Review 
From this review, I found that all digital forensics tools provide binary abstractions to forensic 
images to handle forensic images of hard disk drives or memory dumps. While the commercial 
toolkits may support both file system images as well as memory dumps, most open source 
forensic tools (e.g. Sleuthkit, DFF, OCFA, etc.) predominantly handle only file system images, 
albeit in different image formats as discussed in Chapter 2. File systems contain metadata 
associated with file activity which is independent of file content and forensic tools extract these 
metadata to identify the owner, MAC timestamps, access privileges and so on. However, forensic 
tools like Encase, FTK, Sleuthkit, PyFlag etc. do not usually extract or use application metadata 
from files. All forensic tools support text indexing and searching on an image and classify the 
artifacts on the image according to the file system metadata. While these tools support multiple 
forensic images, they do not provide the ability to correlate metadata values across files and alert 
an examiner when related metadata are discovered (for instance, an identical author name on 
documents). Besides this, log files which can also be found on many file systems are processed as 
files by these tools which have to be exported for analysis. 
Most analysis tools, with the exception of Volatility or Wireshark, do not provide binary 
abstraction [41, 195]. These tools interpret the contents and process the data as independent 
entries while parsing the respective attributes for reporting. Analysis tools also support indexing 
and query base search; however, they can process only one source (e.g., search the records of a 
single log file) at a time. This does not permit examiners to conduct analysis to determine 
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identical or similar entries across sources which can be useful during an investigation. While 
analysis tools do support classification of the log entries based on the parsed attributes, they do 
not allow combining multiple attributes to derive semantic relationships. This functionality is 
becoming a necessity, particularly in the face of the diversity and volume challenges outlined in 
Chapter 1. Naturally, moving forward, tools should be able to support this functionality and there 
is a need for architecture that is inclusive by design. 
Both forensic and analysis tools group their respective contents using two techniques, keyword 
filtering and attribute classification. Typically a digital forensic examiner may need to filter the 
contents based on different keywords or classify them based on different attributes during analysis 
to determine a pattern. In practice, these techniques are controlled by a human and unless the right 
combinations of keywords and attributes are specified, the pattern being sought is likely to be 
missed. Some attributes can also be combined during classification, even if sequentially. The most 
common way of combining attributes for classification as reported in the literature [17, 18, 113, 
195] involves combining timestamps with the owner for forensic images, the username for log 
files and the IP address for network packet captures. This leaves the remaining metadata and 
attributes unused. There is therefore a need for a framework which can identify metadata based 
associations in an unconstrained manner both within a single data source, like files on a forensic 
disk image, and across sources, such as between forensic images and logs or logs and network 
packet captures, and so on. 
Motivated by this understanding of contemporary forensic and analysis tools in examining and 
interpreting digital evidence, I design a functional architecture to integrate the different 
functionalities of existing tools identified from this review and define a new layer to provide the 
ability to combine artifacts using associations determined based on metadata. 
4.2 f-FIA: Functional Forensic Integration Architecture 
The functional Forensic Integration Architecture (f-FIA) is illustrated in Figure 4.1 and its layers 
are as follows: 
1. Digital Evidence Layer 
2. Digital Artifact Traversal & Metadata Parser Layer; and  
3. Evidence Composition Layer. 
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f-FIA is component oriented and multi-layered (refer to subsections below) and is designed to 
integrate the functionalities provided by contemporary forensic and analysis tools to examine 
heterogeneous sources of digital evidence. Besides this, it is also designed to identify associations 
within and across sources of digital evidence to conduct analysis.  
 
Figure 4.1 Block schematic of the functional Forensic Integration Architecture (f-FIA) 
  
The architecture of f-FIA is consistent with forensic principles (maintaining data integrity and 
read-only access during the examination) and lends itself naturally to automation of forensic 
examination, while at the same time seamlessly integrating forensic examination with analysis. Its 
layered architecture is designed to allow scope for future extensions based on technological 
advances. As my work focuses on identifying associations amongst digital artifacts among sources 
of digital evidence, I focus on the Evidence Composition Layer and concentrate on methods to 
group related digital artifacts. I describe the different layers of the f-FIA in the sequel. 
4.2.1 Digital Evidence Layer 
The Digital Evidence layer provides binary abstractions of digital evidence sources that are part of 
an investigation. The media operated by this layer must comply with read only semantics to 
maintain integrity of data during an investigation. The functionality of this layer can be likened to 
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the binary (and possibly hexadecimal) data support extended by Encase, FTK and Sleuthkit to 
forensic images such as dd, EWF and AFF and so on. 
4.2.2 Digital Artifact Traversal & Metadata Parser Layer 
The Digital Artifact Traversal and Metadata Parser layer provides access to the artifacts in digital 
evidence and their metadata. The layer provides appropriate file system and/or schema support to 
the digital evidence sources for examination. For instance, in forensic file system images, the 
layer interprets the files, but in logs, the layer interprets the individual log records and in network 
packet captures, the layer interprets the individual packets. The functionalities of this layer are file 
system and schema support to examine the files in forensic disk images, processes in memory 
dumps, log records in log files and network packets in packet captures. Succinctly, this layer is 
responsible for providing suitable abstractions to the digital artifacts and their corresponding 
metadata present on each source as well as building indices for the same that can be utilized by 
the upper layer to determine associations in digital evidence.  
In order to parse for metadata, the layer can determine an artifact’s application type based on 
which suitable metadata can be extracted. For example, in hard disk images, files and metadata 
carry their usual meaning. In log file and packet capture sources, the records and packets take on 
their attributes as metadata in addition to inheriting the metadata of the log file or network capture 
file. The functionality of this layer also includes the development of source traversal algorithms 
and metadata parsers according to the source and the specific application types. The output of the 
metadata extraction and the indexing process feed into the repository which is then used by the 
upper layer during analysis. 
4.2.3 Evidence Composition Layer 
The Evidence Composition layer is responsible for integrating information from various sources 
of evidence and composing the components into consistent and comprehensive evidentiary 
material to present to a forensics examiner. I achieve evidence integration at two levels; at the first 
level, by determining related evidence artifacts based on value matches to group them together 
during analysis and at the second level, by validating the consistency of grouped artifacts to 
determine relevant evidence. Therefore, this layer is composed of two sub-layers, the Cross 
Referencing sub-layer and the Knowledge Representation and Reasoning sub-layer. 
The cross referencing sub-layer correlates content and metadata from the digital artifacts in the 
repository. The repository is capable of supporting data from multiple sources of digital evidence 
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(digital artifacts, indexed content and metadata). The repository can also support information 
gathered from external sources (e.g., identity related databases such as social security, bank 
accounts, driver’s license database, etc.) that are deemed to be relevant to the investigation. The 
internal architecture of the evidence composition layer is illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2 Internal architecture of the Evidence Composition Layer 
  
4.2.3.1 Cross-Referencing Sub-layer 
The Cross Referencing sub-layer is responsible for cross referencing content, including metadata, 
within and across digital evidence sources. It is the responsibility of this sub-layer to utilize the 
indices provided by the immediate lower layer to identify associations both on the same source as 
well as across multiple sources. Since the immediate lower layer abstracts each source by its 
artifacts and associated metadata, the cross-referencing sub-layer accesses each artifact through its 
metadata and determines value matches across artifacts, irrespective of the type of artifact. The 
functionality of this sub-layer is conceived in a technology-agnostic manner, in order to scale 
across arbitrary sets of digital evidence sources. The resulting sets of associated artifacts are 
stored in the repository for subsequent analysis. The cross referencing sub-layer can access data 
on the repository from multiple heterogeneous sources that can be deemed related to an 
investigation and consists of algorithms that aid in discovering the associations. 
4.2.3.2 Knowledge Representation & Reasoning Sub-layer 
The Knowledge Representation and Reasoning sub-layer is concerned with the logical validity of 
the digital evidence, based on the associations discovered. This sub-layer is responsible for 
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determining causal relationships between one or more assertions that can be established based on 
the artifacts that are associated. Establishing causal relationships between artifacts can help in the 
identification of relevant evidence for user activity reconstruction as part of the forensic analysis. 
For instance, consider the evidence that an email was sent by user X with a file attachment. This 
introduces three distinct predicates as listed below. 
1. User X was logged into that system when the email was sent. 
2. User X was logged into the email account when the email was sent. 
3. The file existed on the system from which the email was sent. 
While each predicate can be independently verified based on the evidence available, it may be 
necessary to identify the associations between the following. 
1. The email and the file attachment. 
2. The email and the email server logs for user X’s email login. 
3. The system and the system access logs for user X’s system login. 
This requires that evidence be considered across heterogeneous sources and associated to establish 
causation and relevance during an investigation. To achieve this, this sub-layer consolidates the 
syntactic metadata associations and metadata equivalence relationships across sources to derive 
semantic inferences on sets of associated artifacts. A few examples are listed below.  
1. If digital image files in the evidence match on one or more of their technical 
metadata, like EXIF metadata, then one may infer that the images were digital 
photographs captured with the same make and model of digital still camera. 
2. If web browser logs indicate a file download whose metadata matches against a file 
in the user’s hard drive, one can infer that the file was not authored by the user.  
3. If there are two records in a mail server for the same user at time instant T to 
indicate simultaneous logins from both Sydney and Melbourne, the information 
leads to two mutually-exclusive assertions “The user was in Sydney at time T” and 
“The user was in Melbourne at time T”. 
In the last case, the login attempts in themselves cannot be treated as incriminating evidence. 
However, the assertions warrant further scrutiny since it is impossible that an individual was in 
both Sydney and Melbourne at the same time. Resolution of such conflicting assertions requires 
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that the examiner takes recourse to other (related) external databases – perhaps flight details and 
passenger manifest databases to determine if the individual travelled between the two cities 
immediately prior to time T. Correctly ordered timestamps become especially useful in such cases. 
Validating the correctness and accuracy of timestamps obtained from metadata on digital artifacts 
including related sources beyond evidence is an example of the reasoning process. 
This sub-layer allows recording assertions and validating them by corroborating them within the 
scope of the data sources provided. Any evidence to the contrary is flagged and presented to the 
examiner. Besides assertion validation, often examiners need to repeatedly query the sources of 
digital evidence for information. Examples of such queries are “list the set of files that were 
modified on June 10
th
 2008 between 2:00 PM and 6:00 PM” or “list all HTTP sessions on the 
network capture with IP address X as the source”. This sub-layer’s architecture enables an 
examiner to query the digital evidence in this way and determine evidence associated with the 
query results simultaneously, without having to search for it. 
To utilize such a framework, it is necessary to understand the implications of determining 
metadata based associations in digital evidence and develop a model to represent such 
associations for analysis. However, when heterogeneous sources need to be correlated for 
analysis, it is essential to characterize the homogeneity of a single source of digital evidence. This 
topic is addressed in the sequel. 
4.3 Defining a Homogeneous Source of Digital Evidence 
Typically, a source of digital evidence is known in terms of where it was acquired from, for 
example, a source of a forensic image could be a hard disk drive, memory dump, network packet 
capture file, and so on. These sources have well-defined semantics in the literature as discussed in 
Chapter 2. However, in this thesis, I require a refinement to this understanding since the digital 
artifacts and more particularly known by their metadata, which varies greatly across the data types 
and establishing a relationship between the digital artifacts is not a straightforward task. In this 
section I develop this understanding further and define what constitutes a homogeneous source. 
Forensic images of hard disk drives are a known source of digital evidence. The hard disk drive 
may contain more than one volume partition containing one or more file systems. In that case, I 
refine my definition of a source to the file system level and distinguish each file system as a 
source of digital evidence. At this point, the forensic image level definition may be dispensed with 
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since the analysis is carried out with regard to the file systems. However, each file system, in turn, 
may contain files belonging to many applications, stored in different formats. Among common 
file types, the semantics of each metadata is well-understood, e.g., ‘Author’, ‘filename’, ‘file size’, 
etc; ‘Author’ refers to the author of a particular file; ‘filename’ refers to the name of a file on a 
particular file system and ‘filesize’ refers to the number of bytes occupied by a file on the file 
system. This can lead to metadata associations using syntactic value matches. Therefore, I 
collectively qualify all files belonging to the same application type (identified based on file 
formats) as a homogeneous source of digital evidence. For my purpose, this definition includes all 
files created either in temporary or permanent storage by that application. By this definition, all 
Microsoft Office Powerpoint presentation files, for instance, along with their temporary backup 
and cache files can be grouped as a single source during analysis. One can extend this argument to 
state that all files created by software X are collectively referred as a homogeneous source and the 
semantics is governed by software X. The definition ensures that when metadata based matches 
are identified between files on the same homogenous source, the corresponding metadata have 
identical semantics in reference to the respective files. Figure 4.3 diagrammatically illustrates the 
progression of a source hierarchy with an example of a Microsoft Windows based hard disk drive.  
 
Figure 4.3 Example of source level hierarchy on a Microsoft Windows hard disk drive 
  
In this example, as I refine a source definition at the logical levels, I draw distinctions in 
applications. Applications, typically record file metadata for file management and files belonging 
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to the same application tend to store similar metadata, e.g., Microsoft Office documents, PDF 
files, JPEG files, etc. Naturally, in such files, determining metadata matches can be simplified into 
a search task pivoting on the corresponding metadata index across all the files and searching for a 
matching value is trivial. Therefore, files whose metadata can be mapped one-to-one are regarded 
as homogeneous. Notwithstanding, file system metadata is common to all files and consequently a 
forensic file system image is homogenous with regard to file system metadata. Where files from 
the same application are found on different storage media, the choice of the level of abstraction 
(either at the storage media level as is traditional practice or at the application level to provide 
uniform semantics across the files) that is appropriate for analysis is left with the forensic 
examiner. The examiner can exercise their choice depending on the granularity of the analysis that 
an investigation necessitates. 
Log files are of different types and while all log files can be treated as similar sources of forensic 
evidence, they are not identical. For instance, syslog and browser logs are not readily comparable, 
however all browser logs pertaining to a single browser application are comparable as their log 
records correspond to some form of browsing event. Naturally, logs describing specific events, 
such as logs pertaining to web browsing or mail server access, can be labeled homogeneous. 
Across homogeneous sources, metadata matches can be determined by identifying corresponding 
log attributes where the values match. The value match encapsulates the syntactic nature of the 
association across these logs while the activity that is represented by the log itself provides the 
semantics for the association, i.e., individual X who browsed website www.domain.com at time 
T1, also browsed website www.abc.biz at time T2, and so on. 
When multiple (heterogeneous) logs have to be compared, attributes such as the username or 
timestamps in the respective logs are comparable. In order to do so, these attributes have to be 
equated and this establishes attribute equivalence between the logs. The concept of a value match, 
as envisioned in f-FIA to implement the cross-correlation sub-layer, captures the syntactic nature 
of the association across these logs while the activity that is represented by the log itself provides 
the semantics for the association, i.e., individual X who browsed website www.domain.com at 
time T1, also checked X’s email at time T2, and so on. Figure 4.4 diagrammatically illustrates the 
progression of a data source hierarchy using common log files. 
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Figure 4.4 Example of the log file data source hierarchy 
  
All network packet captures are regarded as a homogeneous source and where necessary, packets 
are distinguished based on the protocol used in communication; this distinguishes network packets 
that were exchanged based on the ARP or the ICMP from those exchanged using the TCP or UDP 
during a recorded session. These distinctions are necessary to differentiate the parties in 
communication and the nature of the communication that transpired. 
From this, I make the following observation: A homogeneous source is one in which all digital 
artifacts have metadata of the same type (type is governed by the application responsible for 
creating the metadata) and determining syntactic value matches requires only a comparison 
operation. The semantics of the association on individual value matches is derived from the 
semantics of the metadata (elaborated in Section 4.4). Notwithstanding the fact that such digital 
artifacts may come from physically different acquired sources, in my work I treat such artifacts as 
a part of a homogeneous source. To develop this understanding, I present an overview of my 
approach to discovering metadata based associations in digital evidence through the 
identification of metadata matches in value. 
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4.4 Method for Associating Metadata in Digital Evidence 
Metadata matches among artifacts correspond to matching partial states of the digital artifacts. 
Grouping such digital artifacts based on such a partial state can contribute to reconstructing the 
past events during an investigation [26, 28]. If such artifacts are grouped together, the “related” 
artifacts can also be holistically analyzed (e.g., to discover the existence of some higher-order 
relationships). To ground my research in basic metadata based associations and derive the design 
for a model to identify associations in digital evidence using metadata, I conducted several pen-
and-paper exercises with different types of files and logs by matching the metadata of the files and 
log records respectively within the same source. An example of this exercise is illustrated in 
Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure 4.5 Illustration of syntax and semantics associated with a metadata match 
  
Figure 4.5 illustrates how my experiments using metadata matches led to the identification of 
associations. This example is based on a value match and is hence syntactic in nature. If I consider 
the metadata shown for File 1 and File 2 in Figure 4.5, the files contain matching values for 
metadata field ‘Author’ leading to a syntactic association. A similar association exists between 
File 2 and File 3 for metadata ‘File size’. During my research, I discovered that when the digital 
artifacts are of the same type, the metadata indices have well-defined semantics between two or 
more artifacts belonging to the same application. Therefore, between File 1 and File 2, the 
semantics accompanying with metadata ‘Author’ is interpreted as ‘James is the author of the file 
ThisisModified.DOC’ and ‘James is the author of the file ThisisCopied.DOC’. This leads to the 
deduction “James wrote File 1 and File 2”. Similarly, the metadata accompanying the ‘File size’ is 
interpreted as ‘ThisisCopied.DOC is of size 20 kilobytes’ and ‘ThisisOriginal.DOC is of size 20 
kilobytes’. This leads to the deduction “File 2 and File 3 have identical file sizes”. The deduction 
in the first case provides an answer to the who question concerning File 1 and File 2 while the 
deduction in the second case provides an answer to a what question concerning File 2 and File 3. 
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Thus the semantics of a metadata association has the potential to provide answers to questions 
pertinent during forensic analysis. 
As illustrated, at the syntactic level, the representation of the association is based on each 
metadata and its value, and it concerned a set of digital artifacts (files) that satisfied the condition 
required to make the association. If a metadata value is changed, it will result in a different match 
when using the same association semantics. If the metadata’s name is changed, then the semantics 
is changed. I conducted experiments on digital image files and word processing documents using 
different metadata to generate such metadata-value groups in the context of digital image 
provenance and identify files suspected of being doctored
27
. These experiments and their results 
are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
We also conducted similar exercises on browser log files and network packet captures and 
analyzed the semantics for each syntactic metadata match between log records and network 
packets of the same type. I generalized the identification of syntactic metadata matches to derive a 
method for generating associations across artifacts. I am concerned with the identification of 
metadata associations through the identification of metadata matches, so in my design I explicitly 
represent the syntactic associations and make the semantics implicit. While combining the 
artifacts, I used the metadata semantics to guide the grouping and arrived at meaningful 
associations.  
There are four stages of existence for digital evidence (S1 – S4) and three levels of transformation 
(T12 – T34). In stage S1, the set U represents all sources of digital evidence, in their natural state, 
containing heterogeneous digital artifacts. The metadata, related to an artifact, visualized as a 
vector of metadata indices and its corresponding values, is used as the instrument in determining 
the transformations T12 – T34. In stage S1, I apply a static filtering transformation T12 using 
metadata matches to group (similar) artifacts into entities called similarity pockets that correspond 
to the metadata tag where the match was determined. The set of all similarity pockets generated 
based on metadata matches is represented as SP in Figure 4.6. 
                                                          
27
 The concept of file doctoring extends the concept of image doctoring wherein the file in question is claiming to be 
original whereas in reality, it is derived by doctoring another file using one or more software. 
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Figure 4.6 The metadata matching stage giving rise to similarity pockets 
  
As a digital artifact can generate a metadata match based on more than one metadata tag, it can be 
present in multiple similarity pockets for multiple metadata matches in stage S2. In order to 
eliminate this redundancy, I apply a grouping transformation T23 to group the digital artifacts from 
component similarity pockets that overlap on at least one artifact to form similarity groups. The 
set of all similarity groups is represented by SG in Figure 4.7 and are a part of stage S3. Once the 
grouping process is completed, an artifact many occur in only one similarity group and the 
artifacts belonging to similarity groups on a single source are mutually exclusive. 
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Figure 4.7 Grouping the overlapping similarity pockets into non-intersecting similarity groups 
  
When we consider the metadata values taken by the artifacts belonging to similarity groups across 
sources, it is possible to establish metadata equivalence relationships on the metadata indices. A 
simple example of this concept is the equivalence relationships between the file system MAC 
timestamps and the packet timestamps on network packets from packet captures. A similar 
equivalence relationship can be established for ‘Author’ on file metadata and ‘usernames’ on log 
records. We can establish equivalence relationships between such metadata to group the artifacts 
from similarity groups across sources using transformation T34 to give rise to association groups 
in stage S4. The set of all association groups is represented by AG in Figure 4.8.  
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Figure 4.8 Grouping similarity groups across sources into association groups 
  
The members of each association group may be presented to a forensic examiner to identify 
relevant evidence (as illustrated with the user X activity example presented for the Knowledge 
Representation and Reasoning sub-layer in Section 4.2). The model to identify associations in 
digital evidence based on metadata is presented in the sequel. 
4.5 Metadata Association Model 
In this section I define the concept of a metadata association and develop concepts to represent the 
relationships derived from metadata associations arising out of value matches in metadata. My 
Metadata Association Model (MAM) models the associations in digital artifacts identified through 
metadata matches. During an investigation, forensic investigators acquire one or more sources28 of 
stored information which are collectively referred to as digital evidence. The digital artifacts that 
are contained in the collection of sources of digital evidence can be heterogeneous in their 
application type. If we were to impose a homogeneous view on this world of digital evidence that 
contain arbitrary types of digital artifacts, let there be S finite and distinct homogeneous sources 
of digital evidence. Each artifact of a homogeneous source is by definition, homogeneous, i.e., 
belong to the same application type and contain the same set of metadata, albeit with possibly 
                                                          
28
 These are forensic images of hard disk drives, memory dumps, system and application logs and so on. 
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different values. This method is consistent with my definition of a homogeneous source discussed 
in Section 4.3. If DE refers to digital evidence containing S homogeneous sources and si is the i
th
 
homogeneous source acquired for analysis, then 
DE = {si | si is the i
th
 homogeneous source of digital evidence, i ∈  [1, S]}.                  …(1) 
Each source si so acquired can contain one or more digital artifacts and the S sources have N1, N2, 
N3, …, NS digital artifacts, respectively. In general, a source si has its digital artifacts numbered 
from 1 to Ni. Let each digital artifact in source si be referred to as a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3, … and so on. Each 
digital artifact a
i
j has metadata associated with it, which I refer to as m
i
j, that describes the artifact. 
Thus I characterise a source of digital artifacts as 
si = {a
i
j | a
i
j is the j
th
 digital artifact in source si, j ∈  [1, Ni]} where i ∈  [1, S].                ...(2) 
To represent a source si as the set of all metadata associated with the corresponding digital 
artifacts that belong to si, we can equivalently write Equation (2) in the following way, since there 
is a one-to-one correspondence between an artifact a
i
j and its metadata m
i
j. 
si = {m
i
j | m
i
j is the metadata corresponding to artifact a
i
j in source si, a
i
j ∈  si, 
  j ∈  [1, Ni]} where i ∈  [1, S]                                  ...(3) 
Each metadata m
i
j associated with an artifact a
i
j can be represented as an M-vector (m
ij
1, m
ij
2, ... 
m
ij
M) of data values where m
ij
k is the k
th
 value for metadata m
i
j and a
i
j belongs to source si. 
Expressed formally,  
m
i
j = (m
ij
1, m
ij
2, m
ij
3, ..., m
ij
M) where j ∈  [1, Ni], i ∈  [1, S].                              ...(4) 
For convenience, all such vectors are assumed to be of the same length, so where a digital artifact 
has metadata m
i
j such that |m
i
j| < M, I append null values to bring it up to size M. The value M is 
chosen such that it takes the cardinality of the largest metadata vector selected across all digital 
artifacts, across all sources in DE, i.e.,  
M = (|m
i
j|).                                     ...(5) 
Let the digital artifacts in each source si ∈  DE be grouped according to their respective application 
types. In my research, I represent a source of digital evidence as a list of artifacts, each identified 
by a list of corresponding metadata obtained both from the file system and the respective 
[1, ], [1, ]
max
ii S j N 
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applications. Then, a metadata match is indicated by matching values in corresponding metadata 
between two or more digital artifacts. In this thesis, my model for metadata is a vector of name-
value pairs, where the value can be either string or numeric type. 
The metadata correspondence can be established in two ways: (i) directly and one-to-one where 
the artifacts involved in the match belong to the same application and thereby share the metadata 
semantics; or (ii) through a metadata equivalence established prior to identifying metadata 
matches between the equated metadata. Where there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
domains of values taken by two distinct metadata indices p and q across different sources sp and 
sq, a metadata equivalence relationship can be established between the metadata p and q across 
these sources. 
A syntactic association is assigned to the concerned artifacts when a value match or similarity is 
identified. The semantics of the association is derived from the semantics of the metadata where 
the match was found. The semantics of any single metadata associated with an artifact provides an 
‘of’ relationship with the artifact. For instance, if metadata ‘Author’ for a file F is James, then the 
semantics is derived as ‘the author of file F is James’. When multiple files are syntactically 
associated for metadata ‘Author’, then the semantics of the association is derived as ‘the author of 
files F, G and H is James’. Another way of expressing this association is ‘files F, G and H have 
the same author and the author is James’. When identifying metadata associations, it is necessary 
to understand the different types of matches in metadata and define them unambiguously. I briefly 
discuss in the next section the types of syntactic associations that can be defined on metadata that 
can take string or numeric values. 
4.5.1 Types of Metadata Associations 
With regard to metadata values, there can be 4 basic types of associations based on value, viz., 
exact association, partial association, threshold association and date association. These are 
elaborated below: 
Exact association: When a particular metadata value in one digital artifact matches exactly with 
the corresponding metadata on another artifact, irrespective of the type of value, an exact 
association is said to occur between the artifacts for that metadata. 
Partial association: When a particular metadata value in one digital artifact matches partially with 
the corresponding metadata on another artifact, for a value of STRING type, a partial association 
98 
 
is said to occur between the artifacts for that metadata. Such a partial association can be of three 
different types. 
 Left sequence: For two strings s1 and s2 such that s1 ≠ s2, if two or more characters from the 
left in s1 match exactly with the corresponding characters in s2, that defines a left sequence partial 
association between s1 and s2. 
E.g. s1 = SAMUEL s2 = SAMSON 
 Right sequence: For two strings s1 and s2 such that s1 ≠ s2, if two or more characters from 
the right in s1 match exactly with the corresponding characters in s2, that defines a right sequence 
partial association between s1 and s2. 
E.g. s1 = WILLIAMSON  s2 = ROBERTSON  
 Anywhere in the middle: For two strings s1 and s2 such that s1 ≠ s2, if two or more 
characters in s1 match exactly with the corresponding characters in s2 and do not match at either 
the left or right ends, that defines a middle sequence partial association between s1 and s2. 
E.g. s1 = INTRIGUE  s2 = CONTRIVE 
Threshold association: When a particular metadata value in one digital artifact differs with the 
corresponding metadata on another artifact, for a value of NUMERIC type, such that the 
difference occurs within a pre-defined threshold δ, a threshold association is said to occur between 
the artifacts for that metadata. Such a threshold association may occur either with a value greater 
than or less than the specified threshold. As such, the nature of the difference in value is only 
relevant, if the artifact on which the comparison is pivoted, is identified. 
Date association: When a particular metadata value in one digital artifact, for a value of DATE 
type, is matched against with the corresponding metadata on another artifact, it defines a date 
association between the said artifacts for that metadata. Such a date association can occur in 4 
different types. 
 At time t: For two timestamps t1 an t2, if their values match to the last degree of resolution 
that can be determined within technological constraints, then an at t date association is said to 
occur. The value is taken as reference time t. 
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Before time t: For two timestamps t1 and t2 such that t1 ≠ t2, when it is determined that one 
timestamp is less than the other, then a before t date association is said to occur. In this case, the 
artifact corresponding to the larger timestamp value is taken as reference on which the comparison 
is pivoted and its value is taken as reference time t. 
 After time t: For two timestamps t1 and t2 such that t1 ≠ t2, when it is determined one 
timestamp is greater than the other, then an after t date association is said to occur. In this case, 
the artifact corresponding to the smaller timestamp value is taken as reference on which the 
comparison is pivoted and its value is taken as reference time t. 
 Between time instants tʹ and tʹʹ: For two timestamps t1 and t2, if we can determine pre-
defined time instants tʹ and tʹʹ such that tʹ < t1, t2 < tʹʹ, then a between tʹ and tʹʹ date association is 
said to occur. 
Based on the metadata associations outlined in this section, we can group the associated artifacts 
as discussed in the sequel. 
4.5.2 Similarity Pockets, Similarity Groups and Association Groups 
In Figures 4.9 and 4.10, nodes represent digital artifacts and the edges represent metadata with 
identical values. These artifacts, hence, have an exact association between them. Figure 4.9 
represents such a collection of 5 artifacts associated (numbered counterclockwise) by a single 
name-value pair match. Since all the digital artifacts have the same metadata index-value pair, it is 
a fully connected graph. For brevity, I have only shown a connected graph. I term such a 
collection as a similarity pocket since there is exactly one metadata match that is shared by all the 
digital artifacts in that pocket. For instance, a set of 5 documents connected by the metadata 
‘Author’ is a similarity pocket. I introduce the concept of a similarity pocket spikt as a set of digital 
artifacts within a source si which have the same metadata value m
ij
k for the k
th
 metadata index. 
Each similarity pocket corresponds to a specific metadata index-value pair and hence, the 
similarity pockets generated by a particular metadata index k for different values v taken by the 
metadata index are mutually exclusive. The set of all such similarity pockets formed for a 
particular metadata index k and value v is tracked using the index t which belongs to the set of 
natural numbers N, and each t corresponds to a unique value for the metadata index and value that 
has resulted in a similarity pocket. 
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Definition. A similarity pocket spikt is a subset of source si, such that there exists a metadata value 
v and metadata index k ∈  [1, M], where, for each artifact aij ∈  sp
ik
t, metadata value m
ij
k equals v.  
Formally, 
sp
ik
t = {a
i
j | j ∈  [1, Ni], m
ij
k = v} for some v where k ∈  [1, M], t ∈  N, i ∈  [1, S].   
                …(6) 
 
Figure 4.9 Similarity pocket formed among five homogeneous documents on the value of the metadata index 
'AUTHOR' 
  
The set of all similarity pockets across all values v for some metadata index k ∈  [1, M] is denoted 
sp
i
k and the union of all such sets of similarity pockets across all metadata indices k in the range 
[1, M] for a source si is denoted spi. 
sp
i
k = {sp
ik
t | t ∈  N}                                   …(7) 
= set of all similarity pockets generated for metadata index k ∈  [1, M]. 
 spi = sp
i
k                                          …(8) 
= union over all sets of similarity pockets sp
i
k generated on source si across all 
metadata indices in [1, M]. 
We refer to the union of all spi across all sources in DE as the set SP (illustrated in Figure 4.10), 
which is defined as: 
SP = sp
i
                                   …(9) 
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 =  {sp
ik
t | t ∈  N} 
=  set of all similarity pockets generated across all values v for all metadata 
indices k ∈  [1, M] for all sources in DE. 
 
Figure 4.10 The set of all similarity pockets on some source 
  
For the purposes of illustration, consider a scenario where a set of documents on a source are 
being analyzed. The set of all documents are logically treated as homogeneous artifacts belonging 
to that source. The abstraction applied in this context refers to the application level abstraction 
referred to in Figure 4.3. In Figure 4.13, the similarity pocket from Figure 4.9 is extended to a new 
artifact which is associated with documents 5 and 2 via different metadata. By virtue of the 
abstraction applied, document 6 is treated as a homogeneous artifact alongside documents 1 to 5. 
Since this collection is formed by combining multiple similarity pockets, it results in a similarity 
group. A similarity group is the largest combination of two or more similarity pockets within a 
given source of digital evidence where each digital artifact has a least one metadata match with 
one or more other artifacts. I introduce the notion of a similarity group sg
i
t defined as a set of 
digital artifacts obtained from a union over similarity pockets from the set spi where, for each 
similarity pocket, there exists at least one other similarity pocket which has a non-empty overlap 
between them. To build a similarity group from the set of similarity pockets, I pick one similarity 
pocket at random as the seed pocket and iteratively check all remaining similarity pockets in spi to 
determine the similarity pockets that produce non-empty overlap with the seed pocket. The 
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process is continued until transitive closure is reached. I note that each similarity group that is 
formed from two or more similarity pockets has the characteristics described by Equation (10). 
Characteristics of a similarity group. A similarity group sgit is a subset of source si such that it 
is the largest union over similarity pockets in spi where for each similarity pocket sp
ik
q  sg
i
t, 
there exists another similarity pocket sp
ikʹ
qʹ  sg
i
t such that spikq spikʹqʹ ≠ ∅ . 
sg
i
t = {a
i
j | k ∈  [1, M], 
∃ q, qʹ: (q ∈  N  qʹ ∈  N  
∃ spikq, sp
ikʹ
qʹ, kʹ: (kʹ ∈  [1, M]  a
i
j ∈  sp
ik
q  sp
ik
q  sg
i
t  
sp
ikʹ
qʹ  sg
i
t  sp
ik
q  sp
ikʹ
qʹ  
sp
ik
q  sp
ikʹ
qʹ ≠ ∅ ))} where t ∈  N, i ∈  [1, S]          
                   …(10) 
The set sg
i
t is illustrated in Figure 4.11 with a set of conditions that govern membership for any 
two artifacts a and b on source si. 
sgi = {sg
i
t | t ∈  N}                      …(11) 
  = set of all similarity groups generated on source si. 
We represent the set of all similarity groups across all sources as SG.  
SG = sgi                              …(12) 
  = set of all similarity groups generated across all sources in DE. 
 

 



1
S
i
103 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Conditions that govern membership to a similarity group 
  
Similarity groups are formed when I merge the similarity pockets across all metadata for all 
digital artifacts in a source. In order to associate these similarity groups across the sources and 
determine correlations based on metadata values, I group the sg
i
t where i ∈  [1, S], t ∈  N by 
establishing metadata equivalence relationships between the metadata indices between two or 
more sources of digital evidence. The equivalence relationship is established by determining 
equivalence over the domain of values taken for the corresponding metadata indices between the 
respective sources. 
If similarity groups are combined across multiple sources based on metadata matches established 
through metadata equivalence relationships, it results in an association group. An association 
group is the largest union of two or more similarity groups in SG where at least one digital artifact 
Similarity pocket
Similarity group sgit
Condition 1
Condition 2
Condition 4
. . . . . .
. . .
Condition 3
1. artifacts a, b belong to the same similarity pocket.
2. for some artifact c, (a and c) and (b and c) belong to the two respective similarity 
pockets for metadata m and m' respectively.
3. for some similarity pocket sp in that similarity group, a, b belong to two different 
similarity pockets such that there are two other artifacts x, y in sp that are 
associated on different metadata with and a and b.
4. for some arbitrary chain of similarity pockets sp1, sp2, … spn, such that for all k, 
spk and spk-1 exhibit the relationship described in point (2), there exist two other 
artifacts (x belonging to sp1, and y belonging to spn) that are associated on 
different metadata with and a and b respectively.
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from a similarity group sg
i
t has at least one metadata value match based on a metadata equivalence 
relationship with another digital artifact belonging to similarity group sg
iʹ
tʹ where i ≠ iʹ, t ≠ tʹ. To 
build an association group from the set of similarity groups, I pick one similarity group at random 
as the seed group and iteratively check all remaining similarity groups in sgi to determine the 
similarity groups that contain at least one artifact which has a metadata value match based on a 
metadata equivalence relationship for some artifact from the seed similarity group. The process is 
continued until transitive closure is reached. I note that each association group that is formed from 
two or more similarity groups has the characteristics described by Equation (13). 
Characteristics of an association group. An association group agt is the largest union of 
similarity groups in SG across sources in DE where metadata equivalence reveals the presence of 
metadata matches. For each artifact in an association group a
i
j that belongs to some similarity 
group sg
i
t for some i ∈  [1, S], t ∈  N, there exists another similarity group sg
iʹ
tʹ for iʹ ∈  [1, S], tʹ ∈  N 
where sg
i
q  sg
iʹ
qʹ and there is a metadata match between artifacts a
i
j and a
iʹ
jʹ based on metadata 
equivalence. 
agt = {a
i
j
 
| i ∈  [1, S], 
∃ q, qʹ, iʹ: (iʹ ∈  [1, S]  q ∈  N qʹ ∈  N  
∃ sgiq, sg
iʹ
qʹ, a
iʹ
jʹ: (a
i
j ∈  sg
i
q  sg
i
q  agt  sg
iʹ
qʹ  agt  
a
iʹ
jʹ ∈  sg
iʹ
qʹ  sg
i
q  sg
iʹ
qʹ  artifacts a
i
j and a
iʹ
jʹ 
exhibit a value match based on metadata 
equivalence))} where t ∈  N                 ...(13) 
The set agt is illustrated in Figure 4.12 with a set of conditions that govern membership for any 
two artifacts a and b. 
Let AG refer to the set of all agt in DE, then, 
AG  = {agt | t ∈  N}                     …(14) 
  = set of all association groups generated on DE. 
 
 
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Figure 4.12 Conditions that govern membership to an association group 
  
In the illustration in Figure 4.13, if the abstraction were drawn at the file format level, then 
logically document 6 would be regarded as an artifact of a different source and consequently, the 
grouping would result in an association group (where metadata equivalence is established a priori 
on the metadata ‘filesize’ and ‘Title’).  
Similarity pocket
Similarity group
Condition 1
Condition 2
Condition 4
Association group agt
Condition 5
Condition 6
. . .
Condition 3
1. artifacts a, b belong to the same similarity pocket.
2. artifacts a, b belong to the same similarity group.
3. for some metadata m and m' on 'a' and 'b' respectively, we can establish an equivalence 
relationship on their values such that metadata value of 'a' equivalent to metadata value of 'b'
4. for some two artifacts x and y, (a and x) belong to similarity group 1 and (b and y) belong to 
similarity group 2 where x and y exhibit relationship identified in point (3).
5. for some similarity group sg in that association group, a, b belong to two different 
similarity groups such that there is at least one artifact in sg that exhibits relationship 
identified in point (4).
6. for some arbitrary chain of similarity groups sg1, sg2, … sgn, such that for all k, sgk and sgk-1
exhibit the relationship described in point (3), there exist two other artifacts (x belonging to 
sg1, and y belonging to sgn) that are associated differently with and a and b respectively.
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Figure 4.13 Intersecting similarity pockets across different metadata indices among a set of six documents 
  
While documents 1 and 6 are not directly related, they are connected through documents 2 and 5. 
Thus a seemingly unrelated pair of documents (1 and 6) can be shown to be associated based on 
metadata. The transitive nature of metadata associations can be useful in scoping keyword 
searches during analysis as I demonstrate in Chapter 7 of this thesis where I apply my metadata 
association model to analyze collections of word processing documents. I also show how my 
model can be used on arbitrary collections of files to automatically identify and group the related 
files. It is then sufficient for an examiner to study the groups generated rather that examine the 
individual documents. This is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
During forensic investigations, it is common to identify new sources of evidence and therefore, 
any model developed for evidence associations should be scalable, incrementally [130]. The 
metadata association model is so designed that a similarity pocket or association group can be 
easily extended to incorporate additional artifacts where new metadata matches are discovered 
from such incrementally discovered sources. When multiple similarity pockets are connected by 
discovering new metadata matches between them, these pockets are promoted to a similarity 
group if the metadata associations are limited to a single source or an association group, if they 
span across multiple sources. 
When the digital artifacts from a collection (obtained from one or more sources of digital 
evidence) are “associated” using metadata, I can pose the following questions on the collection for 
analysis. 
1. How many associated and unassociated digital artifacts are present in the 
collection? 
Author
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o
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u
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1
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2. How many digital artifacts are singly associated? What is most frequently 
occurring association on such singly associated digital artifacts? 
3. How many digital artifacts are multiply associated? What is most frequently 
occurring association on such multiply associated digital artifacts? 
4. What is the size of largest association group found in the collection? 
5. What is the size of the largest multiply associated group found in the collection? 
6. What is most number of distinct similarity pockets contained within a single 
association group? 
7. What is the largest number of the associations generated by a single digital artifact? 
The numbers determined are inherent to a particular collection. Such questions can be relevant 
when analyzing sets of digital image files or word processing documents as discussed in Chapters 
6 and 7 in this thesis. In such collections of files, the file belonging to the largest association 
group or the file containing the most number of metadata associations are worthy of further 
examination. 
The theory developed in this section and the definitions presented are revisited in Chapter 5 and is 
used to drive the implementation of artifact association algorithms that we’ve developed to 
determine specific relationships between two or more digital artifacts in digital evidence. I discuss 
the nature of forensic analysis to derive digital artifact relationships based on metadata 
associations in the sequel. 
4.6 Nature of Forensic Analysis 
The aim in the analysis of digital evidence is identification of the events leading to a reported 
incident, the nature of these events and their attribution to individual(s). For my discourse, an 
event refers to actions that are directly performed by an individual on any digital device. 
Examples of such events are creating a file, modifying a file, sending an email, logging into a 
server, visiting a website, downloading a file, etc. Each event can result in creating new digital 
artifacts, or accessing or modifying existing digital artifacts(s). Typically the following are 
observed when a new event occurs on the sources of digital evidence we’ve discussed in Chapter 
1:  
1. On a file system, an event can create a new file, or access or modify one or more 
aspects of an existing file. 
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2. In memory, an event can create a new process or modify an existing process. 
3. On a log file, an event usually creates a new log record. Existing log records are 
preserved, untouched. 
4. During a network packet capture session, an event captures a new network packet. 
Existing network packets are preserved, untouched. 
If a new digital artifact is created as a result of an event, its occurrence is reflected in the metadata 
that are also created along with the digital artifact. If an existing artifact is modified as a result of 
an event, its occurrence is reflected in the change in values of the metadata linked to that artifact. 
Therefore, irrespective of the type of event, its effect can be perceived in the metadata linked to 
the metadata. 
The analysis is concerned with finding answers to the forensic questions that relate to who, what, 
when, where, how and why [32]. Naturally the process of analysis is driven by methods intended 
to find these answers. In the previous chapter, I discussed the semantics associated with metadata 
associations. I explore this further here by extending the semantics to multiple metadata 
associations and identify metadata classes that naturally provide answers to these six questions.  
The most common form of grouping metadata, as reported in the literature [17, 18, 98, 106], is 
timestamps with owners for files, usernames for logs or IP addresses for network packet traces. 
The motivation behind this grouping is evident since it helps one find answers to who and when. 
To determine answers to what, where, and how, the artifacts are individually analyzed with 
perhaps, keyword filtering. However, this can be an extended process and may require multiple 
back-and-forth activities to determine the exact nature of the events recorded in evidence.  
When an event creates or modifies more than one digital artifact, identifying the metadata that 
pertain to the event across these artifacts will elicit the relationships that exist between them. 
Therefore, focusing on the appropriate metadata across the digital artifacts, one can reconstruct 
the event(s). 
4.7 Applying the Metadata Association Model in a Forensic Context 
Our approach parameterizes the artifacts (using metadata) in digital evidence and determines the 
associations that underline the artifact relationships both within and across sources. In general, the 
analysis raises several forensic questions, a few of which are listed below. The algorithms 
corresponding to the questions raised are presented in Section 5.3. Successful application of the 
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Metadata Association Model to the analysis of digital artifacts can answer the following 
questions:  
1. How do we apply the MAM to determine all individuals or devices from the digital 
artifacts in the sources of digital evidence? How many digital artifacts correspond 
to each identified individual or device? 
2. How do we apply the MAM to determine the sequence in which the events that 
correspond to the identified individuals or devices occur? 
3. How do we apply the MAM to identify those digital artifacts edited with a 
particular software product? 
4. How do we apply the MAM to identify those digital artifacts downloaded from the 
Internet? How do we identify the sources (or URIs) of these digital artifacts? 
5. How do we apply the MAM to identify digital artifacts that were created or 
accessed or modified at the same time instant as a given artifact? 
6. How do we apply the MAM to identify digital artifacts that are identical or 
structurally equivalent to a given artifact? 
When a forensic examiner examines digital evidence, he/she is actually looking for one or more 
individuals or digital devices and their activities. Associating an individual or a device to an 
activity in evidence ascribes the ownership of that activity to that individual or device. Once the 
activities of an individual or device are identified, it is necessary to chronologically assemble 
them to study the sequence. Questions 1 and 2 pose this as MAM based problems. 
When analyzing digital artifacts, it is necessary to determine those digital artifacts that were edited 
with software and those that were downloaded from the Internet, not necessarily exclusively. 
Having identified an artifact as a downloaded resource, it is necessary to determine the origin of 
that resource from the World Wide Web. Questions 3 and 4 pose this as MAM based problems. 
An examiner is often likely to begin the analysis with a single digital artifact and then proceed 
with the analysis by identifying related artifacts based on the outcome from the first artifact. This 
relationship can exist in time or in structure. When artifacts related in time are sought, it is 
necessary to determine those artifacts that were affected at the same time instants. When artifacts 
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related in structure are sought, it is necessary to determine those artifacts that are stored with 
related structural information. Questions 5 and 6 pose this as MAM based problems. 
To determine answers to these questions using the MAM, it is first necessary to identify the 
metadata in different digital artifacts that are likely to carry information pertinent to the forensic 
questions raised in this section. In the sequel, I identify metadata families across files, log records 
and network packets and link them to MAM based analysis of digital artifacts. 
4.8 Identifying Metadata Families Relevant to Forensic Contexts 
In my work, I am primarily concerned with analysis of files from file systems, log records from 
log files and network packets from network packet captures. Naturally, it is necessary to 
determine the classes of metadata from such artifacts that can provide specific answers to the 
questions raised during forensic analysis. In Figure 4.14, I classify metadata from different 
sources based on the questions concerning forensic analysis.  
 
Figure 4.14 Metadata families pertinent to forenic analysis 
  
Typically, questions of the type what or where relate to the source of the artifact and the metadata 
that identify such sources are potential candidates for finding the answers. The who question 
identifies an individual who is attributed to an artifact or a system that is attributed to an artifact. 
The when question relates to the time-related event(s) that affected an artifact and the timestamps 
in metadata can provide such answers. The how question pertains to describing other aspects 
pertaining to an artifact when an event affecting the artifact was observed. Therefore, metadata 
that identify such situational information are likely candidates. In Figure 4.15, I identify metadata 
from different artifacts, viz., files, log records and network packets, that belong to the four 
metadata families and pertain to specific questions in regard to forensic analysis. A mapping of 
Files Log records
Network 
Packets
M E T A D A T A
Source Ownership Timestamps Application
The what?
The where?
The how?
The where?
The when?The who?
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metadata indices
29
 from documents, logs and network packets corresponding to each metadata 
family is illustrated in Figure 4.15. 
 
Figure 4.15 Metadata tags for each metadata family across documents, logs and network packets 
  
Source typically corresponds to entities that exist within digital media, such as filename, file 
location, IP address and Creator/Publisher. Ownership corresponds to entities that have some form 
of physical presence in the real world, i.e., Author, Username, Organization, Digital camera 
specifications, Web server, etc. Timestamps correspond to time instants when digital events are 
recorded in the digital media and Application corresponds to features describing a particular 
artifact such as its application type, content size, number of pages or slides and formatting. While 
the metadata describe the characteristics of an artifact, my focus in this thesis is to utilize the 
semantics related to the four metadata families to elicit associations across digital artifacts. 
Table 4.2 shows the nature of grouping conducted by identifying metadata associations in digital 
evidence. Since the primary method for determining associations is through metadata matches, 
irrespective of the nature of the sources of digital evidence, if all the digital artifacts are of the 
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same type, i.e., homogeneous, then the process is similar to classification where groups are 
identified based on the values. For instance, all files in a file system, irrespective of the 
application type, contain some file system metadata. Naturally, when I apply the MAM using file 
system metadata, files containing identical values for file owner, last modified timestamp, file 
size, etc. are grouped together and this can also be achieved using a classification technique that 
pivots on those metadata. However, when a file and a log record are “associated” based on 
timestamp metadata, it conveys extra meaning in terms of the higher level actions of a user that 
can be discerned from this grouping. For instance, when a file f is grouped with a log record r 
belonging to application A, then we could infer that “application A was used to modify file f ” 
which can be a valuable inference during analysis. By virtue of the difference in the native 
representation of these digital artifacts, classification may not be able to identify the inherent 
relationship30. Therefore, the power of the metadata association model is best taken advantage of 
when there is inherent heterogeneity in the digital artifacts, irrespective of the number of sources 
of digital evidence from which they come. 
Source of Digital 
Evidence/Nature of Digital 
Artifacts 
Across multiple 
Homogeneous digital 
artifacts 
Across multiple 
Heterogeneous digital 
artifacts 
Across single or multiple 
Homogeneous source(s) 
Classification based 
grouping 
Association based 
grouping 
Across multiple 
Heterogeneous sources 
Classification based 
grouping 
Association based 
grouping 
Table 4.2 Tabulating the nature of grouping conducted across diverse sources and digital artifacts 
  
When we group the associated digital artifacts for forensic analysis, it is necessary to define the 
semantics related to underlying metadata associations between digital artifacts that pertain to 
events of interest. In the sequel, I define digital artifact relationships based on the metadata 
associations for files and log records. 
                                                          
30
 This is particularly so if the timestamp in the log record and the file metadata are slightly different. While 
classification may ignore the chronology in the two artifacts, the MAM will associate them to identify the higher-
level event that is being described. 
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4.9 Deriving Digital Artifact Relationships from Metadata Associations 
When we determine metadata associations across artifacts, it underlines the relationship between 
the artifacts which can reveal the nature of activities recorded. In this section, I define eight types 
of artifact relationships based on metadata associations to conduct analysis.  
4.9.1 Existence Relationship 
When a metadata match occurs in the source metadata family for metadata filename or 
Title/Subject of the file between files f1 and f2, where f1 and f2 reside on different homogeneous 
sources, I define an existence relationship between the files. The files themselves need not belong 
to the same application type, but only contain the metadata that leads to a metadata association, 
e.g., .DOC and .BAK or .TMP. The relationship is denoted by Re and it may be expressed as f1 Re 
f2. By definition this relationship is commutative and associative. The association groups 
containing such relationship pairs in evidence are referred to as existence association groups. 
Therefore,  
1. f1 Re f2  f2 Re f1               …(15) 
2. (f1 Re f2) (f2 Re f3) (f1 Re f3)             …(16) 
When multiple such files (f1, f2, f3, …fn) exhibit an identical association between each other, e.g., 
produce a metadata match for the same value of filename, I represent this relationship as Re (f1, f2, 
f3, …fn). 
4.9.2 Source Relationship 
When a metadata match occurs in the source metadata family between files f1 and f2, where f1 and 
f2 belong to the user file system, I define a source relationship between the files indicating that the 
files were likely to be created on the same source as identified the respective metadata. The 
relationship is denoted as Rs and is expressed as f1 Rs f2. By definition this relationship is 
commutative and associative. Therefore,  
1. f1 Rs f2  f2 Rs f1               …(17) 
2. (f1 Rs f2) (f2 Rs f3) (f1 Rs f3)             …(18) 
When multiple such files (f1, f2, f3, …fn) exhibit an identical association between each other, e.g., 
produce a metadata match for the same value of computer name or software, I represent this 
relationship as Rs (f1, f2, f3, …fn). 
 
 
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4.9.3 Happens Before Relationship 
When a metadata match occurs on the ownership metadata family of log files such as the log 
records of the web history and cache logs of a web browser, I define a happens before 
relationship indicating the occurrence of a web page visit prior to the download of the specified 
resource on the cache log. The relationship is denoted by Rh and expressed as x Rh y where x is the 
digital artifact corresponding to the browser history log and y is the artifact corresponding to the 
browser cache log. In general, for two events x, y, time(x) < time(y) indicating that x happened 
before y, and the interpretation of this relationship is that event y occurred after event x. This 
relationship is purely concerned with the associations between events that exist based on the 
metadata and those that can be practically detected using a deterministic algorithm. Whether these 
events were causally related or not cannot be decided based on the timestamps alone, and in 
general, such decisions are to a human forensic examiner. The discussion regarding the causality 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. By definition, the relationship is not commutative but is 
associative. 
(x Rh y)(y Rh z)   (x Rh z)              …(19) 
 
4.9.4 Download Relationship 
When the filename of a file f on the user file system generates a source metadata family metadata 
match with a download resource r recorded in a browser cache log, I define a download 
relationship indicating the download of the resource r to the user file system. The relationship is 
denoted by Rd and expressed as f Rd r indicating the creation of f implies the download of resource 
r. 
4.9.5 Parallel Occurrence Relationship 
When a metadata match occurs in the timestamp metadata family between two files f1 and f2, 
where f1 and f2 belong to the user file system, I define a parallel occurrence relationship 
indicating that the two files f1 and f2 were accessed at the same time identified by the matching 
value of the timestamps in their metadata. This relationship is purely concerned with the 
associations between events that exist based on the metadata and those that can be practically 
detected using a deterministic algorithm. Whether the association leads to the determination of 
parallelism in the abstract sense is beyond the scope of this thesis and often left to the judgment of 
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a human forensic examiner. The relationship is denoted by Rpo and expressed as f1 Rpo f2. By 
definition, this relationship is commutative and associative. Therefore,  
1. f1 Rpo f2  f2 Rpo f1               …(20) 
2. (f1 Rpo f2) (f2 Rpo f3) (f1 Rpo f3)             …(21) 
When multiple such files (f1, f2, f3, …fn) exhibit an identical association between each other, e.g., 
produce a metadata match for at least one timestamp on the same value, I represent this 
relationship as Rpo (f1, f2, f3, …fn). 
4.9.6 Structure Similarity Relationship 
When a metadata match occurs in the application metadata family between two files f1 and f2, 
where f1 and f2 belong to the user file system, I define a structure similarity relationship indicating 
that the two files f1 and f2 have identical or equivalent attributes. The relationship is denoted by Rss 
and expressed as f1 Rss f2. By definition, this relationship is commutative and associative. 
Therefore,  
1. f1 Rss f2  f2 Rss f1               …(22) 
2. (f1 Rss f2) (f2 Rss f3) (f1 Rss f3)             …(23) 
When multiple such files (f1, f2, f3, …fn) exhibit an identical association between each other, e.g., 
produce a metadata match for the same value of content type or file size, I represent this 
relationship as Rss (f1, f2, f3, …fn). 
4.9.7 Unauthenticated Modification Relationship 
When two files f1 and f2 differ in metadata only with respect to the structural composition of the 
files and the software exclusively present in only one of the files, it indicates an unauthenticated 
modification relationship denoted by Rua and expressed as f1 Rua f2. The relationship, by definition, 
is commutative.  
4.9.8 Majority Relationship 
When two files f1 and f2 have an unauthenticated modification relationship, in the presence of a 
third file f3 which contains a source relationship with either f1 or f2, then that pair of files is said to 
exert a majority relationship, denoted by Rm, over the other file. Therefore,  
(f1 Rua f2) (f1 Rs f3) (f1, f3) Rm f2.             …(24) 
 
 
 
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When such relationships are determined across digital artifacts on the same homogeneous source, 
it results in similarity pockets if exactly one metadata match is discovered or similarity groups in 
the case of multiple metadata matches. Across multiple sources, as in the case of the existence 
relationship, this would result in association groups. Selecting the right MAM group, one can 
determine either a single relationship or combinations of multiple relationships as the case may 
be. Using these eight relationships identified through metadata associations, I show how to 
discover evidence of files downloaded from the Internet, files likely to be downloaded from the 
Internet, the source of the download and doctored files. This is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 in 
the context of digital image files and word processing documents respectively. 
Once the association groups are generated after applying my model, the related digital artifacts 
can be sequenced on a timeline for analysis. This is achieved by sequencing the timestamps in 
metadata into a unified sequence. However, since association groups typically contain 
heterogeneous digital artifacts, possibly across different sources of digital evidence, the timestamp 
interpretations can be a challenge. In the sequel, I discuss this problem in detail.  
4.10 Timestamp Interpretations across Heterogeneous Sources  
To determine evidence relevant to an investigation, it is necessary to analyze the artifacts that 
were created, accessed or modified closer to the time of a reported incident that is being 
investigated. In such situations, one can set up time windows and analyze the artifacts that were 
created, accessed or modified within it. Such time windows are relevant only if the artifacts’ 
timestamps are chronologically ordered or digitally time-lined.  
Timelines are usually generated using the timestamps recorded in the artifacts’ metadata. 
However, when associating timestamps, the syntactic associations as discussed in Section 4.4 
cannot be applied readily. This is because timestamps have varied representations across different 
systems (refer to Chapter 2). Broadly speaking, there are three types of challenges that can arise 
when dealing with timestamps from across heterogeneous sources. Apart from basic syntax 
aspects, there are the following other two types of challenges:  
1. Time zone reference and timestamp interpretation; and 
2. Clock skew, clock drift and synchronization. 
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A consequence of these challenges is that a syntactic association need not necessarily lead to a 
semantic association between the artifacts. For instance, two files with creation timestamps 
09:30:00 AM July 25
th
 2011 AEST and 09:30:00 July 25
th
 2011 GMT have a syntactic association 
but may not share a semantic relationship as these timestamps are 10 hours apart. It is necessary to 
take cognizance of these interpretation challenges when metadata associations are applied to 
timestamps. In this section, I examine such timestamp interpretation challenges. 
4.10.1 Timestamps and Digital Events 
We adopt the timestamp definition given by Dyreson and Snoddgrass [55]. Timestamps are an 
important part of metadata that are scrutinized during analysis. File systems typically record these 
three timestamps for each file that is stored within it. These timestamps indicate when a particular 
artifact was created, last accessed or last modified, as the case may be. Timestamps are also 
recorded on log files and network packet captures and these correspond to the events relevant to 
the respective logging context. In general, there are many types of events and in my research, I am 
concerned with five types of events: 
1. File Create event: creation of a file in a file system 
2. File Modify event: modification of a file in a file system 
3. File Access event: accessing a file in a file system 
4. Logged event: an event logged by some system or application (e.g., Web 
server, Internet browser) 
5. Packet event: the arrival/receipt of a network packet on capture 
The first three events are specific to files on file systems, the fourth event is specific to records 
contained in log files and the last event is specific to network packets in a network capture file.  
4.10.2 Ambiguities in Timestamp Provenance  
Different digital sources record events differently and therefore the representations and resolutions 
of the timestamps also differ. In fact, even if multiple sources were obtained from the same 
location, the values for their timestamps could differ greatly. For one thing, if the location 
information where an NTFS or an EXT file system image was found is not recorded, it may be 
lost forever, since these file systems only record time with respect to UTC. As a result, whether 
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the timestamp was recorded in Sydney (UTC +1000) at 3:30:00 PM July 1
st
 or in New York (UTC 
-0400) at 10:30:00 PM the previous night, the timestamp would record a value corresponding to 
July 1
st
 5:30:00 AM UTC. Hence if the appropriate provenance of the timestamps is not recorded, 
despite the time-shift that is applied to the evidence on forensic tools, it can result in ambiguous 
timestamps which can lead to inconsistent timelines. 
4.10.3 Interpreting Timestamps Using Forensic tools 
On most forensic tools, the combination of source name and its type is sufficient to determine the 
timestamp representation format and its time reference. The event determines the specific event 
name or the file name as the case may be. These timestamps correspond to the MAC timestamps 
for documents on a file system. On Internet logs such as the history and cache, the semantics 
varies, but generally timestamps correspond to the last access of a URL (history) or the timestamp 
on the file system when a resource (represented by a URI) is saved (cache) on the file system. 
Typically, forensic analysis tools read the timestamps’ values and while rendering, apply a fixed 
time zone shift to obtain the UTC (Universal Coordinated Time) value. In the case of timestamps 
from the NTFS or EXT file system, the timestamps are available in UTC and the shift is applied to 
obtain the local timestamp. The time shift corresponds to the time difference between UTC and 
the local time where the evidence was acquired. This time zone information is obtained out-of-
band and all timestamps are adjusted with a uniform translation. The forensic tools process an 
entire forensic image at a time and hence do not maintain separate time zone information for each 
artifact within the image. That is to say, when a file system is analyzed, the same time zone offset 
is applied to the files in the file system as is to the Internet logs discovered within it. However, 
often file systems and logs from different homogeneous sources do not maintain the same time 
reference. I illustrate a generic model (in XML) for representing timestamps in Figure 4.16.  
 
Figure 4.16 Generic timestamp structure 
  
The timestamp model shown in Figure 4.16 is an abstraction of the representation for a 
timestamps as observed in most forensic tools. The timestamp values that are not recorded are 
<timestamp>
<source-name> name </source-name>
<source-type> type </source-type>
<event> event-name </event>
<modified> value </modified>
<created> value </created>
<last-accessed> value </last-accessed>
</timestamp>
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represented by null. The source name uniquely identifies the evidence source and the type 
identifies the type of source, such as a hard disk image or log or network packet capture. The 
event identifies the specific event that is represented and created, modified and last-accessed refer 
to the timestamps with usual meaning. 
4.10.4 The Timestamp Interpretation Problem 
The time-lining tools, currently in existence, do not carry forward the time reference information 
for analysis. While forensic toolkits such as Encase, FTK or Sleuthkit can take a time-reference as 
input, it is usually a fixed offset value common to all the contents on a forensic acquired medium. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4.17. 
 
Figure 4.17 Timeline generation using traditional forensic tools 
  
Consider how the conventional method works in the generation of a timeline. A forensic image is 
loaded into some forensic tool and the timestamps corresponding to the artifacts are extracted 
(using a fixed time zone offset) using the tools such as Encase, FTK, Sleuthkit. The timestamps 
are then sequenced using an analysis tool like log2timeline. Usually if the artifacts were obtained 
from the same source, all timestamps are treated as obtained in the same time zone. However, a 
hard disk as we all know is a mixture of all types of events, each having its own reference clock. 
Therefore applying a fixed time zone reference cannot always provide a homogeneous and 
consistent timeline. The time reference and the timestamp representation of these timestamps can 
significantly impact the timeline generated. For instance, if we consider a FAT file system with a 
Windows operating system, the files store timestamps as local system time while the Internet 
Forensic 
disk image
Forensic Tool
Time zone offset
Fixed offset
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Explorer application stores the browser log event timestamps in UTC, rendered in local time zone. 
I illustrate this challenge in Figure 4.18.  
 
Figure 4.18 Differences in timestamp interpretation across timestamps with different timezone references 
  
A timestamp can either have a local reference or some known global reference. For a local 
timestamp, one requires a time zone offset to determine its corresponding global value and vice 
versa for timestamp with global reference to determine its local time zone value. The two offsets 
are never the same. This results in two distinct problems with regard to timestamp interpretation. 
They are: 
1. A timestamp in local time without zone information (in FAT file systems and ZIP 
file formats) 
2. A timestamp in UTC time without zone information (in NTFS/EXTx file systems) 
One important drawback with regard to present-day digital time-lining tools is that they do not 
interpret the value of timestamps obtained from the source during digital time-lining. The values 
are used as they are found on the source (in the appropriate representation format), except 
perhaps, when a fixed time zone shift is applied. I illustrate the ambiguities that result from 
challenges (1) and (2) in Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20 respectively. 
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Figure 4.19 Intrinsic FAT32 timestamp interpreted with global timezone reference at a different location 
  
 
Figure 4.20 Intrinsic NTFS timestamp interpreted on a FAT32 file system 
  
To address these challenges, it is necessary to distinguish the various homogeneous sources 
present even within a single forensic medium and develop a provenance model that is capable of 
recording sufficient provenance to facilitate accurate timestamp interpretation. The model should 
be capable of recording information relating to when and how a particular homogeneous source 
was acquired, its time zone shift with respect to UTC and ideally clock skew information. Such a 
provenance model will allow computing accurate timestamps to generate the unified timeline, is 
described in the following section.  
4.11 Provenance Information Model to Normalize Timestamp 
Interpretation 
The Provenance Information Model (or PIM) parallels the concept of Turner’s digital evidence 
bags [190], albeit with a practical outlook. While DEB records acquisition metadata such as date 
and time of acquisition, the size and contents of the source and so on, it fails to record time zone 
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information especially when dealing with FAT file systems on hard disks or ZIP archive files and 
so on.  
4.11.1 Structure for Provenance Information Model 
The PIM defines a structure for recording the time information associated with a homogeneous 
source for analysis that incorporates time zone shifts on individual timestamps to obtain values in 
reference to a single time zone. Each homogeneous source is associated with its own PIM to 
uniquely carry forward its time reference. The provenance information model for each 
homogeneous source records four important components that is carried forward along with the 
homogeneous source during analysis, viz., 
1. time zone information from where the homogeneous source was obtained, 
2. any known clock skew for the homogeneous source when acquired, 
3. summary of the acquisition process, and 
4. assertions about events recorded in the homogeneous source. 
The time zone information records the time shift of the event timestamps on a particular 
homogeneous source from UTC. Day light savings, if applicable, are also recorded alongside the 
time zone information. The PIM corresponding to the source provided in the DFRWS 2008 
forensic challenge [51] contains UTC -0500 to denote the time zone of the location in the eastern 
coast of United States where the events were recorded. This information is recorded as a part of 
each homogeneous source identified in the evidence source. It is applied to the timestamps on 
files within ZIP archives, FAT user folder and the contents of browser cache to obtain global 
reference values (e.g. UTC) to generate a unified timeline. Known clock skew is also recorded 
and separately represented as a shift denoting number of seconds each timestamp is skewed off 
the reference clock. Unlike clock skew, clock drift presents a greater challenge as it is necessary 
to determine the exact rate at which the timestamps started to drift and the accumulated drift at the 
time of the acquisition (w.r.t. a reference clock). 
4.11.2 Resilient Timestamps 
Reference clock information for evidence is typically obtained out-of-band from the evidence 
location and transferred through manual documentation. This information, applied through 
forensic tools, incorporates a fixed offset to the evidence contents, without discrimination. It is 
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however, necessary to acknowledge that there can be multiple homogeneous sources within a 
single forensic medium and each source requires a separate storage mechanism to record the 
respective time zone shifts. The PIM forms that medium; the PIM is essential for FAT file systems 
where time zone information is not recorded. ZIP archives do not carry MAC information of their 
own, and only store the last modified timestamp of the files archived in them, that too in local 
time with reference to where the archive was created. Therefore, while examining ZIP archives, 
the PIM can be important to trace the provenance of the archived files. In essence, the PIM 
recorded for a particular homogeneous source is applied to each timestamp to derive a referenced 
local timestamp and corresponding global (UTC) timestamp for:  
i. a local timestamp with no time zone information; and  
ii. a global timestamp with no local time zone information. 
Besides this, the reference clock information can also be used to reverse inadvertent time zone 
shifts caused by analysis tools while processing the homogeneous sources, rendering the 
timestamps resilient to time zone shifts which can produce a robust timeline.  
By virtue of the resilience imparted to the timestamps, the PIM is not merely a place-holder for 
reference clock information; the PIM can also be used to validate and identify, if not correct, 
ambiguous or uncertain timestamps. When assertions are recorded in the PIM, those assertions 
can be validated during digital time-lining. A variety of assertions can be recorded in the PIM; for 
example, one may assert that all documents in a user folder have the same value for the metadata 
‘Author’. 
4.11.3 Identifying and Validating Inconsistent Timestamps 
Maintaining the UTC and a local timestamp value for each timestamp serves two purposes; firstly, 
to digitally timeline the events with respect to global reference, the UTC is used to which all event 
timestamps, irrespective of the homogeneous source type are converted, and secondly, the local 
time zone can be used to allow for assertions and hypothesis within the PI of each homogeneous 
source that can be tested and reported back to the examiner on the outcome. For example, the 
examiner may posit that documents should have been used between working hours, i.e., the 
timestamps should have been recorded after 9 AM and before 5 PM on a weekday. Note that the 
examiner need not be certain that these values are necessarily correct. If this hypothesis was 
indeed true, it can allow one to omit files considered irrelevant and focus on a narrower group.  
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An examiner can make assertions such as, “All timestamps found on a particular homogeneous 
source should have timestamps less than the date and time when that homogeneous source was 
acquired”. When this assertion is satisfied, it guarantees that the homogeneous source has been 
processed according to proper procedures as a sanity check mechanism. On the other hand, if this 
assertion is not satisfied, one of two possibilities is likely, either the chain of custody is faulty, or 
the timestamps were intentionally tampered. While it is still possible for such timestamps to be 
found with no malicious intent, such decisions are left to the examiner. 
The design and implementation of my provenance information model is discussed in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis. I conclude this chapter with a brief summary of the work reported. 
4.12 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I conducted a review of contemporary forensic and analysis tools to abstract the 
different functionalities supported to analyze different sources of digital evidence. This review 
culminated in the design of the functional Forensic Integration Architecture which consolidated 
these functionalities and defined a new layer to group artifacts based on metadata associations. I 
conducted experiments to elicit the syntax and semantics associated with metadata associations 
which were determined through the identification of metadata matches. I generalized my findings 
which resulted in the metadata association model. These contributions directly address my 
research objectives stated in Chapter 1 towards developing a framework for identifying 
associations in digital evidence using metadata. The architecture has resulted in a design for an 
analysis engine to analyze metadata associations among sources of digital evidence. The design of 
this tool is discussed in the next chapter. 
We identified and highlighted the interpretation challenges in processing timestamp-based 
associations across heterogeneous sources during analysis. To address this challenge, I developed 
the provenance information model which develops resilient timestamps for digital time-lining 
across multiple sources. I developed a prototype toolkit implementing this model and generate a 
unified timeline. The design of this tool is discussed in the next chapter. 
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“No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single 
experiment can prove me wrong.” 
- Albert Einstein 
 
 
 
5. Prototype 
Implementation 
In this chapter, I present a practical framework to validate the metadata associations model 
(MAM) designed in Chapter 4 to identify metadata associations across multiple sources and group 
them. This chapter describes my demonstrable implementations of the metadata association and 
provenance information models which were used to translate forensic questions into MAM based 
experiments. I have developed two prototype toolkits which I describe in this chapter. The first 
prototype, called the AssocGEN analysis engine, is used to identify generic metadata matches 
across digital artifacts and group the associated artifacts, and the second, called UniTIME, is used 
to incorporate the provenance information model for timestamp interpretation and generate a 
unified timeline across multiple sources. 
5.1 Prototype Development One: The AssocGEN Analysis Engine 
The AssocGEN Analysis Engine was my research prototype implementation of the MAM used to 
access heterogeneous sources of digital evidence and unify the analysis by identifying metadata 
matches between them. Its design adopts many of the principles proposed in f-FIA (Section 4.2) 
but exclusively focusses on the development of the Evidence Composition layer to combine digital 
artifacts using metadata associations. The AssocGEN architecture is shown in Figure 5.1. 
AssocGEN can extract metadata from digital artifacts belonging to forensic hard disk images, 
Internet browser logs (both history and cache logs) and network packet captures. AssocGEN was 
developed in Java and is cross-platform compliant. 
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Figure 5.1 The AssocGEN architecture 
  
5.1.1 Rationale for the Design 
AssocGEN was primarily designed with the view of abstracting current technological support 
extended to heterogeneous sources of digital evidence. My review of contemporary forensic and 
analysis tools (refer to Chapter 4) informs this design. Since my primary focus in this analysis 
engine was to extract metadata associations across heterogeneous digital artifact, I adopted 
suitable software support to implement the lower layers that conform to forensic requirements 
[130]. Besides this, as I focused on using the metadata extracted/parsed from digital artifacts and 
not the entire evidence source, it was sufficient to implement these functionalities using existing 
software libraries. This rationale applies to the lower layer implementation of both prototypes, 
AssocGEN, in this section and UniTIME, described in the following section. The Digital 
Evidence layer provides binary-stream access to digital evidence. In current technology, the file 
system support provided in Sleuthkit, the evidence image libraries ewflib and afflib and the 
Snorkel file system library are potential candidates to provide this support. 
Among these, Sleuthkit
31
 accesses a source of digital evidence as a monolithic bit stream and 
handling discrete objects such as digital artifacts and metadata can be an implementation 
                                                          
31
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challenge. The ewflib
32
 has similar concerns, best taken advantage of using commercial forensic 
toolkits like Encase which encapsulate using proprietary binary stream interfaces. The afflib 
accesses a source of digital evidence as inodes which store the attribute related to the contents. 
The abstractions modeled in the afflib
33
 library are more conducive to raw binary data and stream 
processing rather than the discrete digital artifact abstraction which is the focus of my work. Afflib 
was therefore, restrictive in terms of being able to define a generic metadata structure to 
determining metadata matches. The Snorkel
34
 library, on the other hand, provided the necessary 
abstractions to handle digital artifacts as read-only nodes with metadata. Besides, being developed 
in Java, it can readily integrate with other Java libraries for log parsing and network packet 
analysis which can be automated. Hence, I chose Snorkel to implement file system support and 
digital artifact traversal in forensic images. 
With regard to the metadata parsers from file systems, there were three contenders, viz., the 
libextractor
35
, fiwalk
36
 and the apache tika
37
 libraries. Of these, the libextractor was completely 
built in C and had (at that time) limited file metadata support to word processing documents. 
Besides this, the memory requirements to handle the metadata structures and determine 
associations during runtime were very demanding. fiwalk was also developed in C and more 
conducive to Linux environments where an ‘inode’ implementation was handy, but its metadata 
extractor was in its early stages of development. In comparison, the apache tika library was 
developed in Java which could be readily integrated with my digital evidence access layer 
implementation and provided the necessary abstractions to deal with metadata matches at the 
digital artifact level. The abstractions supported by apache tika were readily mapped to event 
semantics that allowed effective grouping of digital artifacts that were deemed related through 
metadata associations. Therefore, I chose apache tika to implement the metadata parsers in 
AssocGEN. 
To process the log records and network packets individually, I processed logs and network traces 
and translated them into XML where each tag represented an attribute. The Internet browser logs 
and network packet captures, which were initially extracted as files from a file system, were 
converted into XML and then parsed into individual log records and network packets from their 
                                                          
32
 http://code.google.com/p/libewf/ 
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 http://www.holmes.nl/NFIlabs/snorkel.html 
35
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respective schema. The metadata obtained from each evidence source, viz., file system, or log or 
network packet capture, was represented as a list of hash tables indexed by the file path in the case 
of files and a numerical event ID in the case of Internet browser logs or network packet captures. 
The XML representation for the logs and the network packets contained tags which were 
extracted as metadata. I developed XML parsers to process Internet browser logs and network 
packet captures and extract the attributes of the records from the logs and the packets in the 
network packet captures in AssocGEN. The completed prototype toolkit spans over 20000 lines of 
Java code and consists of multiple modules. The modules are pluggable at runtime and can access 
and parse files and folders from most common file systems such as FAT32, NTFS, EXT2, EXT3 
and HFS+, web page visitation and cache logs on browser applications and network packets 
contained within packet captures.  
5.1.2 Digital Evidence Layer 
The Digital Evidence layer was built using the Snorkel forensic library which is responsible for 
providing raw binary access through a forensic file system interface. The snorkel library mirrors 
the functionality of the fiwalk tool [69]. Internet browser logs and network packet captures were 
treated as record-based files and this layer provides preliminary secure access to such files. The 
digital evidence layer provides regulated bit-stream access to the various different digital evidence 
sources from the upper layers. The layer allows unidirectional data flow ensuring read-only access 
to forensic images, file systems, Internet browser logs and network packet captures implemented 
by the snorkel forensic image interface. The snorkel interface allows traversing multiple forensic 
images without compromising data integrity. 
5.1.3 Digital Artifact Traversal & Metadata Parsing Layer 
The digital artifact extraction and metadata parser layer is composed of third party applications 
that I designed to traverse the digital artifacts and parse the metadata. This layer is implemented 
using the Apache tika metadata extractor library to parse metadata from files and log analyzers to 
traverse log records and network packets and parse their attributes. I extract the metadata from 
files based on the file MIME type. The MIME type for a file is identified by determining its 
encoding type in conjunction with its magic numbers identifying the file beginnings and endings. 
The browser logs are initially processed by a third party application (Nirsoft browser analyzer38) 
into XML which is then read by my parsers to extract the attributes for individual browser events. 
                                                          
38
 http://www.nirsoft.net/web_browser_tools.html 
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The browser history is equivalent to a log that contains URI records; the specific web pages 
visited, its domain name, and the last visit timestamp were regarded as its metadata. Similarly, on 
a network packet, the packet timestamp, source and destination IP addresses, and protocol are 
regarded as associated metadata. The current implementation for parsing logs supports Internet 
browser (history and cache) logs for the Internet Explorer, the Mozilla Firefox and the Apple 
Safari, accessing all related log event attributes as the metadata corresponding to each bowser log 
event. Besides this, the network module can scan captured network packets accessing all packet 
related attributes as the metadata corresponding to each packet. 
5.1.4 Evidence Composition Layer 
The Evidence Composition layer comprises of algorithms that seek metadata matches between the 
various digital artifacts and group them. These groupings are merged and can be presented to a 
forensics examiner for analysis. Although the MAM groups all digital artifacts which have 
associated metadata into an association group, AssocGEN is configured to prioritize based on 
metadata matches by determining the source, ownership and timestamps of digital artifacts, for 
instance, all digital images captured using a Canon Powershot A70 camera on September 11th, 
2011.  
Between two or more digital artifacts, a single metadata match can lead to a set of digital artifacts 
that have an identical value for that metadata tag name. Such a set was termed a similarity pocket 
as per Section 4.5. Each pocket is identified by the metadata tag name. A set of artifacts may have 
multiple metadata tag matches giving rise to multiple similarity pockets each including an 
identical subset of artifacts—multiply matched subset artifacts are a special case of a similarity 
pocket that I term a multi pocket. Similarity pockets may also overlap partially in regard to their 
elements, i.e., digital artifacts. If there are two overlapping similarity pockets within a single 
source of digital evidence, these are merged into a similarity group as per Section 4.5. When such 
similarity groups match across multiple sources, these are merged into an association group as per 
Section 4.5. Merging the overlapping similarity pockets is continued until all transitive overlaps 
are accounted for. When multiple similarity pockets are merged into a similarity group and 
multiple similarity groups into an association group, the individual similarity pockets and 
similarity groups in the repository are replaced with the resultant association group incorporating 
all the metadata matches.  
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Digital artifacts may belong to different types but have metadata tags with identical or similar 
semantics. Therefore, metadata tag equivalence was established for those metadata tags whose 
values tend to be of the same type, i.e., metadata tags that take the names of individuals, metadata 
tags that take the values of applications, metadata tags that take timestamps, and so on. Such 
equivalence relations are configured into AssocGEN ahead of execution depending on the 
diversity that the sources of evidence present. For instance, the author name on a document could 
match the username in a record from Internet browser logs or the attribute timestamp in browser 
history logs can match with the corresponding timestamp in network packet captures and so on. 
The algorithms terminate when all the digital artifacts in the digital artifact and metadata 
repository have been grouped or classified. 
In each case, the set of N distinct homogeneous sources of digital evidence is provided as input. A 
source si contains Ni digital artifacts and the j
th
 digital artifact a
i
j is associated with a metadata 
vector m
i
j = (m
ij
1, m
ij
2, …, m
ij
k, …, m
ij
M). The naïve algorithm to determine metadata matches 
across the sources of digital evidence is described in Algorithm 5.1. The free-running variable t 
accounts for the different disjoint similarity pockets or groups generated within a source and 
association groups generated across all sources and t is a member of the set of natural numbers N. 
The desired output is the set of all association groups represented by the set AG in the algorithm. 
Association Grouping Algorithm 
Given: S = {s1, s2, s3, … sN}, the set of all discrete homogeneous sources of digital evidence 
 Ai = {a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3, … a
i
Ni}, the set of all digital artifacts belonging to source si, i ∈ [1, N] 
Mi = {m
i
1, m
i
2, m
i
3, …, m
i
Ni}, the set of all metadata vectors corresponding to each a
i
j ∈ Ai,  
j ∈ [1, Ni] 
Output: AG, the set of all association groups generated on S 
begin algorithm 
for each si ∈ S do 
 for each a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
  for each m
ij
k ∈ m
i
j corresponding to the j
th
 artifact a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
   sp
ik
t ← {a
i
j | j ∈ [1, Ni], (∃v, m
ij
k = v)}  
  end for 
 end for 
 SP
i
 ← {spikt  | k ∈ [1, M], t ∈ N} 
end for 
for each sp
ik
t ∈ SP
i
 do 
sg
i
t ← largest union (until transitive closure) over those similarity pockets that 
overlap on artifacts across all metadata m
ij
k ∈ m
i
j, for all k ∈ [1, M] 
end for 
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SG ← {sgit | i ∈ [1, N], t ∈ N} 
for each sg
i
t ∈ SG do 
agt ← largest union (until transitive closure) over those similarity groups that 
contain at least one metadata match based on a metadata equivalence 
relationship between the sources  
end for 
AG ← {agt | t ∈ N} 
Display AG as output 
end algorithm 
 
Algorithm 5.1 Association grouping algorithm  
No processing occurs if all the similarity pockets are disjoint, viz., they contain no common 
artifacts. If metadata were unavailable in digital artifacts for any reason, those artifacts are 
removed to an unclassified list. This list can be separately presented to a forensics examiner who 
may manually examine the files for content using a different tool like Sleuthkit or FTK.  
5.1.4.1 Metadata Equivalence in AssocGEN 
AssocGEN allows the establishment of equivalence relationships between metadata tag names to 
support the identification of metadata matches across heterogeneous digital artifacts. In terms of 
the model, it allows the expansion of the similarity groups in each of the sources of digital 
evidence into association groups. I establish equivalence between the following sets of metadata: 
1. Ownership, author(s) in files and usernames in system and application logs; 
2. MAC timestamps, document metadata timestamps in files and log event timestamps in 
system and application logs and network packet timestamps in network packet captures; 
3. IP addresses and domain names from DNS lookups in browser logs and network packet 
captures; 
4. Filesizes from file system metadata with ‘Filesize’ and ‘Content size’ in document 
metadata; 
5. ‘Subject’ and ‘Title’ metadata in Microsoft Office documents; 
6. ‘Creator’ and ‘Publisher’ metadata in Microsoft Office documents; and 
7. ‘Source’ in packet captures with ‘Domain’ in browser logs. 
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In each case where metadata equivalence is established, the metadata tag names are treated as 
identical and value matches are determined. Each value match gives rise to an association group if 
the digital artifacts corresponding to that association were not already a part of any other 
association group.  
5.1.4.2 Configuring and Controlling Metadata Associations in AssocGEN 
Typically, AssocGEN extracts all metadata from each digital artifact and groups artifacts 
according to the inherent metadata matches. As this can be an exhaustive approach with 
significant computational complexity, I have also developed an alternate implementation for 
AssocGEN that allows a user to specify a subset of metadata from the digital artifacts (either 
based on apriori knowledge or based on a cursory manual examination of the file metadata), often 
based on their application type, in order to contain the number of metadata matches found and 
hence constrain the size of the groups formed. This approach enables a user to focus on the 
relevant sets of associations and quickly identify the relevant artifacts for further analysis. 
The AssocGEN user interface customized to analyze files from file systems is illustrated in Figure 
5.2 and Figure 5.3. The user interface is customized to determine patterns that are specific to the 
type of files being analyzed and relevant during an investigation. Each association class indicated 
in the snapshot results in a classification that is used to prime the process of identifying 
associations between the files across these classes. For example, when a camera based 
classification is chosen, the digital image files are organized according to their EXIF metadata and 
the digital images that are associated across different cameras are identified using metadata 
associations. An instance of this can be digital images taken with different cameras but edited 
with the same photo-editing software. The resultant groupings contain those digital images that 
are associated by their subsequent manipulation rather than containing images captured with the 
same digital camera. 
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Figure 5.2 AssocGEN User Interface to analyze collections of digital image files from Digital Evidence 
  
 
Figure 5.3 AssocGEN User Interface to analyze word processing documents from Digital Evidence 
  
During analysis a forensics examiner may need to analyze all related artifacts on a source together 
and determining such related items can be a strenuous task. As observed earlier, this can involve 
multiple keyword searches and analysis to determine those sets of artifacts that are considered 
“relevant”. The AssocGEN engine allows a user to simply select an artifact at random and 
generates a list of all artifacts on the same source or across all sources (as configured) by 
determining all associated artifacts. It is also likely that an artifact that is found during a search is 
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related to other artifacts on a different metadata name. However, for the purpose of analysis, it is 
necessary to take such associations into account. Therefore, AssocGEN also determines all second 
level, third level and further levels of searches until all artifacts that can be potentially associated 
across all possible metadata combinations are determined. Such an incremental approach adopts 
an incremental search method as given in Algorithm 5.2. The desired output is the association 
group corresponding to the seed artifact a
i
j from the source si. This is represented by the set AG in 
the algorithm. 
Incremental Association Builder Algorithm 
Given: S = {s1, s2, s3, … sN}, the set of all discrete homogeneous sources of digital evidence 
 Ai = {a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3, … a
i
Ni}, the set of all digital artifacts belonging to source si, i ∈ [1, N] 
Mi = {m
i
1, m
i
2, m
i
3, …, m
i
Ni}, the set of all metadata vectors corresponding to each a
i
j ∈ Ai, j ∈ [1, 
Ni] 
Seed: Vector m
i
j corresponding to the j
th
 artifact a
i
j ∈ Ai for some source si, i ∈ [1, N] 
Output: AG, the association group corresponding to seed artifact a
i
j for some  j∈ [1, Ni] on source si 
begin algorithm 
 SGi ← ∅ 
 procedure similarity group (input: seed artifact a
i
j): 
 for each m
ij
k ∈ m
i
j corresponding to the j
th
 artifact a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
  sp
i
k
 ← {aij | j ∈ [1, Ni], (∃v, m
ij
k = v)}  
 end for 
sgi ← 
1
M
k
sp
i
k 
SGi ← SGi sgi 
end similarity group 
Move all artifacts a
i
j ∈ sgi to list L; remove seed artifact from L 
while L not empty do 
temp ← first artifact in L 
Perform similarity group (input: temp) 
Remove temp from L 
end while 
for each si ∈ S do 
for each a
i
j ∈ SGi do 
Determine artifacts on all other sources where metadata equivalence relationship 
exists 
Append artifacts to list L indexed as (artifact a
i
j, source si); omit repetitions 
end for 
 end for 
while L not empty do 
temp ← first artifact in L 
Perform similarity group (input: temp) 
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Remove temp from L 
end while 
AG ←
1
N
i
SGi 
Display AG as output 
end algorithm 
Algorithm 5.2 Incremental association builder algorithm  
An interesting feature to note about the incremental algorithm is that since the associations are 
symmetric by definition, any artifact from a particular association group provided as seed input 
will result in the same association group. This provides a method to verify the correctness of the 
generated group by randomly testing the algorithms for any two artifacts belonging to the group. 
If the results do not coincide, it indicates that the transitive closure is not yet met and the 
algorithm must proceed to completion.  
In the sequel, I describe different metadata association algorithms that we’ve developed to answer 
the questions posed in Section 4.7 in the previous chapter. 
5.1.4.3 Metadata Association Algorithms to Determine Artifact Relationships 
The algorithms described in this section identify the relationships between artifacts as defined in 
Section 4.9. The relationships can exist based on an exact value match between two or more 
artifacts of the same type on the same homogeneous source or across heterogeneous artifacts 
based on a value match established through a metadata equivalence relationship on the 
corresponding metadata names across sources. In all the algorithms described below, the free-
running variable t accounts for the different disjoint similarity pockets or groups generated within 
a source and t is a member of the set of natural numbers N. 
In order to identify the digital artifacts belonging to the same source, I apply the source 
relationship (refer to Section 4.9.2) and identify all metadata associations that produce similarity 
pockets for each metadata in the source metadata family. Digital artifacts that produce multiple 
metadata matches are extracted from either similarity groups on a single source or from 
association group across multiple sources as per Algorithm 5.3. 
Source Identification Algorithm 
Given: S = {s1, s2, s3, … sN}, the set of all discrete homogeneous sources of digital evidence 
 Ai = {a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3, … a
i
Ni}, the set of all digital artifacts belonging to source si, i ∈ [1, N] 
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Mi = {m
i
1, m
i
2, m
i
3, …, m
i
Ni}, the set of all metadata vectors corresponding to each a
i
j ∈ Ai, j ∈ [1, 
Ni] 
Set L of metadata corresponding to the source metadata family on each source si 
Output: A list of sources stored in orgn and the corresponding sets of digital artifacts SP
i
 
begin algorithm 
orgn ← 0; SPi ← ∅ 
for each si ∈ S do 
 repeat 
for each a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
  for each m
ij
k ∈ m
i
j and m
ij
k ∈ L do 
   sp
ik
t ← {a
i
j | j ∈ [1, Ni], (∃v, m
ij
k = v)}  
  end for 
  end for 
  SP
i
 ← {spikt | k ∈ [1, M], i ∈ [1, N], t ∈ N} 
orgn ← list v of values corresponding to each similarity pocket in SPi 
until |orgn| = |SP
i
| 
end for 
Generate a list orgn of individuals or devices from all sp
ik
t ∈ SP
i
 where j ∈ [1, Ni], k ∈ [1, M]  
Display orgn, SP
i
 as outputs 
end algorithm 
Algorithm 5.3 MAM based Source identification algorithm  
For this algorithm, the list L maintains a list of those metadata that record values corresponding to 
source devices or software that were used to generate the artifact it was attributed to. The source 
device or software can be different from the source of digital evidence that contains the artifact. 
For instance, on a file, the list for possible sources can include the metadata ‘Author’, ‘Owner’, 
and ‘Computer-Name’. Where necessary, the metadata equivalence relationships are established 
across artifacts belonging to heterogeneous artifacts before executing the algorithm. The sets of 
pockets generated are arranged according to the source name which then characterizes the 
associations among the artifacts contained.  
The verification condition ‘|orgn| = |SPi|’ in the algorithm is used as a measure to test the 
completeness of the set of similarity pockets generated. When the verification condition is met, it 
indicates that transitive closure is achieved and that the algorithm can successfully terminate. 
When this condition is not met, the transitive closure is not yet achieved and the algorithm must 
iterate until the condition is satisfied. 
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Having grouped artifacts that demonstrate the same source associations, it may be necessary to 
also determine some artifacts from that set which are modified. Typically, this can imply that 
artifacts belonging to some source were doctored using same software. However when two 
artifacts demonstrate the software edited relationship, it may need to be established, with the 
presence of a third artifact, that in conjunction with the first artifact exerts a majority relationship. 
This is because, with regard to digital image files where this relationship holds forensic value, 
sometimes the absence of metadata can imply software activity, as in the case of digitally 
generated image files and image files downloaded from the Internet (for a detailed discussion, 
refer to Chapter 6). In order to identify all digital artifacts that were edited with a particular piece 
of software, I apply the unauthenticated modified relationship (refer to Section 4.9.7) and for each 
pair, identify a third digital artifact, two of which can exert a majority relationship (refer to 
Section 4.9.8) over the third for the ‘Software’ in the source metadata family as per 
Algorithm 5.4. For this task, the digital artifacts are homogeneous in nature and naturally will be 
contained within similarity groups. 
Edits Identification Algorithm 
Given: S = {s1, s2, s3, … sN}, the set of all discrete homogeneous sources of digital evidence 
 Ai = {a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3, … a
i
Ni}, the set of all digital artifacts belonging to source si, i ∈ [1, N] 
Mi = {m
i
1, m
i
2, m
i
3, …, m
i
Ni}, the set of all metadata vectors corresponding to each a
i
j ∈ Ai, j ∈ [1, 
Ni] 
Output: A list sftw of software and corresponding sets of digital artifacts SP
i
 
begin algorithm 
for each si ∈ S do 
 repeat 
 for each a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
  for each m
ij
k ∈ m
i
j corresponding to the j
th
 artifact a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
   sp
ik
t ← {a
i
j | j ∈ [1, Ni], (∃v, m
ij
k = v)}  
  end for 
  end for 
  SP
i
 ← {spikt | k ∈ [1, M], t ∈ N} 
Extract unauthenticated modification relationship {(a
i
j, a
i
k) | a
i
j Rua a
i
k, j ∈ SP
i
, 
k ∈ SPi} for each artifact aij from similarity pockets in SP
i 
 
  for each (a
i
j, a
i
k) pair identified do  
Identify a third artifact a
i
n such that a
i
n Rm a
i
j for similarity pockets in SP
i
 
end for 
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stfw ← source metadata name corresponding to the software that established the 
modified relationship Rm on triad a
i
j, a
i
k, a
i
n from similarity pockets in SP
i
 
until |sftw| = |SP
i
| 
Display sftw, SP
i
 for si as outputs 
end for 
end algorithm 
Algorithm 5.4 MAM based algorithm to identify software edits in digital artifacts  
As in the case of Algorithm 5.3, the verification condition ‘|sftw| = |SPi|’ in the algorithm is used 
as measure to test the completeness of the set of similarity pockets generated. When the 
verification condition is met, it indicates that transitive closure is achieved and that the algorithm 
can successfully terminate. 
In order to determine the origin of downloaded files, I apply the download relationship (refer to 
Section 4.9.4) and determine log record y to establish that a file is indeed downloaded. For each 
log record y, I find a happens before relationship (refer to Section 4.9.3) with log record x such 
that y   x. The source metadata for log record x contains the origin of the download. 
Resource Download Identification Algorithm 
Given: S = the set of sources consisting of a user file system, temp files and browser logs {s1, s2, s3} 
respectively 
 Ai = {a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3, … a
i
Ni}, the set of all digital artifacts belonging to source si, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} 
Mi = {m
i
1, m
i
2, m
i
3, …, m
i
Ni}, the set of all metadata vectors corresponding to a
i
j ∈ Ai,for each Ai in 
source si, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}  
Output: List URL of resource download sources corresponding to files in source s1  
begin algorithm 
for each si ∈ S do 
 for each a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
  for each m
ij
k ∈ m
i
j corresponding to the j
th
 artifact a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
   sp
ik
t ← {a
i
j | j ∈ [1, Ni], (∃v, m
ij
k = v)}  
  end for 
  end for 
  SP
i
 ← {spikt | k ∈ [1, M], t ∈ N} 
  Identify all pairs of artifacts such that a
2
j Rs a
1
k where a
1
k ∈ SP
1
 and a
2
j ∈ SP
2
 
 for each temp file a
2
j,  
Find all log records x in s3 such that a
3
x Rd a
2
j 
 end for 
 URL ← values for source metadata from each log record a3x identified 
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 Display URL as output 
end algorithm 
Algorithm 5.5 MAM based algorithm to determine source of downloaded resources in user file system  
In order to determine all digital artifacts that occurred simultaneously, I apply the parallel 
occurrence relationship (refer to Section 4.9.5) to extract those digital artifacts that are grouped 
based on associations from the timestamp metadata family. When all digital artifacts belong to a 
single homogeneous source, these artifacts are grouped into similarity groups and the digital 
artifacts span multiple sources, and they will form association groups. A new group is formed for 
each timestamp value that generates associations. 
Simultaneous Access Algorithm 
Given:  S = {s1, s2, s3, … sN}, the set of all discrete homogeneous sources of digital evidence 
Ai = {a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3, … a
i
Ni}, the set of all digital artifacts belonging to source si, i ∈ [1, N] 
Mi = {m
i
1, m
i
2, m
i
3, …, m
i
Ni}, the set of all metadata vectors corresponding to each a
i
j ∈ Ai, 
j ∈ [1, Ni]  
Set L of metadata corresponding to timestamp metadata family on each source si 
Output: List concurrent of sources and corresponding sets of digital artifacts SP
i
 
begin algorithm 
for each si ∈ S do 
 repeat 
 for each a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
  for each m
ij
k ∈ m
i
j and m
ij
k ∈ L do 
   sp
ik
t ← {a
i
j | j ∈ [1, Ni], (∃v, m
ij
k = v)}  
  end for 
  end for 
  SP
i
 ← {spikt | k ∈ [1, M], t ∈ N} 
concurrent ← Number of timestamp values giving rise to similarity pockets in SPi 
until |concurrent| = |SP
i
| 
end for 
Display concurrent, SP
i
 as outputs 
end algorithm 
Algorithm 5.6 MAM based algorithm to determine all artifacts affected by parallel events  
As in the case of Algorithms 5.3 and 5.4, the verification condition ‘|concurrent| = |SPi|’ in the 
algorithm is used as measure to test the completeness of the set of similarity pockets generated. 
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In order to determine all digital artifacts that are similar in structure, I apply the structural 
similarity relationship (refer to Section 4.9.6) using the application metadata family. Single 
metadata value matches will result in similarity pockets and multiple metadata matches are 
grouped into similarity groups. By virtue of structural similarity, this property applies to digital 
artifacts on a single type of homogeneous source, i.e., file systems, browser log files, network 
packets, etc. 
Similar Structure Identification Algorithm 
Given: S = {s1, s2, s3, … sN}, the set of all discrete homogeneous sources of digital evidence 
Ai = {a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3, … a
i
Ni}, the set of all digital artifacts belonging to source si, i ∈ [1, N] 
Mi = {m
i
1, m
i
2, m
i
3, …, m
i
Ni}, the set of all metadata vectors corresponding to each a
i
j ∈ Ai, 
j ∈ [1, Ni]  
Output: List of lists L containing artifacts that are structure similar (in dimensions and formatting)  
begin algorithm 
L ← empty 
for each si ∈ S do 
 for each a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
  for each m
ij
k ∈ m
i
j corresponding to the j
th
 artifact a
i
j ∈ Ai do 
   sp
ik
t ← {a
i
j | (∃v, m
ij
k = v), j ∈ [1, Ni], t ∈ N}  
  end for 
 end for 
 SP
i
 ← {spikt | k ∈ [1, M], t ∈ N} 
end for 
for each sp
ik
t ∈ SP
i
 do 
sg
i
t ← largest union (until transitive closure) over those similarity pockets that 
overlap on artifacts across all metadata m
ij
k ∈ m
i
j, for all k ∈ [1, M] 
end for 
SG ← {sgit | i ∈ [1, N], t ∈ N} 
for each sg
i
t ∈ SG do 
agt ← largest union (until transitive closure) over those similarity groups that 
contain at least one metadata match based on a metadata equivalence 
relationship between the sources  
end for 
AG ← {agt | t ∈ N} 
for each agt ∈ AG do 
  Extract a similar structure relationship for each artifact a
i
j ∈ agt such that for some artifact 
a
n
k ∈ agt there exists a relation Rss such that a
i
j Rss a
n
k where i, n ∈ [1, N] and j ≠ k 
  For each Rss append to L the set of all artifacts from agt that are linked by this relation 
 end for 
 Display L as output 
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end algorithm 
Algorithm 5.7 MAM based algorithm to identify all similarly structured artifacts  
 
5.1.4.4 Mapping Forensic Discoveries to Digital Artifact Relationships 
Until now, I have described the algorithms that are implemented as part of the Evidence 
Composition layer in my AssocGEN analysis engine to determine artifact relationships based on 
metadata associations. The artifact relationships are indicative of one or more events of interest 
that may have transpired during the creation and/or modification of the artifacts concerned. 
During forensic analysis, it becomes necessary to discover such events in the context of an 
investigation. Often, this can involve pivoting on events specific to one metadata family. For 
instance, in a collection of digital images, a user may be interested in finding the makes and the 
models of all the digital cameras used to take digital photographs and corroborate file system 
timestamps extracted from these digital photographs against their EXIF timestamps. If the 
timestamp differences between the EXIF and the file system timestamps are large then, this can 
inform a user if a photograph may have resided on other sources before being created on this file 
system. On the other hand, if an investigation involved IP theft, the user may prioritize matches 
based on author and/or owner metadata tags to determine the names of individuals other than the 
owner and their photographs from the image collection. Similarly, in a collection of word 
processing documents, supposing the user is interested in identifying all the authors and their 
organizational affiliations, one can then select the ‘Author’ and the ‘Company’ metadata from 
word processing documents and analyze the association group generated. The multi pockets, thus 
generated, represent the sets of documents where the author name and the company name have 
identical values. The examiner may also refine an initial listing of association groups based on 
investigation requirements by modifying the set of matches sought by AssocGEN. Such 
refinements may be required where an initial grouping (using standard classification methods) 
does not reveal any interesting or anomalous activities. Therefore, AssocGEN allows an examiner 
to filter the set of metadata associations thereby controlling in the number of metadata matches 
discovered during analysis. 
While AssocGEN focuses on metadata value matches to determine associations between digital 
artifacts, I discussed the interpretation challenges relating to implementing such matches for the 
timestamps in metadata in Chapter 2. To address the challenge, I proposed the Provenance 
Information Model in Chapter 4 which incorporates the timestamp semantics relating to each 
homogeneous source and allow comparisons for the purpose of developing a unified timeline. In 
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the sequel, I present my design of the prototype toolkit called UniTIME implementing my 
Provenance Information Model. 
5.2 Prototype Development Two: UniTIME unified time-lining tool 
The UniTIME tool was designed to accept the sources of digital evidence as input and convert 
them into one or more homogeneous sources with corresponding Provenance Information Model 
information (refer to Section 4.10). The timestamps within and across multiple homogeneous 
sources are adjusted using the respective PIMs to generate a unified timeline. The contribution of 
UniTIME is three-fold: 
1. Computing unambiguous UTC time values for timestamps by overlaying a PIM to 
a corresponding homogeneous source 
2. Computing location or local time zone information based on a PIM; and 
3. Validating timestamp-based assertions that are recorded in a PIM for each 
homogeneous source. 
5.2.1 Design Overview 
UniTIME was developed in Java to traverse sources of digital evidence, such as forensic hard disk 
images, Internet browser logs and network packet captures and harmonize them using provenance 
information to generate a unified timeline. UniTIME can parse timestamps from file system and 
document metadata on files, the Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox browser history and cache 
logs, and PCAP packet captures. To parse timestamps from browser logs and network packet 
captures, I integrated third party applications to export log records and network packet trace as 
events in XML. The timestamps are then converted to UTC, and validated against related 
timestamps for consistency and sorted to generate the timeline. The relationships are determined 
based on grouping the events determined through metadata associations. The interpretation logic 
for acquiring the true timestamp from different homogeneous sources using PIM, implemented in 
UniTIME is shown in Figure 5.4 which illustrates the time reference embedded in the PIM for 
each homogeneous source and their respective resolution. Two values, one the UTC timestamp 
and the other, the local timestamp, are computed. Additionally, provenance metadata of the 
source, like the tag information [190], are included in the Provenance Information to identify 
inconsistencies. Tag information included with homogeneous sources in UniTIME includes:  
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1. date and time of the homogeneous source acquired;  
2. size and content list of folders; and  
3. total size of each homogeneous source. 
 
Figure 5.4 Timestamp interpretation logic for the digital time-lining tool 
  
5.2.2 UniTIME tool architecture 
The design of the UniTIME tool was based on the f-FIA and the functionality of timestamp 
analysis belongs to the Evidence Composition layer, as a part of the Knowledge Representation 
and Reasoning sub-layer. The tool traverses the sources and identifies the homogeneous sources 
from which the digital artifacts and their timestamps are accessed. These artifacts, if extracted, are 
stored in the Homogeneous source and Digital Artifact repository. Where it is necessary to only 
generate a timeline from the sources, it was sufficient to traverse the artifacts and parse the 
timestamps from metadata for run-time computation. On the other hand, if it is expected that the 
digital artifacts would be re-used (or possibly combined) with other information during analysis, 
then the extracted artifacts are stored into the repository. Separate file metadata parsers, Internet 
browser history and cache log parsers and network packet parsers were implemented to parse the 
metadata from the artifacts. If the metadata are expected to be re-used, they are extracted and 
stored into the Metadata & Timestamps repository. For each homogeneous source traversed, a 
reference PIM is created which stores the relevant information for timestamp interpretation. The 
PIM is populated from out-of-band information. The UniTIME tool architecture is shown in 
Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5 UniTIME Architecture based on f-FIA 
  
5.2.3 Dataflow in UniTIME 
The timestamp corrections using the PIM were applied as follows: If the homogeneous source was 
a FAT file system, then the document metadata and the MAC file system metadata are time 
shifted to denote the time in the local time zone where the homogeneous source was acquired and 
in UTC. If the homogeneous source was a homogeneous NTFS file system or an Internet browser 
log, then the UTC timestamp is duly recorded and the local timestamp is computed using its PIM 
information and validated against the assertions. Files stored in an NTFS file system, which could 
have originated from a FAT file system or ZIP file archives, are identified39 prior to the timestamp 
corrections and treated as such. Figure 5.6 depicts the data flow corresponding to the timestamps 
corrections and validations conducted using the PIM. 
                                                          
39
 I applied the hypothesis that timestamps within NTFS/EXT file systems which had 2-second resolution and 
represented timestamps in even-second intervals are likely to have originated from a FAT file system or a ZIP file. 
All such files are isolated and a correspondence is established to determine their PI. 
Unified Timeline Rendering
Metadata match & grouping
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning sub-layer
Homogeneous 
source & Digital 
Artifacts 
Repository
Metadata & 
Timestamps 
Repository
f-FIA Repository
Ev
id
en
ce
 C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 L
ay
er
Apply PI correction to timestamps
Evaluate the validity of assertions in PI
Generate Unified Timeline
Recording PIM info. for each 
homogeneous source
Forensic  
Images
System and 
Application 
logs
Network 
Packet 
captures
Binary Access Layer
Forensic Image 
Interface
Volume/file 
system 
Interface
Preprocessing + 
XML parsers
Apache Tika
interface
XML parsers for 
logs and network 
packets
D
ig
it
al
 
Ev
id
en
ce
La
ye
r
D
ig
it
al
 A
rt
if
ac
t 
Ex
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
M
et
ad
at
a 
Pa
rs
er
 L
ay
er
Secure File Access
145 
 
 
Figure 5.6 UniTIME Dataflow during Timestamp analysis 
  
5.2.4 Maintaining Resilient Timestamps 
When the timestamps across all homogeneous sources are corrected, the events are digitally time-
lined. The tool provides the examiner the option to view these timestamps in UTC or in a selected 
local time zone according to its source. Additionally, the tool also provides the examiner the 
option of choosing to assert statements in the PIM after applying corrections to the timestamps. If 
the examiner chooses to assert, then the timestamps are validated against the assertions, otherwise 
the tool proceeds to the sorting of each list followed by the generation of the unified timeline. This 
ability enables an examiner to initially analyze the timestamps in an unbiased manner and assert 
afterward, to determine the differences, if any exist. To illustrate this feature, consider a scenario 
where an examiner is examining a set of emails and some documents from a file system. Let the 
assertion state, “the document metadata in documents found as attachments in emails should 
occur before the corresponding email server timestamps”. Once the appropriate PIM corrections 
are applied, the examiner can choose not to assert and generate a timeline of all activities, both the 
file timestamps and email timestamps from mail servers. While the activities may all appear 
consistent, if the examiner had asserted the statement, the examiner could have discovered that the 
documents were created after the email was received according to the timestamps in the document 
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metadata. Such anomalies are flagged by the tool. In the following section, I describe my 
experimental methodology. 
5.3 Mapping Forensic Context into MAM experiments 
The MAM discovers associations between digital artifacts that are inherent in the metadata. While 
traditional approaches for conducting forensic analysis rely on searching and classifying the 
digital artifacts in the sources of digital evidence, these techniques presume the existence of prior 
knowledge about the digital artifacts or the nature of an investigation. While that strategy may 
work within the scope of a focused investigation, during general forensic analysis, it is necessary 
to discover and report all relationships and higher-level associations that may exist between the 
digital artifacts. Unless some specifics with regard to the values being searched for or attributes 
that are likely to demonstrate any unique patterns are known a priori, keyword searches and 
classification offer limited help. However, even if an examiner does not have all the information 
needed to conduct the analysis, the metadata about the digital artifacts store this information, if 
only partially, that can be used to guide the process and extract the relationships. 
Naturally, the application of the MAM is more suited to analyzing collections of digital artifacts 
where only the end goal is known, which is the extraction of all relationships and higher level 
associations between the digital artifacts, but the means to achieve this is, at best, vague. The 
absence of any prior information to conduct an analysis makes the MAM readily suited to the 
analysis of collections of digital image files and word processing documents. Often, such helpful 
information is only available after the analysis has begun. When a single file or a few sets of files 
are not available to seed the analysis process, we may apply the MAM to that collection of digital 
artifacts and group them based on the metadata associations. 
5.3.1 Hypotheses for Experimentation 
In my work, I evaluated the metadata association model (MAM) by applying the model to specific 
collections of files and online application logs to identify the origins of files, files that were 
doctored (in content) and posed as originals and to determine the user activity sequence on an 
online download session. I conducted these experiments using the hypothesis based testing method 
[61, 149] as stated in Chapter 3. For my purposes, I developed the following hypotheses to 
evaluate the utility of MAM using the AssocGEN analysis engine. 
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1. If we apply the MAM to a collection of files and determine Rs on sets of artifacts, it 
will give rise to discrete sets of files created by the same 
source/owner/device/software. 
2. If we apply the MAM to a collection of files and determine Rss on sets of artifacts, 
it will give rise to sets of artifacts structurally identical with regard to file 
size/content type/encoding structure/file formatting information. 
3. If we apply the MAM to user files and application browser logs to determine Rd 
and Rh on the sets of artifacts, it will give rise to sets of artifacts (in an association 
group) which when sequenced will identify a particular user’s activities tracing the 
user’s browsing sessions and file downloads. 
5.3.1.1 Controllability of MAM experiments 
In the context of setting up a controlled environment, my experiments were conducted on isolated 
logical images of a user file system while the network packet captures and web browser logs were 
exported into XML. In my experiments designed to validate the model, inputs were drawn from 
digital artifacts across the sources. There were a finite number of metadata in each dataset
40
 and 
the values taken by each metadata were discrete and finite. Using AssocGEN, I parsed the 
metadata without altering the integrity of the files. The engine searched the metadata pool for 
exact and partial matches and grouped the files conforming to each match into similarity pockets. 
I merged overlapping groups into similarity groups across homogeneous sources on a single 
physical source and into association groups across multiple physical sources. Redundancy was 
eliminated by merging the associations that contained overlapping artifacts. The groups were then 
organized into appropriate relationships using the semantics of the associations. The resultant 
groupings (in textual form) were presented to us for further input. The inputs can range from 
specifying a subset of metadata and re-compute the metadata groupings or the identification of 
one or more association groups that are listed to analyze the relationships embedded in the 
member artifacts.  
5.3.1.2 Metrics and Measurements 
From my definition of a similarity group in Chapter 4, I know that it is the set of all those artifacts 
which are related either directly based on a metadata association or indirectly through one or more 
artifacts such that transitive closure is satisfied. Besides, I also established that the similarity 
                                                          
40
 The datasets are described in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis 
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groups within a single source are mutually exclusive. Based on these two properties, to analyze 
the functional completeness of the metadata association model, I introduced a parameter called the 
association index (ai). The association index ai for a source is defined as the average of the ratio 
of the size of the similarity group that an artifact belongs to the total number of artifacts on that 
source. By definition, the range of values taken by ai is [0, 1.0], where ai = 0 indicates that the 
artifact in question is isolated while ai = 1.0 indicates that the artifact is highly connected and all 
artifacts are related to the said artifact. The following relationships hold with regard to the 
association index ai: 
0 1.0ai                            … (1) 
ai = 
1 | |
number of association groups
i
i
ag
N
 
 
 
                        … (2) 
where | |i
i
ag  is the number of digital artifacts in the association groups as determined using 
digital artifact i as the seed and N is the total number of digital artifacts being considered. In my 
experiments, on a given source, I computed the association indices for all the artifacts on the 
source and determine the mean ai value that is assigned to the source. 
To study the effectiveness of the metadata associations generated on files and their relative 
advantage when compared with the traditional techniques for individual file analysis, I define two 
parameters, the effort margin r and its complement, the grouping efficiency η as metrics. 
The effort margin is a measure of the fraction of effort as against individual file analyses when 
conducting a forensic analysis. The effort margin is computed as the ratio of the sum of the 
number of association groups to the number of groups to be analyzed in the worst case41. The 
value ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents zero effort for the examiner and 1 represents effort 
identical to that which is necessary to carry out the task of individual file analyses using 
traditional forensic tools. The effort margin can take a value 1 if and only if all the digital artifacts 
remain unassociated after applying the model, leading to a separate group for each digital artifact. 
The effort margin can take a value 0 only theoretically since the least value for the numerator in 
the ratio is 1 which results when all the digital artifacts get grouped into one association group.  
                                                          
41
 In the worst case, the number of association groups equals the number of digital artifacts in the source. 
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The grouping efficiency is a measure of the degree of closeness between the digital artifacts in 
digital evidence, across all sources. It is computed as 1 – effort margin. The value for grouping 
efficiency ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents that no association groups were generated, 
implying that all the artifacts remained unassociated, while a value of 1 represents that all the 
digital artifacts were grouped together. The grouping efficiency can take a value 1 only 
theoretically since the effort margin can only take non-zero values in practical scenarios. In short, 
Effort margin r = 
number of association groups
number of association groups in the worst case
          … (3) 
Grouping efficiency η = 1 – r              … (4) 
The effort margin should be interpreted as the fraction of full effort necessary to analyze the 
digital evidence after applying the MAM. The full effort is deemed to be applied when the digital 
artifacts are analyzed individually. The grouping efficiency values should be interpreted as the 
percentage reduction in volume of digital evidence resulting from the application of the MAM to 
determine metadata based associations. The digital evidence is deemed to be at full volume when 
all the digital artifacts are unassociated. 
Although these metrics are defined using association groups which apply to the groups of digital 
artifacts across sources, without loss of generality, the same definitions can be interpreted even 
within a single source by replacing association groups in the ratio with similarity groups related 
within the source of digital evidence concerned. When this modified definition is applied to each 
individual source of digital evidence, it can provide a forensics examiner an assessment of the 
total effort involved in analyzing all the digital artifacts contained in that source, based on the 
degree of closeness exhibited by the artifacts. 
5.3.1.3 Reproducibility of MAM experiments 
For my experiments, each dataset (described in Section 6.4 and Section 7.3) was imaged (logical 
image) using the FTK imager tool and stored on the computer executing the AssocGEN analysis 
engine program. The digital evidence layer that can access evidence in raw format provided a 
handle to access this source. The digital artifact traversal and metadata parser layer traversed the 
digital artifacts (files) and parsed the metadata. The evidence composition layer provided us with 
the option to select the metadata tags thereby allowed us to main control over the number of 
associations sought and determined. After determining the metadata matches, the similarity 
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pockets were aggregated into similarity groups and associations groups. When I sought a 
particular file, the tool automatically listed the associated digital artifacts on a console and 
highlighted the nature of the association with the selected file. When I selected a file from the 
image, all the associated files were listed on a textual console. Figure 5.7 illustrates such a 
grouping on digital image files achieved using AssocGEN. The digital images shown in the figure 
were grouped based on the structural similarity relationship Rss identified using the application 
family metadata pertaining to image dimensions. 
 
Figure 5.7 Example of file grouping on digital image files 
  
After each experiment, I loaded the source on FTK 3.2 and examined the metadata in the user 
view mode. For each file suggested by the tool based on the metadata groupings, I compared the 
respective file metadata to verify the groupings. When file system metadata did not produce 
matches, the files were exported to the local file system and examined using FTK 3.2. 
In the sequel, I motivate the need for analyzing digital image files and word processing documents 
using the AssocGEN analysis engine to elicit answers relevant to the six forensic questions, viz., 
who, what, when, where, how and why. 
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5.4 Forensic Analysis of Digital Images & Word Processing Documents 
Digital image files are popular and it comes as no surprise that they form the subject matter of 
many digital investigations. When analyzing a collection of digital image files, one may begin 
with an image chosen at random and methodically analyze all related image files. Typically, the 
images in the collection can be classified in different ways to determine “related” image files. 
Such classification techniques can include, source, scene, time-instants, image dimensions, and so 
on. Unless the images in the collection were systematically captioned, keyword searches may be 
of little use.  
Forensic analysis of documents is a critical component to the process of forensic reconstruction of 
activities, especially on Microsoft Windows based computers. More than 80% of the world’s 
computers run the Windows operating system [198] and a considerable number of these use the 
Microsoft Office document suite. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Windows based 
documents and in particular, Microsoft Office documents are commonly encountered during 
investigations. When analyzing a collection of documents, one may initially identify a subset of 
documents based on some keywords. Using the outcome from file analysis, one can identify 
further keywords or contents based on which other related documents are traversed.  
Traditional methods presume the existence of some prior knowledge about the files and hence 
cater to that presumption. Hence, one may not be able to determine the scope for all types of 
patterns that can be determined on a given collection using these traditional techniques. In 
situations where the presumption may not be relevant, this presumption has a tendency to mislead 
the analysis. It is therefore necessary for a grounded approach which evaluates the scope for 
analysis and establishes a framework to determine all patterns thereof. I demonstrate the 
application of MAM-based analysis to digital image files and word processing documents in 
Chapters 6 and 7. I frame one or more of the six forensic questions into MAM-based experiments 
and generate association groups based on metadata value matches using my AssocGEN analysis 
engine. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I presented my approach to designing practical experiments to evaluate the models 
proposed in my research. I developed three hypotheses to verify my proposed models, viz., the 
metadata association model implemented in the AssocGEN analysis engine and the provenance 
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information model implemented in the UniTIME timeline analysis tool and discussed the 
verification of my prototype implementations. I presented the design of two research prototypes, 
the AssocGEN analysis engine and the UniTIME unified time-lining tool and discussed how they 
implemented the MAM and PIM respectively. In the next two chapters, I demonstrate the use of 
the models through experiments using my prototypes. I discuss the characteristics of my datasets 
and rationalize their utility in regard to my experiments and present the insights gained by 
applying my approach. 
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“There is no such thing as a failed experiment, only 
experiments with unexpected outcomes.” 
- Richard Buckminster Fuller 
 
 
 
 
6. MAM Based 
Analysis of Digital 
Images 
In this chapter I focus on the application of my Metadata Association Model to collections of 
digital image files to elicit metadata based associations for analysis. I assume no prior knowledge 
of the digital image collections in my experiments in the application of the MAM. The experiment 
demonstrates the functional completeness of the model in two modes of operation: determining 
need-based and exhaustive image file associations. 
6.1 Classification vs. Association 
When analyzing a collection of digital image files, a typical analysis can involve classification. 
Image classification is of many types, image source-based, image dimension-based, digital 
camera-based, image timestamp-based, and so on [17, 18]. Source based classification, for 
instance, will decompose the collection into sets of digital photographs, edited photographs and 
digitally generated images. This process enables a forensics examiner to group similar or 
homogeneous image files so that they may be analyzed together. Traditional classification uses 
single or multiple parameters based on which digital image files are grouped for analysis [16-18]. 
However, such parametric classification is mostly syntactic and often the burden of determining 
related digital images falls on the individual. This task requires comparison of different classes 
which can involve the images being re-classified several times, using different sets of parameters, 
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to determine in how many distinct classes an image file may be classified. Often, the knowledge 
and experience relating to different types of classification which are likely to reveal such insights 
is not readily available [67]. 
Association based analysis focusses on identifying those digital images which are likely to occur 
across such groups and is not merely bound by the rules defined in traditional classification. This 
is illustrated in Figure 6.1. On the same collection of digital image files, while a classifier may 
take a classification parameter as the seed input around which to build a cluster of files, the MAM 
approach does not need any such input. Besides this, whereas a classifier may give rise to image 
classes containing similar image files that are homogeneous with regard to that classification 
parameter, the metadata association instead generates groups42 that contain image files “related” 
based on their metadata. 
 
Figure 6.1 Illustrating the differences in Image classification vs. association 
  
By identifying images on a given grouping that are “associated”, the MAM allows one to explore 
the scope for related or similar images when analyzing within a context. In my evaluation, I 
develop the context by classifying the digital images in each collection according to its source. I 
classify digital images in a given collection as: 
1. Digital photographs; 
2. Software processed or edited photographs; 
                                                          
42
 While one may perceive digital artifacts being grouped based on metadata values as a classification process, the 
ability to group three or more digital artifacts together such that each pair demonstrate a different metadata match 
between them can be achieved using the MAM but not using any single classification process. 
Classifier
Seed input (classification parameter)
Image classes
MAM
Association groups
Digital Image collection
Related groups of images
Digital Image collection
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3. Digitally generated images; and 
4. Images with incomplete image metadata. 
Once these classes of digital images are determined, I identify metadata associations using value 
matches between the digital images across all the classes to form association groups. The 
association groups are then analyzed with regard to the six questions identified by Casey [32] that 
are relevant during forensic analysis. 
6.2 Conducting Forensic Analyses on Collections of Digital Images 
When analyzing a collection of digital image files as part of an investigation, many forensic 
questions can be raised during the analysis, of which some are listed below: 
1. How many digital cameras can be identified from the digital image metadata? How 
many image files belong to each of these cameras? 
2. How many digital photographs are doctored? How many Internet downloaded 
images are doctored? What photo-editing software was used? 
3. Are there other “similar” digital image files without source metadata? How can 
such related digital image files be identified? 
4. Which of the digital image files were downloaded from the Internet? If so, can the 
source of these image files be determined? 
While some of these questions can be answered in part or whole using traditional classification, 
often it is up to an examiner to analyze the individual classes to identify inter-image relationships. 
I believe that identifying such relationships can be useful to a forensic examiner during a digital 
forensic investigation. To determine answers to such questions, it is necessary to recognize that no 
single classification method can provide all the answers and it is necessary to determine 
relationships between the images to extract all higher-order associations that exist both within a 
particular source class and across such classes. Such a task requires exhaustive classification using 
all individual parameters (from metadata) as well as all combinations of multiple parameters to 
determine where the digital image files overlap and group them. The association groups generated 
from the MAM, on the other hand, achieve this task readily and simplify the task of identifying 
related images to a search task within an association group. Through its automation, the MAM 
integrates this task and eliminates the need to manually identify such related images. 
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6.3 MAM Based Analysis of Digital Image Collections 
The Metadata Association Model is intended to identify image files related through metadata and 
group them together. In the absence of a specific context, the MAM can be evaluated based on 
identifying quantifiable metrics identified in Section 5.3 When a particular context is provided, 
the MAM can be configured to seek specific patterns that extract the specified relationships 
inherent to the collection of digital image files. I demonstrate the two modes of evaluation in my 
experiments discussed in Section 6.5. In general, when applying the MAM to a digital image 
collection for analysis, there are two modes of operation, viz., need-based and exhaustive. 
1. Need-based. Given a single digital image file, it is always possible to exhaustively 
list all digital image files in a collection that are associated on metadata. 
2. Exhaustive. Using the MAM, it is possible to determine all metadata associated 
digital image files in the collection. 
We demonstrate both modes of operation using the MAM. In the need-based analysis mode, a 
forensics examiner may identify a small set of digital images and each image is then used to 
identify a chain of related digital images based on the metadata associations identified in the 
image collection. This would be suited to tracing the origin of digital image files if there is 
suspected online activity. The exhaustive analysis mode is suitable to group digital images in an 
arbitrary collection where a specific starting point for the analysis is unavailable. In this case, the 
digital image files are grouped first, based on their metadata, and the groupings are then used to 
guide the analysis. To achieve this, I have identified multiple collections of digital images 
obtained from different digital still cameras, images edited using photo-editing software and those 
downloaded from the Internet. Digital image files belonging to these classes vary in the number of 
metadata that affect the number of the associations that can be determined between them. 
6.3.1 Criteria for Selecting Digital Image Collections 
There are many criteria that govern the identification of associations in digital image files. In my 
work, I am concerned with the associations that exist in metadata. As discussed in Section 4.7, 
metadata can be classified into four families that are relevant to forensic analysis, source, 
ownership, timestamps and application; each type can contain one or more individual metadata 
that can produce matches leading to metadata associations between the digital image files.  
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The association index ai (defined in Section 5.3) is a measure for determining the quality of 
metadata associations that can be derived out of a given dataset. The index provides an estimate of 
how “connected” a dataset is and is given by the mean of the association index computed for all 
the image files in that dataset. An image file containing a large number of metadata is likely to 
generate a large number of metadata associations and is likely to be highly connected. On the 
other hand, an image file which contains few metadata may give rise to only a few metadata 
associations and thereby be less connected. An image file which does not generate any metadata 
associations is therefore “unconnected”. It is noteworthy that the association index for a given 
collection is correlated with the grouping efficiency η. The higher the value of association index 
ai, the higher the value of grouping efficiency η. 
To apply the MAM and analyze collections of digital image files for the case studies described in 
this chapter, it was necessary to identify digital image collections (experimental datasets) which 
span the spectrum of highly connected to less connected. Typically, digital image files that were 
captured using one or more digital still cameras may generate many metadata matches including 
those that pertain to source, ownership, timestamps and application. Consequently, collections 
containing such digital images are likely to be highly connected. On the other hand, collections 
where the digital image files were downloaded from different sources, e.g., downloaded from 
different websites while browsing, can produce very narrow groups of image files and hence are 
likely to result in less connected digital image files. Besides this, if such image files do not contain 
application metadata, the scope for finding such associations is further reduced.  
In order to determine answers to the questions we’ve posed in Section 6.2, the digital image files 
in a dataset are required to have certain properties in regard to their metadata. These properties are 
as follows: 
1. At least one metadata from each metadata family should be available: 
a. Metadata identifying one or more digital still cameras and/or computer 
software; 
b. Metadata pertaining to the format and structure of the digital image; or 
c. Metadata pertaining to time instants when specific events affected a digital 
image file. 
2. Digital artifacts referring to the same instance of a digital image must demonstrate 
existence and source relationships. 
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3. Digital image files with identical or similar filenames being stored in different file 
formats must demonstrate existence and source relationships. 
4. References to digital image files across log files must demonstrate a happens 
before relationship. 
5. All available file system and application metadata must be authentic. 
Corroboration of related digital image files has been an integral part of forensic analysis [26, 28, 
50]. In order to identify image files and corroborate, the dataset must contain digital image files 
with identical source metadata information (one or more metadata values corresponding to the 
source metadata can be equal, threshold association may also hold). When two or more digital 
image files with identical source metadata values are stored in different formats (as regular or 
backup or temporary files), the files must demonstrate the existence Re and source Rs relationships 
(metadata such as filename, file location, computer software). During analysis, it is customary to 
determine the sequence (timelines) of events involving the digital image files. To achieve this, a 
digital image file must support at least one timestamp metadata. 
6.3.2 Metadata & Metadata Families in Digital Image files 
We identify the digital image metadata at their respective metadata families relevant during 
forensic analysis in Figure 6.2. A collection of digital image files can be organized according to 
the image file names and their respective locations on a particular source of digital evidence. The 
metadata that allow one to do that belong to the source metadata family. Another metadata 
pertaining to this family, viz., ‘software’ metadata is usually found in digital images if the images 
were edited. When this metadata value is present and there are no discernible EXIF markers, it 
could indicate a digitally generated image file. 
159 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Digital image metadata tags of interest in Digital Investigations 
  
Digital image files also must be identified based on the device used to record or capture the digital 
image files and the metadata that allow us to do that are the EXIF metadata Camera make and 
model metadata tags. The EXIF metadata in the digital image files store information about the 
digital still camera and technical details about how a digital photograph was captured. Such 
groupings not only identify all the cameras used in generating the collection, but they can be used 
to identify the number of digital images generated by a camera of a particular make and model. 
These metadata belong to the ownership metadata family.  
The MAC timestamps and the EXIF timestamps, where available, belong to the timestamp 
metadata family and identify events corresponding to creation, modification and access of the 
image files.  
Image dimensions can help one gauge the granularity of digital image files and is a useful pre-
analysis metric; the higher the image dimensions, the better the level of detail in the image file. 
Such metadata and those such as image file size and image content type that provide information 
regarding the features of digital image files belong to the application metadata family.  
Digital image files do not store author information; rather they record the details pertaining to 
devices such as digital still cameras, computers and computer-based software used in creating or 
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editing these images. As a result, the software and camera devices are identified as source and 
ownership information pertaining to namesake metadata families in my experiments. 
6.4 Datasets 
While examining a source of digital evidence for digital images, an examiner is likely to discover 
images from different sources, viz., images recovered from carved data [50], images that are 
digital photographs, images edited or digitally generated using software and images downloaded 
from the Internet. These different types of digital images are shown in Figure 6.3.  
 
Figure 6.3 Different probable sources for digital images discovered in digital evidence 
  
Each collection of images has a different level of metadata associated with it that can either 
enhance or impede the grouping. Usually, images from carved data have incomplete or no 
metadata and hence a grouping based on metadata is likely to result in a high effort margin and 
low grouping efficiency. Images from the Internet can be downloaded in several ways and popular 
methods include downloading images from Google image search results and downloading 
compressed archives from where the images are then extracted. While the Google database may 
not include image metadata unless it is voluntarily provided during uploading, archives usually 
omit image metadata during compression. As a result, the chances that metadata is present in such 
images is likely to be low, which could also lead to a high effort margin r and low grouping 
efficiency η. Images that are digital photographs store a variety of metadata provided by digital 
technology for better management. As these images are rich in metadata, they are likely to result 
in low r and high η. Digitally generated images and those edited by software are increasingly 
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storing valuable information in the image metadata and hence fall in the same category for r and 
η. In any personal collection, the images found are usually a mixture of digital images across such 
sources, and hence the grouping efficiency is determined by the majority fraction of image 
sources. 
6.4.1 Digital Image Datasets 
We describe 5 datasets of digital image collections acquired from various sources to conduct my 
experiments and generate association groups. 
6.4.1.1 Drew Noakes Digital Photograph Collection 
The Noakes digital photograph collection [142] can be characterized as a personal collection that 
contains 126 digital images of which 124 are digital photographs taken with over 20 different 
digital cameras. Of these 124, 7 digital photographs were processed using Adobe Photoshop 6.0. 
Noakes had downloaded the remaining two image files from the Internet and did these files did 
not contain camera related metadata.  
6.4.1.2 NPS-Canon-Images: Digital Corpora Collection 
The NPS-Canon-Images can be characterized as a carved image collection that was obtained from 
Digital Corpora [68]. It contains a set of 6 digital forensic images43 containing 52 JPEG images44 
created as an exercise for image carving and analysis. Of these, 34 images can be fully recovered 
with valid metadata to perform association grouping. The remaining 18 images do not have 
sufficient metadata to lend themselves suitable for association grouping and were hence discarded. 
Each valid image is a still shot containing a screenshot of text either on a Mac computer or writing 
on a piece of paper. The image dimensions vary from 640 × 480 to 3072 × 2304 and the image file 
sizes range from 103 KB to 2.70 MB. All the images in this dataset have been captured from a 
single camera, viz., a Canon Powershot SD800 IS. All images were recorded on the 
aforementioned camera from the afternoon of 23
rd
 Dec 2008 to late on 24
th
 Dec 2008. The image 
resolution along the vertical as well as the horizontal is 180 dots per inch. None of the images 
have been modified by image processing software45. 
                                                          
43
 This was a forensic digital image of the 6 different sources obtained from Digital corpora. Each forensic image was 
a raw image of the file system from a single digital camera in which all digital photographs were taken.  
44
 Downloaded from URL http://digitalcorpora.org/corp/images/nps/nps-2009-canon2/ 
45
 After corresponding with the author of the Digital Corpora collection, I concluded that these relatively high-
resolution digital photographs were not part of any particular digital investigation and were created as basic image 
forensic exercises. 
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6.4.1.3 Assorted Image Collection 
The assorted image collection can be characterized as a personal image collection that contained 
491 images from a volunteer’s laptop. There are 62 original camera images taken on two different 
cameras, viz., 34 from a Canon Powershot A400 and the 28 from a Samsung SGH F480 mobile 
phone camera. All images taken with the Canon camera are set to image dimensions 1280 × 960 
(1.2 MP) while those taken with the Samsung camera are set to 2560 × 1920 (5 MP). The image 
file sizes on the Canon camera range from 300 KB to 1.62 MB while those taken with the 
Samsung camera range from 1.26 MB to 1.42 MB. These digital images were genuine digital 
camera images and did not contain the metadata tag ‘software’. I intended to study which 
operation and what software introduces the “software” tag in a camera image. I identified Adobe 
Photoshop, GIMP, IrfanView, Paint.NET, Photoscape and Photostudio in my experiments and 
selected a set of 5 images at random from each camera and subjected them to a set of image 
transformations. Each image was subjected to lateral rotations, grayscale representations and a 
Gaussian filter by the different photo editing tools. This exercise generated a total of 250 images 
which were also part of this dataset. 
The remaining 179 images were downloaded image files. Of these, 55 images are screensaver 
images downloaded from the WarnerBros Harry Potter website [84] and among these 12 are 
computer generated images. Their dimensions range from 800 × 600 to 1050 × 800 and the image 
sizes range from 55 KB to 600 KB, and one computer generated image is 2.25 MB. There were 
another 124 images which were downloaded from the Internet in response to Google Image search 
queries concerning mobile phones, digital cameras, flash drives, computers, laptops, rack storage 
and Australian birds. These images ranged in file size from 2 KB to about 160 KB. 
6.4.1.4 Govdocs1: Digital Corpora Collection 
The Govdocs1 collection can be characterized as a downloaded image collection that contains 
2157 digital images. It was obtained from the Digital Corpora [70, 71] repository and had 1000 
folders each containing 1000 commonly found files such as documents, image files, text files, and 
HTML pages, from which I filtered the digital image files for my experiments. Of these 1000 
folders, I selected the first 10 folders (from 000 to 009) and 6 subset folders (from subset0 to 
subset5) and filtered only the digital image files46. The digital images in this collection were all 
                                                          
46
 The statistical characteristics of the collection are given at http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/files/govdocs1-simple-
statistical-report. Each folder in the repository is a random collection of files that are statistically congruent with 
the file distribution in a “regular” user workstation. Hence, the set of images in this dataset were representative of 
the entire collection and sufficient for my purposes to demonstrate the metadata association model. 
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downloaded by Garfinkel [70] from different sources from the Internet in response to Google 
Image search queries covering several topics and range from a 1 KB to a few hundred kilobytes in 
size. Of these 2157 digital images, 1891 have been edited on different versions of the Adobe 
Photoshop software, 124 are thumbnail images and none are computer generated images. Of the 
1891 digitally edited images, 207 were digital camera photographs taken using 7 different camera 
makes and 20 different camera models. All the image files in the collection had file system 
metadata as provided by the host workstation. 
Since all the images from this collection were downloaded from the Internet and did not generate 
sufficient number of metadata matches using EXIF metadata, I focused on highlighting the 
association groups generated based on image file sizes and the JPEG image dimensions, where 
available. Thumbnail images can be classified according to the NLA guidelines [135] to identify 
and separate the thumbnail image files. In my evaluation of the datasets, I have imposed an 
additional criterion that such an image file shall be less than 10 kilobytes in size. 
6.4.1.5 Dresden Image Database 
The Dresden image database [79] can be characterized as a digital photograph collection that 
contained 8896 digital photographs at the time of the download47. This database was created for 
the purposes of forensic investigation of digital still camera based photographs. These digital 
images have been taken with over 20 different camera models. Multiple cameras of the same 
make and model are also used to account for device variations and 36 devices have been used in 
all. Complete characterization of the digital images in this image collection is given by Gloe and 
Bohme [78]. 
6.4.2 Dataset Characteristics 
A summary of all the digital images datasets is presented in Table 6.1. It lists the metadata and the 
number of digital images in each dataset which contained these metadata. Additionally, it lists the 
images that contained image dimensions and MAC timestamp information. This characterization 
is used as reference in the following chapter to evaluate the accuracy how the association groups 
adhere to these categories.  
 
                                                          
47
 At the time of download, the web repository was being updated. Since then, the repository has grown to 16,384 
digital photographs across 72 camera models. The latest statistics from the analysis are available on request. 
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   EXIF Metadata JPEG Metadata  File System 
Metadata 
Serial 
No. 
Dataset 
Volume 
Number 
of images 
in the 
dataset 
Digital 
Camera 
make 
and 
model 
Date/ 
Time 
Original 
Image 
dimen-
sions 
Soft-
ware 
tag 
ONLY 
file 
system 
meta-
data 
MAC 
time-
stamps 
File 
size 
1 374 MB 126 124 123 126 7 2 126 126 
2 126 MB 52 34 34 34 none none 34 34 
3 1.6 GB 491 312 153 491 53 179 491 491 
4 6.8 GB 2157 207 205 2157 1891 1891 2157 2157 
5 24.2 GB 8896 8896 8896 8896 none none 8896 8896 
Table 6.1 Image characteristics of the five datasets 
  
6.5 Conducting the Experiments 
In this section, I describe two experiments used to analyze a collection of digital images. The first 
experiment applies the need-based analysis method and the second experiment applies the 
exhaustive analysis method. 
6.5.1 Determining the Provenance of Downloaded files 
In this experiment, I developed a systematic method to identify the provenance of digital images 
downloaded from the Internet. Given a user’s file system, browser history and cache logs and 
emails, determining the origin of the files discovered from the sources of digital evidence is a non-
trivial task. Using my Metadata Association Model, however, I can group heterogeneous digital 
artifacts belonging to different sources of digital evidence together. Unlike classification, 
metadata associations, derived though metadata matches on the digital artifacts, can reveal certain 
higher-order relationships which can be used to determine the origin of a particular file. Using this 
method, the file in question is tracked from the user file system under examination to the different 
logs generated during online user activity to its point of origin in the Web. Since traditional 
forensic tools can find pieces of evidence for extraction, this methodology proposes a significant 
improvement in conducting and automating forensic analyses which have thus far been in the 
realms of human investigation and analysis. This experiment was demonstrated using Dataset 5 
summarized in Table 6.1. The image files in this dataset alone contain existence, source, and 
download metadata and the happens before relationship that was necessary to establish the image 
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files as downloaded resources and then trace their origins. If suitable sources were available for 
the other datasets, this can be repeated although similar results are likely to be observed. 
Given a snapshot of a user’s file system, it is necessary to determine the origin of the files 
discovered. Figure 6.4 displays the Downloads folder on the user file system where I am 
interested in the origin of the digital image highlighted. 
 
Figure 6.4 Snapshot of the user's file system containing some digital image files 
  
Since it was likely that the image files in question were downloaded during some form of Internet 
activity, the remaining file system was searched for files whose filenames resemble them. In this 
case, I discovered the presence of a copy in the temporary files folder corresponding to the user’s 
Internet Explorer browser activity. Figure 6.5 illustrates the discovery of an identical copy of the 
image file in the temporary files folder. 
 
Figure 6.5 Snapshot of the user’s temporary internet files 
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Having determined the existence of at least one file in the temporary Internet files folder, I 
extracted the browser cache, sought file matches and determined their respective attributes, as 
metadata. Figure 6.5 establishes the relationship between the resource discovered in the browser 
cache and the file discovered in the temporary Internet files folder. 
6.5.1.1 Method 
The method followed was as follows. Set up a virtual machine with Windows 7 operating system 
and create a user account. Generate the following constructed scenario.  
1. Login to the user account and set up a user email account.  
2. Capture steps 3-5 concerning user’s browsing activity using Wireshark network packet 
capture. 
3. Using the Internet browser, browse the Internet, arbitrarily choose a website and view the 
images on that website.  
4. Download images to the user’s computer.  
5. Access user’s email and view the messages. View the attached images using the browser 
and download attachment files to the user’s computer.  
6. Isolate the computer and create a virtual machine snapshot of the user file system. Isolate 
the Internet browser history and cache logs for analysis.  
7. Examine the sources using traditional forensic tools. Use FTK to examine the file system 
forensic image. Use web analysis tools to examine the Internet browser logs.  
8. Determine the origin of the images discovered on the user’s computer. Corroborate the 
results of the web analysis tools against the packet capture.  
9. Independently, use AssocGEN tool and load the different sources.  
10. Traverse the user’s computer using AssocGEN and determine the files containing 
Existence relationships. 
11. Determine Download relationships on these files and establish Happens before 
relationships from the log source.  
12. Using metadata associations, identify all relationships to determine the source of the files. 
Generate final groupings for analysis.  
Repeat the steps using a different Internet browser. 
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6.5.1.2 Basis for the experiment 
During a forensic examination, when a computer is identified, the traditional approach maintains a 
monolithic forensic image of the computer [171]. This forensic image is examined using a 
forensic toolkit like FTK to ascertain the file system’s contents. Once the contents are ascertained, 
each file is individually analyzed and its metadata is examined. By virtue of the monolithic nature, 
the files are examined in isolation and unless the origin of the file is stored in the file metadata, it 
is likely to be missed. Besides this, the user’s Internet activities can only be deciphered when the 
browser history file is examined. Since history files only record web access records, unless the 
forensic examiner simultaneously searches the browser cache records and compares it against the 
files in the user’s computer, the origin of the file cannot be determined. 
On the other hand, the AssocGEN tool, by design, segregates user documents, temporary Internet 
files, system and application logs including browser history and cache logs, and network traces as 
distinct sources. Since AssocGEN is developed based on the MAM, multiple digital artifacts can 
be accessed to determine associations. The associated artifacts are then grouped together, 
irrespective of the source they originated from. The dataset used in this experiment is summarized 
in Table 6.2. 
Characteristics  
User files 47, 699 (30 GB) 
Temporary Internet files 8916 
Browser history 115832 
Browser cache 128624 
Network packets in trace 35035 
Table 6.2 Summary of the evidence analyzed and their characteristics 
  
While FTK treats browser logs are mere files as identified in my review of forensic tools in 
Section 4.1, AssocGEN treats them as independent user activity logs and enables the identification 
of events that occurred on the file system affecting one or more files. Using the MAM, the log 
records are grouped with the related files tracing the event sequences to help an examiner.  
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6.5.1.3 Observations 
We use AssocGEN to first process the user file system and load the files and their metadata (after 
parsing) into the f-FIA repository. Figure 6.6 is a snapshot of AssocGEN loading the user files 
created using the procedure listed in Section 6.5.1.1 into the repository. 
 
Figure 6.6 AssocGEN analysis engine processing a user file 
  
Once the user files are completed, AssocGEN tracks all Internet based activity which includes 
traversing the temporary Internet files folder used by the web browser to temporarily store 
downloaded web resources. Figure 6.7 is a snapshot of AssocGEN traversing the temporary 
Internet files before parsing the metadata and loading them into the f-FIA repository. 
 
Figure 6.7 AssocGEN processing temporary Internet files 
  
After the files are processed, AssocGEN extracts the browser history and cache events which are, 
likewise, loaded into the repository with their respective attributes. After this, the analysis engine 
generates all metadata associations. Once the associations are generated and stored into the 
repository, it then discerns the relationships that exist among the associations which can provide 
the origins of the image files in question. Figure 6.8 is part of the Java source code of the 
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execution logic in AssocGEN used to determine metadata associations in evidence followed by 
the extraction of relevant relationships leading to the determination of the origin of the image 
files. 
 
Figure 6.8 AssocGEN code logic 
  
The existence relationships Re are determined to exist between the user files and their copies in 
the temporary Internet files folder, the happens before relationships Rh are determined between 
the browser logs obtained from the browser history and cache and the download relationships Rd 
are determined between the browser cache and the temporary files. The relationships determined 
from the metadata associations for the Internet Explorer browser are shown in Table 6.3. The 
results were found to be identical when I repeated this experiment with the Mozilla Firefox 
browser. 
Number of distinct relationships Internet Explorer 
Existence relationships Re 142 
Happens relationships Rh 424 
Source relationships Rs 3 
Download relationships Rd 424 
Table 6.3 The discovered metadata based relationships in the evidence 
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Since I was primarily interested in establishing the origin of the digital image files discovered on 
the user’s file system, I only focused on that set of image files, 142 in number. These were the 
digital image files that were discovered in the temporary files folder of the user’s computer. When 
I compared the browser logs (history and cache), I derived 424 relationships which aided in 
identifying 424 unique resources that were visited and downloaded. Each resource identified 
contained a happens before relationship Rh with a corresponding record in the browser history log. 
A similar relationship was also determined between the browser cache and the temporary files 
folder giving rise to 424 unique files being discovered in the temporary files folder. These 
included the 142 digital image files and other web resources such as validation scripts (.js) and 
bitmap images (.bmp). For the sake of this exercise, I only focused on identifying those download 
Rd and happens before Rh relationships identified between the user’s computer and the web 
domain ascertained as the origin. Other activities including normal web browsing activities of the 
user were omitted. 
The relationships also identified 3939 digital image files on the user’s file system which were 
captured using three distinct digital still cameras, namely, an AgfaSensor 505, a 
FugiFilm_FinePixJ50, and a Pracktika_DCZ5.9 as determined from their EXIF metadata. These 
digital image files indicated 3 respective source relationships with the digital image files whose 
origin is my subject of discussion.  
6.5.1.4 Analysis 
Once the relationships are determined in evidence, the files’ origins are determined by mapping 
the web page linked to the download of the resource leading to the identification of the files stored 
in the temporary Internet files folder and their presence in the user file system. Figure 6.9 shows 
the pairings of the image files discovered on the user’s computer and their respective web page 
origins. 
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Figure 6.9 AssocGEN pairing of the image files with their respective web page origins 
  
In each grouping that is shown in Figure 6.9, the image file name is printed first followed by the 
URL corresponding to the web page visited in the browser log. The groupings where multiple 
URLs are listed with a digital image, indicate multiple visit counts that represent the number of 
additional copies that were downloaded to the user file system. In all, there were 142 digital 
images that were downloaded from the specified web domain and also 282 other web resources 
such as validation scripts (.js) and bitmap files (.bmp) which were discovered on the user’s 
temporary Internet files folder. Besides this, the metadata associations determined that the user 
file system also contained 3939 digital image files which were taken with 3 different digital still 
cameras (an AgfaSensor 505, a FugiFilm_FinePixJ50, and a Pracktika_DCZ5.9) and exhibited 
structural similarity relationships with the digital image files downloaded from the specified web 
domain. These findings suggest that these digital images were also likely to have been 
downloaded from the same web domain, although there is no current trace of this in the evidence 
other than the image relationships determined. 
To corroborate the findings, I analyze the browser history logs (Figure 6.10) and determined the 
origin by tracking the URL in the attribute corresponding to the resource in question. In 
Figure 6.10, the presence of the image file on a website is identified which also provides us with a 
URL. 
172 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Analysis of Internet Explorer History - identifying the origin of download 
  
To corroborate this finding, I visited the website (webpage snapshot illustrated in Figure 6.11) and 
determined that the image file is indeed listed. In addition, I also noted the presence of other files 
which are likely to be present on the user file system.  
 
Figure 6.11 Snapshot of the specified webpage corroborating the listed files in the user's computer 
  
When the findings were corroborated against the network packet trace, I obtained a similar 
assessment as illustrated in Figure 6.12. However, if I were to incorporate the network trace as 
another source of evidence into AssocGEN, then the analysis engine will simply group the 
respective TCP sessions between the domain of origin and the user’s computer and incorporate it 
into the association groups corresponding to the appropriate relationships. 
This suggests that these image files were also likely to have been downloaded from the website, 
although a recent search reports that these image files have now been taken down from the 
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website. To corroborate that the user had indeed downloaded these image files from the identified 
origin, I analyzed the network trace using Wireshark which is illustrated in the Figure 6.12. 
 
Figure 6.12 Corroborating the findings with network trace analysis 
  
6.5.1.5 Conclusions 
Via this case study, I have thus demonstrated the use of the Metadata Association Model to 
determine relationships between different sources of digital evidence, viz., a user’s file system, 
browser logs and temporary Internet files to discover the origin of digital image files downloaded 
from the Internet. 
6.5.2 Image Analysis 
In this experiment, I develop a systematic method to grouping digital image files in a given 
collection for analysis. When we analyze collections of digital images, it is important to gain an 
understanding of how many digital photographs, digital generated composites, edited photographs 
and downloaded images exist in a collection. This is typically provided by standard classification 
techniques which identify the source based on a number of different known parameters. However, 
it is also important to determine those images that relate to certain images of interest which belong 
to a particular class. For instance, when we classify digital images according to their source, how 
do we determine the set of related images to a given digital photograph?  
(a) Which are photographs taken with the same camera model and that were edited? 
(b) Which are edited photographs from different camera models using the editing 
software discovered in step (a)? 
(c) Which are photographs that were digitally generated using the editing software 
discovered in step (a)? 
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(d) Which are photographs that are potentially downloaded images having identical 
image settings to the image of interest? 
By their very nature, these and other such questions necessitate one to study the relationships that 
exist in the documents, a task that requires content analysis, usually by an individual. I 
demonstrate the application of the Metadata Association Model to determine such information 
from diverse collections of digital image files. 
In regards to the nature of the analysis, it concerns the grouping of those metadata which belong 
to the families that elicit answers to the six questions identified by Casey [32] pertaining to 
forensic analysis. In this experiment, I studied the nature of associations that result in specific 
relationships as identified in Chapter 5 for varying values of association index ai across the 
datasets. The purpose of this experiment was to conduct a triage on collections of digital image 
files using the MAM eliciting common context across image files based on metadata based 
relationships. The effectiveness of the number of relationships discovered is measured using the 
grouping efficiency η. 
6.5.2.1 Method 
When analyzing a collection of digital images, classifying the source of the digital images is a 
common starting point. I classified each digital image collection based on source into four classes 
by grouping them using metadata which are only present under certain conditions. The source 
classification method is summarized in Table 6.4. The symbol ‘’ denotes the presence of the 
metadata and ‘×’ denotes the absence of metadata. 
 
 
Classification 
Category 
File System 
Metadata 
EXIF 
metadata 
JPEG 
metadata 
Editing 
Software 
metadata 
Digital 
Photographs 
   × 
Software 
Processed 
    
Computer 
Generated 
 ×   
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Incomplete 
Image 
Metadata 
 × × × 
Unclassified  ×  × 
Table 6.4 Image Classification based on source 
  
6.5.2.2 Expected Behavior 
Digitally processed photographs for instance, are likely to generate many association groups since 
the images in this class will be found both under the category for camera make and model and the 
photo-editing software. The file system metadata which is present in each of the 4 categories are 
also likely to generate several metadata matches. Besides this, the MAC timestamps and EXIF 
timestamps can be used to generate a unified timeline of the digital images. The JPEG metadata 
that describe the image dimensions can be used to classify images based on the image resolution. 
Oftentimes, however, images which are rather small in size and dimensions could just be 
thumbnails and may be ignored for the purposes of analysis. The complete implications of all the 
associations generated between the different categories are discussed in the following subsection. 
The set of possible associations that can be identified among the various lists is illustrated in 
Figure 6.13.  
 
Figure 6.13 Possible metadata associations between the different lists 
Digital Photographs
Software Processed 
Digital 
Photographs/Images
Computer 
Generated Images
Incomplete Image 
Metadata
Camera make and 
model
Photo-editing 
software
MAC + EXIF 
timestamps
Image dimensions
MAC timestamps
LEGEND – metadata tags that generate metadata matches
File name File size
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As Figure 6.13 shows, digital images from all collections can potentially generate metadata 
associations based on all file system metadata, i.e., Filename, File size and MAC timestamps. 
Where exact value matches were rare, a threshold margin of 20% was allowed. This was practiced 
on both numeric and string metadata values. On numeric metadata, the margin indicated a value ± 
20% of the reference value while on string metadata, the margin referred to difference in 
characters of up to 20% the size of the larger string. 
Since digital photographs taken with the same camera use identical software and hence tend to 
store digital images with similar file names, the metadata associations and the groups 
subsequently generated can be used to determine if such is the case. Where this hypothesis is 
falsified, an examiner would be able to conduct analysis on that specific association group to 
determine the cause. 
When digital images are associated based on image dimensions, it allows one to prune the set of 
thumbnail images which would have, under usual conditions, been downloaded by a browser 
when one visits a web page represented by a URI. In a collection such as the one identified in 
Dataset 4 which contains a significant number of images downloaded from the Internet, I believe 
that these associations and the groupings can aid a forensics examiner to focus on a smaller set of 
digital images, while excluding the thumbnail images from further analysis. However, if such a 
thumbnail was generated while processing an image using some photo-editing software, this will 
be determined by the source classification method as a computer generated image and the 
examiner can analyze that image as deemed necessary. 
6.5.2.3 Observations 
All the files that contained the EXIF metadata generated the source Rs relationship between them 
and between any two such image files f1 and f2, the relation f1 Rs f2 held, which was applied 
associatively. Similar associations led to the identification of the other classes. Digital 
photographs that were edited and stored in the same collection gave rise to the unauthenticated 
Rua relationship which was later confirmed after establishing the existence Re and majority Rm 
relationships on image files from temporary files. The existence relationship was established 
between the digital photograph and the temporary file while the photograph and the temporary file 
exerted the majority relationship over the edited image from the collection. 
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We also identified the high-resolution and thumbnail images in the digital image datasets by 
overlaying the image dimension information from the application metadata family. The set of 
digital images labeled “unclassified” were then presented to the user for separate analysis. The 
results of applying the common source identification method to my digital image datasets are 
shown in Table 6.5. 
 
Data-
set No. 
Dataset 
Volume 
Number 
of images 
in the 
dataset 
Digital 
Photo-
graphs 
Images 
Edited 
with 
Software 
Comp-
uter 
Gener-
ated 
Images 
High-
res 
images 
(> 1 
MB) 
Images 
with 
Incom-
plete 
Metadata 
Thumb-
nail 
Images (< 
10 KB) 
1 374 MB 126 124 7 0 23 2 0 
2 126 MB 52 34 0 0 3 0 0 
3 1.6 GB 491 312 53 12 48 179 82 
4 6.8 GB 2157 207 1891 0 0 1891
48
 501 
5 24.2 GB 8896 8896 0 0 7919 0 0 
Table 6.5 Results of Common Source Identification for Image Datasets 
  
The set of discovered metadata associations between the different lists among the digital images 
from the different datasets is shown in Figure 6.14. Figures 6.14 (a) through (e) illustrate the 
number of metadata matches that were determined across the different source categories. 
We regard datasets that contained few metadata associations with the adjacent image classes as 
basic datasets (refer to Figure 6.14 (a), (b) and (e)). In such datasets, the image associations were 
predominantly within the images in the same source class. Dataset 1 contained 124 digital 
photographs of which 7 were processed with Adobe Photoshop and 2 images belonged to the 
category Incomplete Image metadata. Since the 7 Software Processed images was essentially a 
subset of the Digital Photographs, I was able to determine all possible metadata matches as shown 
in Figure 6.13 between these categories. Datasets 2 and 5 only contained digital photographs and 
hence there were no other categories to determine metadata matches with. However, I determined 
metadata name-value matches on all the metadata listed in the legend below with the exception of 
photo-editing software metadata tag amongst the images in the respective datasets. 
                                                          
48
 These images were determined to be downloaded from the Internet based on the information provided in the Digital 
Corpora repository regarding the source of these digital images. 
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Figure 6.14 Metadata associations discovered among the digital images from across all the datasets 
  
We regard datasets that contained significantly large number of metadata associations across the 
different image classes as assorted datasets (refer to Figure 6.14 (c) and (d)). In Dataset 3, I 
discovered overlapping sets with regard to the Digital Photographs and the Software Processed 
Images. The set of Software Processed Images also overlapped with the set of images that 
contained Incomplete Image Metadata, primarily on the ‘Software’ metadata tag. There were 179 
images identified under the category of Incomplete Image Metadata, however, 53 of those 
contained the ‘Software’ metadata tag. Hence, between the two sets of categories Digital 
Photographs and Software Processed, and Incomplete Image Metadata and Computer Generated, I 
Incomplete Image 
Metadata (2)
(a) Drew Noakes’ Photograph Collection
Digital Photographs 
(124)
Software Processed 
Digital Photographs (7)
Digital Photographs 
(34)
(b) NPS Canon Image Dataset
Digital Photographs 
(312)
Software Processed 
Digital Photographs (53)
Computer 
Generated Images 
(12)
Incomplete Image 
Metadata (179)
(c) Assorted Personal Image Collection
Digital Photographs 
(207)
Software Processed 
Digital Photographs 
(1891)
Incomplete Image 
Metadata (1891)
(d) GovDocs – Digital Corpora
Digital Photographs 
(8896)
(e) Dresden Image Dataset
Camera make and 
model
Photo-editing 
software
MAC + EXIF 
timestamps
Image dimensions
MAC timestamps
LEGEND – metadata tags that generate metadata matches
File name File size
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discovered all possible metadata associations as defined by Figure 6.13. Based on the overlaps 
observed between the categories Software Processed and Computer Generated, the only photo-
editing software found was Adobe Photoshop, albeit different versions. Some images in this 
collection were intended to be used as desktop background images and, therefore, were primarily 
found in standard image dimensions of 800 × 600, 1080 × 800 and 1200 × 1080. I observed that 
digital images that were similar in image dimensions were also similar in their file sizes. 
Dataset 4 had three distinct categories, Digital Photographs, Software Processed Images and 
Images with Incomplete Image Metadata, and the missing category was Computer Generated 
Images. Although the application of the classification method discovered 1891 images as 
belonging to Incomplete Image Metadata, the Digital Corpora repository identified all these image 
files as being downloaded from the Internet. All digital photographs in this dataset were processed 
using Adobe Photoshop and the Digital Photograph category is hence a subset of the set of 
Software Processed Images. Moreover, I observed that merely using the digital camera make and 
model alone failed to classify the images correctly since many of the images in this dataset 
contained EXIF metadata with the exception of the camera make and model. I believe that since 
all these Digital Photographs were processed using Adobe Photoshop, the camera details were 
stripped during one of the many editing operations that may have taken place. Based on my 
correspondence Simson Garfinkel, this may have occurred before it was copied to the repository. 
Between these different categories that were detected in this image dataset, I discovered all 
possible metadata associations as suggested in Figure 6.13. 
In datasets which contained both Digital Photographs as well as Software Edited Images, the 
number of associations discovered was the greatest since these digital images contained the most 
metadata that could generate interest during a forensic investigation. In contrast, the list of Images 
containing Incomplete Image Metadata were the most isolated group with the exception of Dataset 
3 where the images downloaded from the Harry Potter website and those downloaded in response 
to Google search queries generated metadata associations among each other on ‘File name’, ‘File 
size’ and the ‘last modified timestamp’49. This is due to the fact that these images were indeed 
Computer Generated Image files that were downloaded from the Internet and consequently 
belonged to both categories.  
                                                          
49
 The other two MAC timestamps, namely, the creation timestamp and the last access timestamp, mimicked the value 
of the last modification timestamp, since this was accessed via the local file system into which the image collections 
were downloaded. 
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There were many associations discovered using the image dimensions but this can be attributed to 
the fact that images of a certain size tend to have a specific resolution which is relative common 
across many files. For instance, the image dimensions 800 × 600 and 1080 × 800 were commonly 
found in computer generated images which are also the standard desktop resolution ratios on 
common computer monitors. All Digital Photographs that were processed using software, for 
instance the images under both categories in Datasets 3 and 4, were found to have similar image 
dimensions. Many of these image files also had the same or similar file names and were hence 
pocketed together, based on the Filename metadata tag. A snapshot of the results displayed on 
Dataset 3 using AssocGEN is shown in Figure 6.15.  
Where the digital image files contained insufficient metadata, I correlated the available metadata 
with the temporary files and Internet browser logs50. In cases where I observed the existence Re 
and the download Rd relationships and a source match using file name metadata, I labeled those 
image files as potentially downloaded files. This was later established as a fact when I determined 
the happened before Rh relationship between the browser logs. The potentially downloaded files 
were present in the temporary files and the filename metadata matched against the resource name 
in the browser cache logs. 
 
Figure 6.15  Snapshot of AssocGEN displaying the results of classifying digital image files based on source 
  
By tracking the domain name identified in the browser log, I identified the URLs on the browser 
history log that corroborated with the timestamps against the cache log. The results of association 
grouping applied to all the digital image datasets is shown in Table 6.6. My findings are discussed 
                                                          
50
 It is presumed that the activities were tracked and logged to generate the necessary sources for analysis. 
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below. In the effort margin reported in column 7, I have listed each unassociated digital image as 
a single association group for computing the r and η values. My observations are analyzed in the 
sequel. 
 
Data-
set 
No. 
Dataset 
Volume 
Number of 
images in 
the dataset 
Association 
index (ai) 
Assoc-
iation 
groups, 
Unassoc-
iated 
images 
Effort 
margin 
(w/o 
unassoc-
iated 
images) 
Effort 
Margin 
(inclusive 
of unassoc-
iated 
images) 
Group-
ing 
effic-
iency η 
1 374 MB 126 0.42 4, 2 0.032 0.048 0.952 
2 126 MB 52 0.21 1, 18 0.029 0.366 0.634 
3 1.6 GB 491 0.06 7, 179 0.022 0.379 0.621 
4 6.8 GB 2157 0.001 10, 1891 0.037 0.888 0.112 
5 24.2 GB 8896 0.86 36, 0 0.004 0.004 0.996 
Table 6.6 Results of association grouping to Image Datasets 
  
6.5.2.4 Analysis 
In Dataset 1, I discovered 4 different camera makes and models that were used to take the Digital 
Photographs, of which 7 were edited using Adobe Photoshop 6. Two images with Incomplete 
Image Metadata remained unassociated. With regard to the grouping efficiency η, it is very close 
to 1 given the number of images that were grouped based on metadata associations, η = 
(4 2)
1
126

  
= 0.952. All valid digital images in Dataset 2 belonged to Digital Photograph and captured with a 
single camera. With regard to the efficiency η, it is low owing to the large number of unassociated 
files. Since 18 of the 52 images did not have sufficient metadata, those files remained 
unassociated bringing down the overall value for grouping efficiency. However, all the 34 digital 
photographs were grouped together and thus η =
(1 18)
1
52

  = 0.634. In Dataset 3, the original set 
of 62 photographs, in addition to the 250 digital images generated using various photo-editors, 
resulted in 312 digital photographs. Of these, only 35 photographs were discovered with the 
‘Software’ metadata tag from Adobe Photoshop. Among the images in this collection with 
Incomplete Image Metadata, 12 were identified as Computer Generated Images as they contained 
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the ‘Software’ metadata tag in addition to file system metadata. With regard to η, there were 6 
association groups resulting from the digital photographs and one separate association group for 
all the Computer Generated Images. Additionally, there were 179 images without sufficient 
metadata and this impacted the overall value for grouping efficiency. Therefore, η =
(7 179)
1
491

  
= 0.621. In Dataset 4, I observed the presence of metadata tags for camera make and model only 
in 207 digital images among the entire collection. The ‘Software’ tag on the other hand was 
detected in 1891 digital images. Other types of EXIF metadata however were present in all these 
1891 digital images. Hence, these digital images are categorized as Software Processed Images 
and not Computer Generated51 Images. With regard to η, there were 10 association groups 
generated from the set of 207 Digital Photographs and 1891 unassociated images. Naturally, this 
Dataset had the lowest value for grouping efficiency. Therefore, η =
(10 1891)
1
2157

  = 0.112. All 
the digital images in Dataset 5 were Digital Photograph images and none of them contained the 
‘Software’ metadata tag. Since there were no unassociated files, all the digital photographs were 
grouped into 36 association groups. Each association group obtained in this case corresponded to 
the distinct cameras used in generating this collection. Therefore, this set has the largest efficiency 
with η =
(36 0)
1
8896

  = 0.996. 
In order to compare the values for the effort margin r against the reduction factor proposed in 
theory, it must be noted that reduction factor only applies to the groups sans the unassociated 
artifacts. Therefore, I compute the effort margin values discounting the unassociated digital 
images from the Datasets and have listed the values in Table 6.4 for column labeled effort margin 
(w/o unassociated images). I observe that these effort margins are a fraction of the effort required 
to analyze the individual image files for Dataset 5; this is due to the fact that there were no 
unassociated digital images and all the image files formed distinct groups of related digital 
photographs. In the presence of metadata associations leading to grouping of image files, the 
effort involved in analyzing the images reduces to a fraction of the total effort needed to analyze 
them individually. 
The digital image collections that contained digital photographs typically contained multiple 
photographs from the same digital camera. All digital photographs from the same camera generate 
                                                          
51
 The description of these images on the Digital Corpora website shows that none of the images were specifically 
generated using a computer, which was taken into account in this classification.  
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source relationships between each other and consequently are grouped together in the same 
association group. Naturally, each digital image in that group finds all other digital images from 
the same group. As a result, if one of the digital images in an association group had an ai value of 
0.3, all the other digital images in that group also had the same value. In general, we may state 
that each digital image had an ai value which is the fraction of the total number of digital images 
in the Dataset that were associated with that image. Therefore, Datasets that contained digital 
photographs (both normal and edited) produced higher values for ai as against datasets that 
contained fewer digital photographs. In Datasets 1 and 5, I found high averages for the ai values 
since there were little or no unassociated digital images. In Dataset 2, while most digital images 
were digital photographs and associated based on source and ownership relationships, a third of 
the Dataset was unassociated which resulted in a lower average value for ai. In Datasets 3 and 4, I 
observed very low values for the average ai since a significant number of digital images in these 
Datasets were unassociated. 
6.5.2.5 Ground Truth  
The macro-level classification was determined to be accurate on Datasets 2 and 5 where the 
digital image files were primarily digital photographs and were not edited. However, Datasets 3 
and 4 involved a significant number of digital image files downloaded from the Internet, and in 
the absence of sufficient metadata or alternate sources to corroborate the evidence like temporary 
Internet files or browser logs associated with the image file downloads, the Existence Re, the 
Download Rd and the Happened Before Rh relationships cannot be established. As a result, the 
precise nature of the different operations performed on these digital images could not be 
established. The unassociated digital images were removed to an unclassified list. Such files were 
individually analyzed by examining the corresponding forensic images under FTK. 
6.5.2.6 Conclusions 
Through the case study in this section I have thus demonstrated the use of the Metadata 
Association Model to determine which files are related to a particular matter of interest by using 
standard image classification groups and identifying cross linkages using metadata based value 
matches. 
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6.6 Discussion 
During forensic investigations, investigations often require information on the circumstances and 
conditions prevalent during periods of interest. The semantics associated with metadata usually 
relate to events (e.g., timestamps) and consequently, determining matching metadata values 
correspond to identifying identical or related events. Metadata underlines the context to describe 
the situational similarity during the life cycle of the digital images stored in digital evidence. 
Using metadata associations, we can automatically identify and group: 
1. a digital photograph and any altered version of itself together; 
2. an edited image with digital generated images using a particular software; 
3. digital image files with log records that identify the event sequence tracing the file 
download from the Internet; 
4. a digital photograph or a digital generated image with image files that are related or 
similar containing partial metadata; and 
5. all thumbnail image files. 
The ability to automatically identify and group such related sets of digital image files based on 
metadata associations simplifies the process of analysis for an examiner. Metadata associations 
can be used to validate hypotheses by comparing different metadata values across the digital 
images from a known source and establish consistency among them. 
We now present a brief discussion on the parameters used in my study and the use of digital 
image relationships based on metadata associations to conduct analysis. 
6.6.1 Association Index ai vs. Grouping Efficiency η 
The association index ai assesses a collection of digital artifacts holistically and is an average 
measure of the number of associated digital images that can be discovered by pivoting on a single 
digital image in a collection. The grouping efficiency η quantifies the number of association 
groups and it quantifies the benefit perceived in the analysis after applying the MAM in 
comparison with traditional file-based methods. Although efficiency η is influenced by the 
association index ai, its values are generally larger that ai values in my datasets. This is due to the 
relatively large number of unassociated digital artifacts that effectively result in single member 
185 
 
association groups (treated so, for the purpose of analysis). Each member association group has a 
small association index
 
and when averaged over a large collection, it can bring down the overall 
value of ai for that collection. On the other hand, η is a ratio of the number of association groups 
to its worst case scenario. In cases where there are single member association groups, its 
contribution is moderated over the collection. 
6.6.2 Digital Image relationships and analysis 
When it is suspected that one or more digital image files were downloaded, this can be established 
by identifying the download Rd and the happens before Rh relationships between the image files 
and the respective browser log files. Digital image files that demonstrate an existence Re 
relationship indicate the presence of another copy of that image and this can be used to determine 
duplicate image files in a collection. Besides this, when such pairs of image files also exhibit a 
source Rs relationship along with unmodified authentication Rua relationship, an edited image file 
is likely to be present whose original image is identified using the existence Re relationship. 
Naturally, during image analysis, these image files can be starting points when no other 
information is available regarding the image collection. Each camera make and model identified 
through a source Rs relationship is a potential source of digital evidence discovered. Digital image 
files that demonstrate a parallel occurrence Rpo relationship are likely to have been operated on 
using some software if there is an exact metadata match and further analysis of the content may be 
warranted in cases where a Rua relationship is not observed. Digital image files which exhibit the 
structural similarity Rss relationship are likely to possess identical image resolution capability and 
encoding indicating that their content can be analyzed using the same tool. This can be useful if an 
unknown application format is detected during the examination of the image collection. Images 
with incomplete image metadata, unless they contained illicit content, can be spared from 
unnecessary analysis. However, that may be ascertained only through content processing using an 
alternate tool. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I studied the use of the Metadata Association Model to analyze collections of 
digital image files. Depending on the nature of the forensic analysis, I demonstrated two methods, 
viz., need based and exhaustive to determine metadata associations and group the related digital 
images. I discussed the formation of association groups across multiple source classes by 
determining metadata matches between them. I illustrated the use of digital image file 
186 
 
relationships to determine instances of image downloads and identify the origin of these 
downloads. 
While image processing attempts to capture the content-related information about a digital image, 
the metadata, on the other hand, records and transports the situational information of the digital 
image. Using metadata belonging to the four metadata families, I have shown that it is possible to 
determine digital image relationships through metadata associations to find answers to questions 
pertaining to the analysis of digital image collections. 
In the following chapter, I demonstrate the use of the Metadata Association Model to analyze 
word processing documents. 
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“I read, I forget;  
I see, I remember;  
I do, I understand.” 
- Confucius 
 
 
 
 
7. MAM Based 
Analysis of Word 
Processing 
Documents 
In this chapter, I focus on the application of my Metadata Association Model to collections of 
word processing documents to elicit metadata based associations and scope a forensic analysis. I 
assume no prior knowledge of the word processing document collections in my experiments. This 
chapter demonstrates the functional completeness of the model in two modes of operation: 
determining need-based and exhaustive document associations. When analyzing word processing 
documents, it becomes necessary to determine some important parameters:  
1. The authors, and authors’ affiliations;  
2. File names and patterns;  
3. The range of file sizes;  
4. The applications used and their frequency of use;  
5. The authors who created the most number of documents; and so on.  
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In my research, I apply my method to group the metadata matches into groups and determine 
these characteristics. 
7.1 Conducting Forensic Analysis on Collections of Word Processing 
Documents 
When collections of digital image files are analyzed as part of an investigation, many forensic 
questions can be raised during the analysis, some of which are as follows. 
1. How many document authors can be identified from the word processing document 
metadata? How many documents belong to each of these authors? 
2. How many document files were downloaded? If any, can the source of these files 
be determined?  
3. How many downloaded documents are edited? What was the editing software 
used? 
4. Are there other “similar” document files without ownership/authorship metadata? 
5. Which of the document files were downloaded via Emails? If any, can the parties 
of the email be identified? What were the mail carriers? Is there a mail client with a 
copy of the relevant emails? 
To determine answers to such questions, it is necessary to recognize that no single classification 
method can provide all the answers and it is necessary to determine relationships between the 
word processing documents to extract all higher-order associations that exist both within a 
particular source class and across such classes. Such a task requires exhaustive classification using 
all individual parameters (from metadata) as well as all combinations of multiple parameters to 
determine where the document files overlap and group them. 
Word processing documents store metadata relating to the author and owner of a document which 
I use to determine the names of individuals and the names of computer software that were used to 
create/modify the document. Documents also have metadata which record characteristics 
pertaining to the structure of a document, word count, page count and so on. These metadata are 
useful in determining how documents were created, and stored on a file system. When this 
metadata is used in conjunction with the author/owner metadata, it can determine all users who 
created similar documents. 
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7.2 MAM Evaluation Using Word Processing Document Collections 
While traditional approaches in analysis have presumed the existence of knowledge regarding the 
digital artifacts in the sources of digital evidence, the Metadata Association Model does not 
assume the existence of prior knowledge. I demonstrate the two modes of evaluation in my 
experiments discussed in Section 7.4. In general, when applying the MAM to a collection of word 
processing documents for analysis, there are two modes of operation, viz., need-based and 
exhaustive, as described in the previous chapter. 
7.2.1 Criteria for Selecting Word Processing Document Collections 
The association index ai (defined in Section 5.3) is a measure for determining the quality of 
metadata associations that can be derived out of a given dataset. The index provides an estimate of 
how “connected” a dataset is and is given by the mean of the association index computed for all 
the documents in that dataset. A document that is likely to generate a large number of metadata 
associations is likely to be highly connected while a document that contains few metadata may 
give rise to only a few metadata associations and thereby be less connected. A document which 
does not generate any metadata associations is therefore “unconnected”. As previously mentioned 
in Chapter 5, the higher the value of association index ai for a source, higher is the value of the 
grouping efficiency η. 
In order to determine answers to the questions we’ve posed in Section 7.1, the word processing 
documents in a dataset are required to have certain properties in regard to their metadata. These 
properties are as follows: 
1. At least one metadata from each metadata family should be available: 
a. metadata identifying one or more software applications; 
b. metadata pertaining to the format and structure of the word processing 
document; or 
c. metadata pertaining to time instants when specific events affecting the word 
processing documents occurred. 
2. Digital artifacts referring to the same instance of a word processing document must 
demonstrate existence and source relationships. 
3. Word processing documents with identical or similar filenames being stored in 
different file formats must demonstrate existence and source relationships. 
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4. References to word processing documents across log files must demonstrate a 
happens before relationship. 
5. All available file system and application metadata must be authentic. 
Corroboration of related word processing documents has been an integral part of forensic analysis 
[26, 28, 50]. In order to identify word processing documents and corroborate them, the dataset 
must contain word processing documents with identical source metadata information (threshold 
association may also hold). When identical copies of word processing documents are stored in 
different formats (as regular or backup or temporary files) are discovered, they must demonstrate 
the existence Re and source Rs relationships (metadata such as filename, file location, computer 
software). During analysis, it is customary to determine the sequence (timelines) of events 
involving the word processing documents. To achieve this, a word processing document must 
support at least one timestamp metadata. 
7.2.2 Metadata & Metadata Families in Word Processing Documents 
We identify the digital image metadata at their respective metadata families relevant during 
forensic analysis in Figure 7.1. A collection of word processing documents can be organized 
according to the image file names and their respective locations on a particular source of digital 
evidence. As discussed earlier, title or subject metadata can often throw light on understanding 
whether or not the document has been used as a template in creating the material while leaving the 
metadata untouched. ‘Creator’ and ‘Publisher’ metadata help identify some of the additional 
software used in generating the content. Such metadata belong to the source metadata family. 
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Figure 7.1 Word processing document metadata tags of interest in Digital Investigations 
  
When dealing with documents, it may be necessary to identify the author(s), their affiliations with 
an organization or company, when and who last modified the document and so on. The metadata 
that allow one to do that belong to the ownership metadata family.  
The MAC timestamps and the document timestamps, where available, belong to the timestamp 
metadata family and identify events corresponding to creation, modification and access of the 
word processing documents.  
Metadata such as the number of pages, slides, etc., retain some content context. ‘Keywords’ is 
another metadata which, if available, could provide alternate keywords to examiners while 
exploring related documents or other digital artifacts from one or more sources of digital 
evidence. Such metadata that provide information regarding the features of word processing 
documents belong to the application metadata family. 
In the sequel, I describe the use of metadata associations to automatically corroborate a fact, in 
this case, to solve the classical file ownership problem introduced by Buchholz and Spafford [22]. 
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7.3 Ascribing File Ownership Using Association Groups 
Buchholz and Spafford noted that when sufficient metadata is recorded, it can aid in determining 
answers to the six questions listed by Casey [32] concerning forensic analysis. The metadata 
associations model takes this approach one step further by determining metadata based 
associations across digital artifacts to discover relationships and provide answers to investigation 
related questions.  
7.3.1 File Ownership Problem 
Consider the problem described by Buchholz and Spafford [22] where the owner of a document 
and the involvement of individuals is under investigation. I have adapted this problem to illustrate 
the benefits of using my framework to examine multiple sources of digital evidence and the model 
to identify metadata associations for solving this problem. There are three users, User A, User B 
and User C. User A creates a file F. User A then communicates with User B and transfers a copy 
of file F and User B in turn transfers a copy to User C. The ownership of the document is 
transferred to User B and then User C once each of them received a copy of the file F. The 
question for an examiner posed by Buchholz and Spafford [22] is who is responsible for file F? I 
interpret this question as who is the author of the contents found in file F? I illustrate this file 
ownership problem in Figure 7.2. From the description of the problem, I inferred that initially an 
examiner has access to some form of digital evidence, one source each from User B and User C, 
without loss of generality. 
 
Figure 7.2 The file ownership problem 
  
file F
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Created 
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7.3.2 Discovering User A 
Since file system metadata only records the last known owner, the involvement of User A in the 
generation of the document cannot be traced from a simple examination using any forensic tool. 
Buchholz and Spafford [22] have observed that in the presence of only file system metadata, and 
particularly, the owner of the document, this problem cannot be solved. Moreover, they note that 
in the presence of a finite sized field to hold user information, the question cannot be answered, in 
general. In my work, I relax the assumptions slightly to include the use of document metadata in 
addition to file system metadata for identifying the original owner. Document metadata which are 
inherent to the document they are associated with are persistent across file copies over networks 
and this can be utilized in determining the provenance of the file. 
From a digital forensics standpoint, Buchholz and Spafford advocate that if a forensics examiner 
is uncertain as to who (or which process) is responsible for an artifact, especially when multiple 
candidates exist (Users A, B and C are listed as the owners in their own copy of file F), one has to 
simply assume that all of them are responsible and retain information supporting that hypothesis. 
If the above scenario was investigated using conventional forensic toolkits, then some form of a 
digital evidence source would have been seized from User B and User C. Despite the potential for 
forensic tools to examine the two sources together, merely using file system metadata will identify 
both User B and User C simultaneously as the owners of file F, which is a fallacy. User A is never 
identified during the examination. Therefore, it is likely that the original author cannot be traced 
or could be wrongly identified.  
However, using my approach, the sources acquired from User B and User C can be examined 
together using AssocGEN thereby allowing the examiner to corroborate the sources of digital 
evidence, in a tool-supported manner. This would then allow the parsing of not only file system 
metadata, but also the document metadata from the two copies of file F. The document metadata 
from the two copies of file F, from User B and User C, generates metadata matches and forms 
association groups that include the metadata ‘Author’ and ‘Filesize’; the metadata value based on 
which the group was generated identifies User A, who remained undiscovered previously. Then, if 
a copy of the file F is also acquired from User A for analysis using AssocGEN, the metadata 
matches generated between this file and the two copies from Users B and C in addition to a 
timeline of the event timestamps from the three copies of the file F shows that User A is the actual 
owner. 
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7.3.3 Automatic Corroboration of Evidence Using Association Groups 
With AssocGEN, a user can configure the tool to determine all metadata associations. The tool 
traverses the two sources and identifies the different digital artifacts and parses the respective 
metadata. After parsing the metadata, it identifies the metadata matches and groups them into 
similarity pockets (refer to Section 4.5). The similarity pockets containing overlapping digital 
artifacts are grouped and presented to the user. In short, these are the set of steps that take place: 
1. Mount the two sources of digital evidence. 
2. Traverse the sources and parse metadata from all digital artifacts. 
3. Identify all metadata name-value pair matches and combine the respective files to 
form similarity pockets. 
4. Merge overlapping similarity pockets into association groups. 
5. Present the groupings to the forensic examiner. 
Once the groupings are presented, the examiner can skim the groupings and find metadata 
matches that relate to the provenance of file F. In this context, the metadata tags ‘Author’, the 
MAC and document timestamps and the ‘Filesize’ are relevant. When the examiner studies the 
groupings, it will be found that the two copies of file F, one each from Users B and C are grouped 
together based on the metadata tag ‘Author’. Interestingly, the value contained is neither User B 
nor User C, but ‘User A’ although the owners of these files are listed respectively as User B and 
User C. Since internal metadata persist when documents are copied over networks, the ‘Author’ 
metadata generates a match between the two files identifying User A.  
7.3.4 Conclusions 
Application metadata in tandem with file system metadata will also generate multiple matches that 
correspond to information that relate to who, when, where and how, leading to association groups 
that characterize the similarity of the two copies of file F. Using AssocGEN, I was able to 
determine inherent Source and Application metadata relationships between these files that shows 
that neither User B nor User C was the original owner of the file. For the purpose of 
completeness, the provenance of the file can be established if a copy of the file is obtained from 
User A for comparison against the two copies of the file from Users B and C. Besides, the 
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timestamps recorded on the application metadata, which will predate the MAC timestamps
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discovered on copies of file F with B and C, will establish User A as the original author of file F. 
Hence, the use of metadata associations can aid in attributing the ownership of the file to the 
correct individual.  
7.4 Datasets 
To evaluate the MAM, it was necessary to identify datasets which span the spectrum of highly 
connected to weakly connected artifacts. Typically, word processing documents that were created 
by users from the same organization may generate multiple metadata matches including those that 
pertain to ownership, timestamps and document structure and template. Consequently, such 
collections are likely to result in highly connected documents. On the other hand, collections 
where the word processing documents were downloaded from different sources, e.g., downloaded 
from different websites while browsing can produce very narrow groups of image files and hence 
are likely to result in weakly connected or unconnected documents.  
7.4.1 Word Processing Document Datasets 
We describe two document datasets acquired from two different sources to conduct my 
experiments and generate association groups. In my datasets, the documents are largely created 
using the Microsoft Office application and therefore always generate metadata matches with 
regard to the application metadata. However, for the purposes of my research, I have limited my 
definition of a homogeneous source with regard to the MIME type associated with the document 
files and omitted the metadata match arising from the application metadata since this can render 
the association group formed trivial. 
7.4.1.1 Desktop Dataset 
The desktop Dataset was a collection of Microsoft Office documents from a personal computer 
containing 976 Microsoft documents. The computer was provided by a student volunteer that 
contained 49703 files in total. The period of data accumulation was between 2008 and 2011. The 
files contained in the collection were related to the student’s research work over this period. This 
collection has 752 Word documents, 154 PowerPoint files and 70 Excel spreadsheets. More than 
half of the remaining files were system and application files, 4,533 were Adobe PDF files, 10715 
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 The document timestamps were created according to User A’s copy which will persist despite the copy. Since the 
MAC timestamps on the file for Users B and C are created after the file was copied from User A, the document 
timestamps will predate the MAC timestamps. 
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were digital image files, a few HTML files, logs files and several programming script files. The 
documents do not belong to any particular investigation. Primarily, most of the documents in this 
collection belonged to the volunteer and created by the volunteer, albeit with different user names 
and with multiple organization affiliations and while a few PowerPoint files were downloaded 
from the Internet. The collection contains multiple author names and 7 distinct organizations 
overall. The minimum file size is 10 KB and the maximum file size is 11.62 MB in this collection. 
Both Word documents and the PowerPoint files in this collection have template (.POT) files 
which were downloaded from the Internet. Word documents which are modified and updated as 
different versions share the same title in the metadata field. This dataset is summarized in the first 
row of Table 7.1.  
Amongst the application metadata, the document’s author was the most commonly occurring 
metadata tag in this dataset, in 822 out of the 976 documents. The documents recorded this field 
differently and I obtained the count from both ‘Author’ and the ‘Last-Author’ metadata53 tags. 
When a document is created, the title of the document is recorded by Microsoft Office (Windows 
version) in the metadata tag ‘Title’ or ‘Subject’ which was the next most commonly occurring 
metadata tag. During document analysis, comparing the filename and this particular metadata tag 
could inform one if the document was created on its own or was derived from another document. 
In the latter case, the title could differ from the filename which would indicate that it is derived 
from another document. The organization the author is affiliated with is denoted by metadata tag 
‘Company’ which was found in a little fewer than half of the documents in this dataset. 
‘Application-Name’ which records the specific version of the application that created that file and 
the ‘Last-Modified-Date’ or ‘Last-Printed-Date’ was found in a little fewer than 600 documents54. 
I was always able to extract the MAC timestamps and other file system metadata (such as file 
name, file path, and file size) for all the documents in the dataset. 
7.4.1.2 Govdocs1: Digital Corpora Collection 
The second Dataset was obtained from the Digital Corpora [68, 70, 71] repository containing 
several Microsoft Word documents, PowerPoint files and Excel spreadsheets. The document 
collection was downloaded from the corpora which contained documents and other files 
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 Although the values for metadata tag ‘Author’ need not coincide those of ‘Last-Author’, in my dataset, these values 
coincided where both were available. Hence, I deemed the tags to be equivalent in my experiments. Among the set 
of documents where both tags were present, I arbitrarily chose to count from metadata tag ‘Author’ and omitted 
‘Last-Author’. 
54
 There were several documents in which the metadata tag was present but the corresponding value was NULL. Such 
documents were not included in the counting. 
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downloaded from the Internet by Simson Garfinkel for digital forensic research purposes. I 
downloaded folders 000 to 010 and subset0 to subset5 totaling 17399 files. The documents from 
this source contained a large number of metadata and adequate metadata per file to be included in 
my experiments. Within the documents in my collection, there were 2970 documents of which 
there were 1282 Word documents, 1044 PowerPoint files and 644 Excel spreadsheets. The 
remaining files were Adobe PDF files, HTML files, text and digital image files. The documents 
do not belong to any particular investigation and have been acquired from several different 
authors. These files were downloaded by Garfinkel and loaded in the Digital Corpora repository 
directly without any additional modifications to files, excepting the change in filenames [71]. 
These documents were downloaded from this repository and used in as-is condition in my 
experiments. The collection contains 103 different authors and over 80 distinct organizations 
overall. The minimum file size is 6 KB and the maximum file size is 58.6 MB in this collection. 
All files in this repository are numbered sequentially from 000 followed by the subfolder ID 
further followed by a 3-digit file ID between 000 and 999. The filenames themselves have been 
assigned arbitrarily. The filenames hence do not have any connection with the content of the file. 
Since all the files in this dataset were downloaded from the Internet and renamed, the file system 
metadata for the documents in this collection were taken from my local file system into which 
these files were downloaded. The file system metadata values are accurate from the point of the 
download, which are used in subsequent metadata based associations. The application metadata 
that were present at the time of download are used to report the values. This dataset is summarized 
in the second row of Table 7.1. 
Amongst the application metadata, the document’s author, taken both from ‘Author’ and ‘Last-
Author’ metadata tags, was the most commonly occurring metadata tag in this dataset, appearing 
in 2921 out of the 2970 documents. The metadata tag ‘Company’ was found in 2702 documents in 
this dataset. The metadata tag ‘Title’ was discovered in 2406 documents. ‘Application-Name’ was 
found in 2760 documents and the ‘Last-Modified’ or ‘Last-Printed-Date’ was found in 1723 
documents. I was always able to extract the MAC timestamps and other file system metadata 
(such as file name, file path, and file size) for all the documents in the dataset. 
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  Microsoft Document Metadata File System 
Metadata 
Serial 
No. 
Dataset Dataset 
Volume 
Author
/Last 
author 
Company
/Organi-
zation 
Appli-
cation 
name 
Key-
wo-
rds 
Last 
modi-
fied/ 
printed 
date 
Title
/sub-
ject 
MAC 
Time-
stamps 
File size 
1 Desktop 
(956) 
1.6 GB 822 440 577 334 583 660 976 976 
2 Digital 
corpora 
(2970) 
6.8 GB 2921 2702 2760 1362 1723 2406 2970 2970 
Table 7.1 Summarizing the Microsoft document metadata from the different datasets 
  
7.4.2 Metadata Availability in Document Datasets 
To gain a comprehensive understanding of the metadata distribution on documents within a 
standard file system, I calculated the frequency of occurrence of metadata from multiple 
collections of Microsoft Office documents. Based on my study of 10 workstations, a standard 
workstation was found to contain documents of different file formats (e.g., .DOC, .PPT, .XLS, 
.DOCX, .PPTX, .PPS, PDF, .TXT, .LOG, etc.) and from across different versions recording 
metadata to varying degrees of detail. Such a preliminary study was required in my research to 
understand the metadata distribution so that we may utilize the most frequently occurring 
metadata to determine associations and derive inferences during a forensic investigation. 
7.4.2.1 Documents & Metadata Distribution 
In the desktop machine, all the files across the entire file system were counted and reported. In the 
Digital Corpora dataset, the number of files downloaded from the main repository were counted 
and reported. Each metadata tag name was counted exactly once. The documents from each of the 
three formats and the respective cumulative number of metadata discovered on each type are 
shown in Table 7.2. 
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Source 
Machine 
Name of 
files on 
Source 
MS-WORD, No. 
Of distinct 
metadata 
MS-PPT, No. 
Of distinct 
metadata 
MS-XLS, No. 
Of distinct 
metadata 
Desktop 
machine 
49703 752 Word docs, 38 
metadata 
154 
presentation 
docs, 38 
metadata 
70 spreadsheet 
docs, 17 
metadata 
Digital 
Corpora 
17399 1282 Word docs, 
59 metadata 
1044 
presentation 
docs, 36 
metadata 
644 
spreadsheet 
docs, 17 
metadata 
Table 7.2 Preliminary statistics of relative metadata richness of different Microsoft Office document types 
  
In Table 7.2 there were over 30 metadata tags in MS-WORD and MS-PPT files in comparison to 
fewer than 20 for MS-XLS files. Among these MS-WORD files (DOC extension), Microsoft 
Office 2007 Word files (DOCX extension) are the most metadata rich image files and similarly 
for MS-PPT, Microsoft Office 2007 PowerPoint (PPTX extension) documents. An interesting 
finding from my analysis of metadata in Microsoft Office document collections was that the same 
metadata could be referred to by different tags depending on the application version. For instance, 
while Word documents belonging to Word 2003 or earlier used the metadata tag ‘Last-Save-
Date’, Word 2007 documents used the metadata tag ‘Last-Modified’ to refer to the timestamp 
when the document was last modified. While ‘Application-Name’ metadata tag was used on Word 
2003 and the document version referred to the application name, the metadata tag ‘Creator’ was 
used on Word 2007 to refer to the same value. These results identified MS-WORD and MS-PPT 
as the document types containing the maximum number of metadata describing a document 
among the various word processing files analyzed in my Datasets. 
Largely, Microsoft Word files were found to contain the most number of metadata closely 
followed by the PowerPoint files. Both sets of documents contain metadata that describe the user 
context on who created and/or modified the document. This includes metadata such as ‘Author’, 
‘Last Author/Group’, ‘Creator’ and ‘Organization’. The metadata also describe the application 
context that was used in creating/modifying the document. The metadata that come under this 
category include ‘Application-name’, ‘Application-ver’ and ‘Publisher’ etc.  
Notably, not all metadata tags were discovered in all Microsoft Office documents, even within the 
same type. Often, this can be attributed to the fact that Microsoft Office applications have evolved 
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over the years and some of the earlier versions did not record as much metadata as compared with 
recent versions. For instance, Microsoft Office 97 only recorded the ‘Author’ name and did not 
record application metadata which were only introduced since Microsoft Office 2003. 
7.4.2.2 Metadata Availability & Frequency 
In this section, I compute the frequency of metadata tags found in the documents from the two 
datasets. The purpose of the metadata frequency study is to estimate the most commonly 
occurring metadata in Microsoft Office documents which can be relied upon to determine 
metadata matches. I have tabulated the relative percentage occurrence of the most relevant 
metadata in Microsoft Office documents files with regard to forensic investigations. The value 
was computed as the ratio of the number times that particular metadata was found in that 
collection to the total number of documents in the collection expressed in percentage. This is 
shown in Table 7.3. The application metadata tags listed in this table were discovered in all the 
three different Microsoft Office document types, although the percentage of occurrence in MS-
XLS documents alone was marginally lower (between 5–10% lower) compared to MS-WORD 
and MS-PPT. The highest percentage of occurrence was discovered for ‘Author’ metadata in MS-
WORD documents which was as high as 99% and the lowest was for metadata tags ‘Manager’ 
and ‘Security’ in MS-PPT, which was as low as 3–4%. 
In Table 7.3, ‘Author’ represents the metadata naming the author of the document. In some cases, 
when the author is logged in as part of an organization as listed by metadata ‘Company’, the 
author is listed by their username within that organization. I believe that identifying these aliases 
can be very useful during forensic investigations. Often, the aliases could provide reference to the 
user’s email account within that organization which can subsequently be searched for evidence if 
required. I was always able to extract the MAC timestamps and other file system metadata (such 
as filename, file path and file size) for all documents in each of the collections; hence the 100% 
availability. 
  Word Processing Document Metadata File system 
Metadata 
Machine 
source 
Total No. of 
all 
documents in 
the collection 
Auth-
or 
Comp
-any 
Title/ 
Subject 
Last-
Printed 
Date 
Last-
Save
-
Date 
Total/Edit 
Time 
MAC 
time-
stam-
ps 
File 
size 
Desktop 976 86 % 46 % 69 % 57 % 61 % 79 % 100 % 100 % 
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Digital 
Corpora 
2970 95 % 91 % 81 % 58 % 96 % 66 % 100 % 100 % 
Table 7.3 Percentage occurrence of metadata tags from across all word processing documents 
  
The ‘Last-Printed-Date’ and ‘Last-save-Date’ metadata recorded by the corresponding 
applications can often be used to validate if a document has been tampered with. These 
timestamps could be corroborated with the MAC timestamps to establish timestamp consistency. 
Frequently, documents are iteratively modified and each version of the modification is stored with 
similar or different filenames. Interestingly, the original document records the ‘Title’ when it is 
created, which is often duplicated on all subsequent iterations. In my experiments to determine 
metadata associations on the Desktop dataset, I discovered several documents that were multiple 
iterations of a single document and all these documents shared the same value for metadata tag 
‘Title’, although the filename was differently recorded in these documents.  
The aforementioned situation is also often observed when a particular document is modified based 
on revisions and new content is added into iterative versions of the same document. In this 
scenario, the documents may contain the same subject or title in metadata but a different filename 
for each file. I believe that such discoveries can help forensic examiners rule out documents which 
need not be included for subsequent analysis. Metadata recording the last printed date and total 
edit time can often inform examiners on any recent activity on these document(s) or if an 
unusually large or small amount of time has been spent in editing. 
7.4.3 Dataset Characteristics 
Metadata pertaining to the ownership metadata family can provide answers to Question 1 listed in 
Section 7.1 and identify the different individuals connected with a single document or a set of 
documents. This information was, by and large, available on both the document datasets. The 
source metadata family identified that all documents were created on a Microsoft Windows XP 
SP2 machine using the Microsoft Office 1997–2003 software products. In some cases, I also 
determined the specific names of the computer systems on which the documents were created. 
This allowed us to group the documents that were created on the same machine, and hence 
possibly by the same individual. Where I noticed deviations from this expected behavior, it was 
found to be due to the machine being a shared computer within an organization as identified by 
the ownership metadata. The timestamp metadata family indicated that the files were last operated 
on at least six months prior to creation of the dataset. Documents that were created on the same 
202 
 
date and time as those modified or accessed were identified as “derived” documents whose 
content was obtained from the modified or accessed documents. A one-to-one relationship was 
established using the source relationship and the structural similarity relationship. 
In the following section, I discuss the experiments conducted using AssocGEN by applying my 
metadata association model to collections of documents for analysis. 
7.5 Conducting Experiments 
During forensic investigations when examiners are faced with the challenge of analyzing several 
documents, they may begin the process by conducting keyword and/or string searches on the 
collection and lists the set of documents that match the criteria [50]. However, since this is purely 
based on string matches, some context may be missed. One of the advantages of my Metadata 
Association Model is that the similarity pockets and association groups can aid in discovering 
missed context, stored in document metadata. My first experiment demonstrates a method to 
expand the scope of basic string search techniques using my method. 
Given an arbitrary document collection, it may be necessary to determine document 
characteristics such as those listed in Section 7.1. These characteristics will provide a better 
understanding of the document collection (for triage purposes) for an examiner to take informed 
decisions during analysis. In my second experiment, I illustrate how to determine document 
characteristics by identifying metadata matches and generating association groups. I group the 
similarity pockets from individual metadata matches into association groups to identify documents 
of importance during document analysis in two document datasets. I generate the association 
groups in two different ways: 
1. obtain metadata from the set of files identified by keyword search and determine 
metadata associations to generate association groups against the rest of the 
document collection; and 
2. determine metadata associations automatically based on primary metadata to 
characterize the document collection in terms of number of authors, file name and 
size similarity, number of organization affiliated with authors, the most active 
author and so on. 
Approach 1 is suitable when there is a subset of documents that are of interest to a forensics 
examiner and hence, one is interested in identifying those documents that are related the set of 
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interesting documents. Approach 2 may be suited for situations when an examiner is examining a 
collection to identify what’s contained in them. It can automatically identify and group the related 
documents and it is then sufficient for an examiner to study the groups generated rather that 
examine the individual documents. Each group, by virtue of the metadata associations embedded 
within, are likely to contain related information.  
7.5.1 Identifying relevant documents with limited context 
When I use keyword searches during analysis, the goal is to obtain all search hits for the values 
that pertain to the keywords. However, it may also be important to determine what other 
documents are related to the set of files that were identified from the search hits and thereby 
expand the scope of the search. Typically, this would involve examining each file from the search 
hit list and determining additional keywords and conducting further searches. As we’ve discussed 
in Chapter 2, this approach is not scalable both in volume and diversity. For instance, if a 
Microsoft Word document was identified using a search keyword, how would I identify the image 
files that were created/downloaded along with such a file?  Metadata based associations provide a 
scalable model to determine such related files and group them, and the approach is amenable to 
automation. 
We used two datasets, the Desktop dataset and another containing a user’s Internet activity. This 
dataset was created by combining sets of Web documents and Microsoft Office documents that 
were downloaded from the Internet in response to Google search queries “bomb” and “explosion”. 
This produced 154 files consisting of 3 Word documents, 4 PowerPoint presentations, 2 Excel 
spreadsheets, 20 HTML files, 56 GIF image files, 18 JPEG image files, 38 JavaScript files and 13 
Cascading Style Sheets.  
7.5.1.1 Method 
We identified 3 keywords for each case study and discovered 18 document matches in the first 
and 16 in the second. I identified the keywords “architecture”, “evidence” and “research” for the 
Desktop dataset. The keywords for the second case study were obtained from filenames in the 
responses to search queries. I identified the keywords “explosion”, “bomb” and “c4” for this 
dataset. In this case study, the matches were determined from the Microsoft Office documents in 
addition to the HTML files in the collection. Consequently the metadata associations determined 
were primarily based on matches in filenames and download timestamp matching with the file 
creation timestamp from the file system. 
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We used the AssocGEN analysis engine to extract metadata from the files identified in the 
keyword search to determine metadata name-value matches with the remaining documents in the 
collection. The results of the metadata associations discovered are summarized in Table 7.4. 
Datasets Association 
index (ai)  
Grouping 
efficiency 
η 
No. of 
Documents 
discovered 
from 
keyword 
search 
Total No. of 
metadata 
associations 
discovered  
No. of 
Documents 
discovered 
from 
metadata 
associations 
Avg. No. of 
associations 
per file  
(Col #3 / 
Col #2) 
Desktop 
Dataset 
(976 files) 
0.21 0.43 18 108 68 6 
User’s 
Internet 
activity 
files (154 
files) 
0.62 0.87 16 132 82 8.25 
Table 7.4 Outcomes from determining metadata associations on keyword matches 
  
7.5.1.2 Observations 
In the Desktop dataset, I discovered 18 files that matched from a total of 976 files for the 3 
keywords. Since all the files in this collection were Microsoft Office documents, I used the 
metadata name-values from these 18 documents to list the set of all other documents in the 
collection which generated similarity pockets. When I discovered multiple sets of documents 
matching on more than one metadata tag, I combined them into association groups and listed the 
set of all metadata matches discovered among them. For this dataset, the metadata associations 
were determined based on primary metadata since secondary metadata was not sufficiently 
populated to generate many associations. The metadata that did generate associations were 
document Author, Organization, file size and file name similarity. This resulted in the discovery 
of 68 other documents in the collection that were associated with the documents identified from 
the keyword search.  
In the second dataset, I discovered 16 files that matched from a total of 154 files for the 3 
keywords. The files determined by the keyword matches contained 2 Microsoft Word documents 
and 3 PowerPoint documents in addition to HTML files. The metadata associations for this case 
study were primarily determined from file system metadata, viz., filename, filesize and file 
creation timestamp. As discussed earlier in this section, I corroborated the download timestamp 
with the file creation timestamps and additionally discovered associations based on metadata 
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filename and filesize. On the Microsoft Office documents, I discovered that the ‘Author’ was 
identical in one Word, one PowerPoint and two Excel spreadsheet documents. Moreover, file 
name and file size similarity measures generated additional matches which enabled the discovery 
of 82 other documents from this collection. 
The number of metadata associations discovered from the Desktop dataset was 108, an average of 
6 associations per file identified from the keyword search. Although not all files generated that 
many associations, the average value is indicative of the relationships exhibited between the 
documents in that collection. The number of metadata associations discovered from the user’s 
Internet activity dataset was 132, an average of 8.25 associations per file identified from the 
keyword search.  
7.5.1.3 Conclusions 
We have thus demonstrated the use of the metadata association model to determine files related to 
a particular matter of interest that were not readily discovered using the keyword search 
technique. 
7.5.2 Document Analysis 
When I analyze large collections of documents, it is useful to determine characteristics such as the 
total number of authors, the number of single author documents, the number of authors who 
appear in exactly one file, the largest number of documents authored by a single individual and so 
on. Typically, classification techniques can identify these characteristics and as discussed in 
Chapter 6, each classification process uses unique parameters to determine the classes that exist. 
However, during analysis, it is also necessary to identify documents related to those found in a 
particular class. For instance, if we were to classify all documents into Microsoft Word 
documents, PowerPoint slides and Excel spreadsheets, how do we determine all the co-authors of 
a particular set of documents  
i. who have authored single-author Word documents; and 
ii. who have co-authored PowerPoint slides or Excel spreadsheets? 
If such authors exist, then are the set of co-authors identical or different? Some other questions 
that can be posed during analysis include how do we determine which PowerPoint slides were 
created, modified, used or downloaded along with a Word document and how many Excel files 
were used during the time that the document was edited? By their very nature, these questions 
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necessitate one to study the relationships that exist in the documents, a task that requires content 
analysis, usually by an individual. Traditional forensic tools offer little help in identifying such 
critical information when analyzing document collections. If we were able to propose an 
automated approach to identify such relationships and group the documents, it can save significant 
human effort. I have identified 12 characteristics for document collections and propose the use of 
the Metadata Association Model to determine these characteristics using the metadata.  
7.5.2.1 Method 
On each dataset, I provided the documents from the collection to the AssocGEN analysis engine 
which traversed the documents and identified multiple homogeneous sources
55
. The parsed 
metadata determined metadata matches leading to source relationships, existence relationships and 
structural similarity relationships. In my work, I have focused on the metadata that pertain to the 
source and ownership metadata families. This focus stems from the need to attribute documents 
and determine related documents and individuals when conducting the analysis. Naturally, the 
characteristics identified for this experiment use metadata like ‘Author’, ‘Organization’, 
‘Filename’, ‘Filesize’ and so on. I have also included the application metadata family to identify 
documents created using the same software application with identical or different release versions. 
The results are tabulated in Table 7.5 and discussed in the sequel.  
Charact-
eristic No. 
Dataset Characteristics Desktop 
(976) 
Digital 
Corpora (2970) 
 Number of association groups 108 1892 
Association index (ai) 0.21 0.004 
Grouping efficiency η 0.856 0.293 
1 No. of distinct authors 158 3300 
2 Most number of documents by one 
author 
170 228 
3 No. of authors who have authored 
more than one document 
126 2599 
4 Most number of documents 
similarly named by a single author 
36; 
Stefan 
17; J. Scott 
Peterson
56
 
5 Most number of documents of 98; 9; Jon Heal 
                                                          
55
 Documents belonging to the same application of the identical software version were treated as coming from a single 
homogeneous source, differentiated based on document MIME type. 
56
 Since all the files in this repository were renamed (and named similarly) after they were downloaded by Simson 
Garfinkel, this value is merely the single largest similarity pocket based on ‘Author’. 
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similar file size belonging to one 
author 
Stefan 
6 Most number of Organizations 
single author is affiliated with 
4; Stefan 2
57
 
7 No. of distinct Organizations 71 1098 
8 Most number of documents 
generated within the same 
Organization 
79; QUT 50; US Dept of 
Agriculture 
9 Most number of authors from a 
single Organization 
13; QUT 11; US Dept of 
Agriculture 
10 No. of Organizations generating 
multiple documents 
27 336 
11 No. of distinct application names 16 20 
12 No. of distinct document titles 207 1703 
Table 7.5 Results from determining dataset characteristics for the two datasets 
  
7.5.2.2 Observations 
For the desktop dataset, besides the metadata ‘Author’ and ‘Organization/Company’, the metadata 
‘Filesize’ and ‘Filename’ generated the largest number of metadata matches. After combing the 
overlapping similarity pockets, I discovered 108 association groups. In addition to this, there were 
32 documents that were removed to the unclassified list as they lacked sufficient metadata. Such 
files were individually analyzed by examining the forensic image under FTK. Consequently, the 
efficiency η = 
(108 32)
1
976

  = 0.856. This implies that for this collection, more than 85% of the 
documents are associated with one or more documents and is indicates that several documents 
were created, accessed or modified under similar contexts. Besides this, providing a reduction in 
the number of independent documents for further analysis can help a forensics examiner to triage 
the dataset and quickly focus on a smaller set of documents.  
For the Digital Corpora dataset, there were not many common points with regard to where the 
documents were downloaded from and, therefore, it resulted in a much larger set of association 
groups. Metadata ‘Author’ and ‘Organization/Company’ generated the largest number of matches 
amongst their documents. Filesize matches, although present, had few other metadata matches and 
resulted in a small number of association groups. In all, I determined 1892 association groups and 
209 documents in the unclassified list. Therefore, the efficiency for this dataset is computed as η =
                                                          
57
 More than one author was affiliated with 2 organizations. Since there is multiplicity, no name is specified. 
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(1892 209)
1
2970

  = 0.293. Since these documents were downloaded from the Internet from diverse 
sources, the relative association factor was, expectedly, low. Notwithstanding, metadata matches 
and association groups enable one to group similar documents and analyze related documents 
together, eliminating the need to repeated or unnecessary analysis. The characteristics defined in 
Table 7.5 are generic pertaining to the analysis of documents and can be applied to any collection 
of documents as described below. 
The number of distinct authors (Characteristic 1 in Table 7.5) and number of distinct 
organizations (Characteristic 7) are computed by counting the value field for the ‘Author’ and 
‘Company’ metadata tags respectively. Since the author field is also multi-valued and a document 
can have more than one author, each unique author is counted when this is the case. Wherever 
multiple authors from the same organization are discovered, the individual similarity pockets are 
merged into association group(s). Thus, I integrate multiple association groups and the size of the 
largest similarity pocket for metadata tag ‘Company’ provides the organization generating the 
largest number of documents. The largest multi pocket generated from the similarity pockets for 
‘Author’ and ‘Company’ provide the values for Characteristics 2 and 8 in Table 7.5. The number 
of non-singleton similarity pockets identified for ‘Author’ and ‘Company’ provide the values for 
Characteristics 3 and 10. 
By grouping the pockets for ‘Author’ and ‘Filename’ similarity the size of the largest multi pocket 
provides the values for Characteristic 4 in Table 7.5. When I substitute the similarity pockets 
generated by ‘Filename’ with those by ‘Filesize’, then the largest multi pocket thus formed 
provides the values for Characteristic 5 in Table 7.5. Superimposing the similarity pockets 
obtained from the ‘Author’ and ‘Company’ metadata then reveals the set of authors who share the 
same organization affiliation. The largest multi pocket formed by superimposing the similarity 
pockets for ‘Author’ with the ones for ‘Company’ provides the values for Characteristic 9 in 
Table 7.5. Characteristics 11 and 12 are determined in the same manner as Characteristics 1 and 2 
using the metadata Application-Name and Title. 
7.5.2.3 Conclusions 
We have thus demonstrated the application of the MAM to generate metadata associations using 
the exhaustive mode to determine critical parameters to document analysis. The approach is 
amenable to automation by virtue of the ubiquity of metadata and the generation of associations 
leads to the identification of source and ownership relationships during analysis. 
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In this thesis, I have hitherto established the existence of associations between files based on 
metadata value matches and demonstrated them for collections of digital image files (refer 
Chapter 6) and word processing documents (in this chapter). However, I showed in Chapter 2 how 
the establishment of associations based on timestamps, particularly across files stored across 
heterogeneous sources can contribute to interpretation challenges. I developed the Provenance 
Information Model in Chapter 4 to address this challenge and developed a prototype toolkit called 
UniTIME in Chapter 5. In the sequel, I demonstrate the utility of the model using UniTIME by 
applying it to two hypothetical case studies. 
7.6 Generating Unified Timelines Using PIM 
We present here two case studies that use the UniTIME digital time-lining tool; the first case 
study is based on the DFRWS forensic challenge 2008 [51] which contains four distinct 
homogeneous sources, maintaining different time references and the second case study is based on 
synthetic user documents based on a FAT32 file system to detect timestamp inconsistencies by 
comparing the MAC timestamps against the document metadata timestamps. 
7.6.1 Evaluation Criteria 
With regard to evaluating the prototype, the following criteria were tested through my 
experimentation. 
1. Did the tool generate a unified timeline? 
2. Does the generated timeline include all the events recorded in evidence in the 
homogeneous sources? 
3. Is the generated timeline consistent with the expected outcome? 
4. Did the tool identify all timestamp related inconsistencies in the homogeneous 
sources? 
For a successful implementation, the expected answer for all these criteria is ‘yes’. If otherwise, it 
could indicate either a design flaw or an incomplete implementation in software. The most 
common reason for the tool’s inability to provide a complete timeline was determined as the 
inability to complete the extraction of timestamps owing to inaccurate parsing of the timestamps 
from the homogeneous sources. 
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7.6.2 Repeatability in Generating Unified Timelines – A Case Study 
In this case study, my goal was to generate a unified timeline of the events for the DFRWS 
Forensic Challenge 2008 [40]. The timestamp interpretation was a challenge due to the fact that 
the source of digital evidence being a ZIP archive of the userspace folder, the Mozilla Firefox 
browser history and cache logs and a packet capture, each corresponding to a distinct 
homogeneous sources on the source
58
. In all, there are four sets of homogeneous sources,  
1. a user folder (with US/Eastern time zone reference),  
2. the Firefox59 browser history (with US/Eastern time zone reference),  
3. the Firefox browser cache (with US/Eastern time zone reference), and  
4. a packet capture (with UTC time zone reference).  
A brief case outline is provided below. 
7.6.2.1 DFRWS 2008 Challenge Case Outline 
Mr. Steve Vogon, an employee at Saraquiot Corporation, was suspected of smuggling confidential 
Saraquiot information to an outsider using the company’s resources. The source was a hashed 
archive of the aforementioned contents. Based on the case brief, I set the location of the activities 
as the east coast of the United States and accordingly the Provenance Information Model for each 
homogeneous source, i.e., the user folder, the browser logs and the packet capture was set to UTC 
0500. The activities on the source were recorded between May 2007 and December 2007. The 
packet capture contains a network session in December 2007 captured on the IP assigned to the 
user’s machine. I separated the homogeneous sources and parsed the contents for analysis. The 
homogeneous sources were provided as inputs to UniTIME which extracted the timestamps from 
the metadata and interpreted them using the PIM.  
The list of significant findings for this investigation was recorded by Cohen et al. [40]. A merged 
timeline of the events was reported by Jokerst et al. [94]. While Cohen et al. apply a fixed time 
zone offset using Pyflag to interpret the timestamps; Jokerst et al. did not interpret the timestamps, 
                                                          
58
 The original forensic image provided for the DFRWS 2008 challenge also contains a memory capture from Mr. 
Steve Vogon’s computer. However, for the purpose of this case study, the memory capture has been omitted. 
59
 Although the Firefox browser stores history and cache log timestamps internally in UTC with a local time zone 
offset, the timestamps were all converted into local time zone when there were compressed into the ZIP format. 
Besides this, the time zone information was not encapsulated within the archive and hence lost. 
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but merely used the locally rendered values. In their case, the source was extracted in the same 
time zone (US/Eastern) as that of the source, which rendered the interpretations unnecessary. 
However, the approach was not repeatable for corroboration of results. When I retraced the steps 
reported by Jokerst et al. [94] in a different time zone (AEST), it resulted in an inconsistent 
timeline where the network activities were found to occur after the reported source acquisition. I 
demonstrate how my Provenance Information Model was used to address this issue and how I 
implemented a repeatable solution for generating a unified time-lining using UniTIME. 
7.6.2.2 Experiment 
In regards to this experiment, the individual homogeneous sources were isolated and preserved 
along with their respective Provenance Information Model data. The user folder was provided as a 
forensic image with no explicit time zone bias, since this is achieved using its PIM. The browser 
logs and the network trace were pre-processed into XML form following which they were also 
added as sources into UniTIME. The tool was then executed and the generated timeline was 
compared against the manually enumerated sequence. 
7.6.2.3 Applying PIM corrections 
Since the source was provided as a compressed zip archive, the files contained within the user 
folder could only store one timestamp reliably, namely, the last modified timestamp and that only 
to a 2-second precision. The timestamps on the browser logs, however, are stored differently 
(UNIX timestamps) with a 1-second precision. The PIM for each homogeneous source is designed 
specifically for this purpose which was taken to be UTC 0500. In order to obtain the timestamps 
in UTC, the homogeneous sources had to selectively corrected; i.e., only the timestamps on the 
user folder and the browser history and cache had to be corrected, by being shifted forward in 
time 5 hours. The packet capture internally records timestamps in UTC and the values were 
readily available. To compute the local timestamps, only the packet capture timestamps had to be 
shifted back in time 5 hours, while the others were readily available. Thus, each event in each of 
the homogeneous sources now had one timestamp in UTC and a corresponding timestamp in local 
time. 
7.6.2.4 Verifying Timestamp Resilience 
Once the PIM corrections were applied, the timestamps were checked for consistency by 
validating any assertions pertaining to timestamps for verifying the event sequence that an 
examiner may record during analysis. In this case study, the assertions pertained to validating the 
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file system timestamps against the packet timestamps in the network capture. Basically, the 
timestamps obtained from the user folder correspond to one of three file activity events (create, 
modify and access). The timestamps obtained from the network packet capture correspond to a 
packet sent/arrival time. Since it was mentioned in the case brief that the network activity was 
discovered from within the user folder, it implied that the network packet capture was created 
before the last file activity event in the user folder. In other words, the network packet timestamps 
should precede the last file activity as recorded from the user folder. The timestamps from each 
homogeneous source were sorted and I compared the last timestamp from the user folder against 
the last timestamp on the packet capture. The snapshot of the partial timeline after harmonizing 
the provenance information across different sources is shown in Figure 7.3. The time zone 
provided in the figure is in reference with the Pacific Eastern time zone (UTC -0500). 
 
Figure 7.3 Snapshot of the partial timeline obtained sing UniTIME after harmonizing the provenance 
information between the different sources of digital evidence 
 
7.6.2.5 Conclusions 
Once the timestamps passed the consistency checks, they are digitally time-lined and rendered. 
The resultant timeline was in agreement with the timelines produced by Cohen et al. and Jokerst 
2007-12-16 23:06:39 SYSLOG of goldfinger dhclient: DHCPREQUEST on eth0 to 192.168.151.254 port 67
2007-12-16 23:06:39 SYSLOG of goldfinger dhclient: DHCPACK from 192.168.151.254
2007-12-16 23:06:40 SYSLOG of goldfinger dhclient: bound to 192.168.151.130 -- renewal in 869 seconds.
2007-12-16 23:06:51 PCAP of Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.8.0.12) Gecko/20071020 CentOS/1.5.0.12-6.el5.centos Firefox/1.5.0.12 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/conduct_manufacturers.html
2007-12-16 23:06:52 PCAP of Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.8.0.12) Gecko/20071020 CentOS/1.5.0.12-6.el5.centos Firefox/1.5.0.12 
http://hb.disney.go.com/stat/Hitboxcode.js
2007-12-16 23:08:18 MODIFICATION of .mozilla/firefox/n5q6tfua.default/Cache/CA145DAFd01 ( Non-ISO extended-ASCII English text, with very long lines)
2007-12-16 23:08:19 HISTORY First Browse of http://corporate.disney.go.com/environmentality/index.html
2007-12-16 23:08:19 HISTORY Last Browse of http://corporate.disney.go.com/environmentality/index.html
2007-12-16 23:08:20 MODIFICATION of .mozilla/firefox/n5q6tfua.default/Cache/0C72616Dd01 ( JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.02)
2007-12-16 23:08:20 MODIFICATION of .mozilla/firefox/n5q6tfua.default/Cache/B652618Ad01 ( JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.02)
2007-12-16 23:08:20 MODIFICATION of .mozilla/firefox/n5q6tfua.default/Cache/56A7DF65d01 ( JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.02)
2007-12-16 23:08:20 MODIFICATION of .mozilla/firefox/n5q6tfua.default/Cache/90F04203d01 ( JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.02)
2007-12-16 23:08:20 MODIFICATION of .mozilla/firefox/n5q6tfua.default/Cache/3B2FF872d01 ( JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.02)
2007-12-16 23:08:20 MODIFICATION of .mozilla/firefox/n5q6tfua.default/Cache/DE92D282d01 ( JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.02)
2007-12-16 23:08:24 MODIFICATION of .mozilla/firefox/n5q6tfua.default/cookies.txt ( Web browser cookie text)
2007-12-16 23:08:39 PCAP of Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.8.0.12) Gecko/20071020 CentOS/1.5.0.12-6.el5.centos Firefox/1.5.0.12 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/environmentality/index.html
2007-12-16 23:18:48 PCAP of Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US) Gecko/20071126 http://en.wikipedia.orghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page
2007-12-16 23:21:08 PCAP of Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US) Gecko/20071126 http://en.wikipedia.orghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lee_Smith_%28baseball_player%29
2007-12-16 23:24:05 SETTING (sources) change of .gconf/apps/evolution/addressbook/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:06 SETTING (interface) change of .gconf/apps/ekiga/protocols/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:06 SETTING (output_device) change of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/sound_events/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:06 SETTING (public_ip) change of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/nat/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:06 SETTING (input_device) change of .gconf/apps/ekiga/devices/video/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:06 SETTING (input_device) change of .gconf/apps/ekiga/devices/audio/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:06 SETTING (output_device) change of .gconf/apps/ekiga/devices/audio/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:08 MODIFICATION of .gnome2/gnomemeeting ( ASCII text)
2007-12-16 23:24:09 SETTING (size) change of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/user_interface/druid_window/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:09 SETTING (position) change of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/user_interface/druid_window/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:11 SETTING (position) change of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/user_interface/main_window/%gconf.xml
2007-12-16 23:24:22 PCAP of Agent: Ekiga http://ekiga.net/ip/
2007-12-16 23:25:04 MODIFICATION of .gconf/apps/ekiga/protocols/%gconf.xml ( XML)
2007-12-16 23:25:04 MODIFICATION of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/sound_events/%gconf.xml ( XML)
2007-12-16 23:25:04 MODIFICATION of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/nat/%gconf.xml ( XML)
2007-12-16 23:25:04 MODIFICATION of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/user_interface/druid_window/%gconf.xml ( XML)
2007-12-16 23:25:04 MODIFICATION of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/user_interface/main_window/%gconf.xml ( XML)
2007-12-16 23:25:04 MODIFICATION of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/user_interface/%gconf.xml ( empty)
2007-12-16 23:25:04 MODIFICATION of .gconf/apps/ekiga/general/%gconf.xml ( empty)
2007-12-16 23:25:04 MODIFICATION of .gconf/apps/ekiga/devices/video/%gconf.xml ( XML)
2007-12-16 23:25:04 MODIFICATION of .gconf/apps/ekiga/devices/audio/%gconf.xml ( XML)
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et al. [40, 94] and was found to be repeatable as I obtained an identical timeline by repeating this 
experiment for 3 other different time zones. 
7.6.3 Validating Document Consistency Using Assertion Testing in PIM – A 
case study 
For this case study, I created a synthetic user folder to detect timestamp inconsistencies on 
documents during analysis. While earlier research [19, 23, 171, 184] has used only file system 
timestamps to detect anomalies, I have considered timestamps both from the file system and 
document metadata. The user folder was generated on a FAT32 file system as shown in Figure 
7.4. The folder contained an archive file and a directory, both called Sample; the directory 
contained multiple sub-directories and files. 
7.6.3.1 Experiment 
In this directory, 4 Microsoft Word document files (Doc1.docx, Doc2.docx, Doc3.docx and 
Doc4.docx) were created at different levels in the hierarchy and the system was set to a different 
time zone (the time zone changed from UTC +1000 to UTC +0500). Since FAT32 does not record 
the time zone, the current system time will be regarded as the source for recording these 
timestamps. All directories and the text files were created earlier than mid-2009 and were 
therefore insensitive to the time zone shift applied in June 2011. After the time zone change, the 
Word documents were accessed a few times. Among the Word documents, Doc1.docx and 
Doc4.docx were updated while the other two were merely read. This action would ensure that the 
document timestamps and the file system timestamps corresponding to LAST_MODIFIED and 
LAST_ACCESS are updated in accordance with the present system time zone. Then, I imaged 
(using DD) the folder and analyzed it using UniTIME. 
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Figure 7.4 The synthetic User folder structure for detecting timestamp inconsistencies 
  
7.6.3.2 Setting up Assertions 
At the time of acquiring the source, the system time zone was UTC +0500 and was set in the 
Provenance Information Model. The first of my two hypothetical assertions recorded into the PIM 
is given below: 
1. Document creation times must always precede document last modification and last 
access times.  
Since the documents were regarded as being generated according to the current system time, it was 
expected that all files are first created ahead of file operations such as file access or file modify. 
When a document breaches this assertion, it can indicate one of two possibilities, i.e., the 
document was a copy (either direct or altered) of a document from some removable or network 
storage or the timestamps were intentionally tampered with. While the former can be a common 
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occurrence in a file system (usually in FAT and NTFS file systems, as noted in Footnote 60, p. 
216), there is still value in identifying such documents, especially in an automated manner using 
the PIM. The second hypothetical assertion recorded was: 
2. File system MAC timestamps on documents should be greater than or equal to the 
document metadata timestamps.  
The application is responsible for modifying the document metadata while the operating system 
controls the file system metadata. Hence all modifications by the application on documents should 
have occurred before the operating system modified the respective MAC timestamps. When a 
document breaches this assertion, it can indicate timestamp tampering. 
7.6.3.3 Testing Assertions to Detect Inconsistencies 
The UniTIME tool traversed the file system hierarchy on the forensic image and applied the 
provenance information model corrections to the timestamps in metadata. All text files passed the 
assertions but the 4 Microsoft Word documents breached them. This is attributed to the fact that 
when the Word documents were modified after the time zone was changed, the 
LAST_MODIFIED timestamps were updated according to local system time and since the system 
time was temporally behind the CREATION timestamps on the respective documents. The output 
from the result of the breach is shown in Table 7.6. The tool identified the files in breach and 
flagged a message stating the type and nature of the inconsistency discovered. 
Sl. No. Artifact name Alert TYPE Details 
1 Doc1.doc alert for TS inconsistency file metadata inconsistent 
2 Doc4.doc alert for TS inconsistency file metadata inconsistent 
3 Doc3.doc alert for TS inconsistency file metadata inconsistent 
4 Doc3.doc alert for TS inconsistency metadata and MAC 
inconsistent 
5 Doc2.doc alert for TS inconsistency file metadata inconsistent 
6 Doc2.doc alert for TS inconsistency metadata and MAC 
inconsistent 
Table 7.6 Output from temporal assertion testing 
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7.6.3.4 Conclusions 
The message “file metadata inconsistent” was flagged when the tool determined that the document 
metadata had an inconsistency on Assertion 1, i.e., the Microsoft Word metadata “Creation-Date”, 
“Last-Saved-Date” and “Last-Printed-Date” were found to be out of order. The message 
“metadata and MAC inconsistent” was flagged when MAC timestamps (one or more) were less 
than the document metadata timestamps. Such inconsistencies are detected and alerted for 
preemptive corrective actions on the identified documents
60
 during analysis. 
7.7  Discussion 
Metadata underlines the context to describe the situational similarity during the life cycle of the 
documents and files stored on digital sources. Document metadata store a variety of information 
regarding who and how a document was created and operated on such as author, organization, 
document format, application type, application version, MAC timestamps and document 
timestamps. Such information are related to who created the document and how (formatting 
information) it was created. Document metadata may also record information about where it was 
created (geo-tagging), number of pages/slides, formatting type, encoding type and so on.  
Rowe and Garfinkel [165] have analyzed a large repository of documents to determine anomalous 
documents. They computed statistical characteristics using directory metadata and identified the 
top and bottom 5 percentile in the repository as outliers. These statistical characteristics are 
applicable to file size, number of similarly named files, related files residing in the same directory 
and so on. Their dataset does not pertain to a single investigation and hence the anomalies 
identified correspond to misnamed files and duplicate copies of files. In a similar vein, by 
applying the MAM to document collections, not only can one identify such anomalies (files with 
unusually large file sizes and similarly named files will generate their own respective similarity 
pockets), those files would be grouped together informing the forensic examiner of exactly how 
many files there are in each category and also identifying any additional metadata similarity that 
associate these documents. Identifying metadata associations among the documents will group 
documents that stand out from the rest and thus could assist an examiner in filtering out the subset 
                                                          
60
 The apparent inconsistency in timestamps as demonstrated in this case study can also occur when a Microsoft Word 
document is copied across computers, especially set to different time zones. The Microsoft Word application which 
manages the document metadata does not often modify these timestamps on a copy/move operation which always 
affects MAC timestamps. The document metadata are only changed when the application is used to operate on the 
file. Therefore, such an inconsistency does not always imply malicious activity. However, whenever such an 
inconsistency is discovered, the tool prompts the examiner who may then choose the appropriate course of action. 
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of documents from a large collection that require further analysis while simultaneously identifying 
those that can be safely excluded, reducing the number of digital artifacts requiring manual 
analysis. For example, if an examiner comes across an unusually large association group (for my 
purposes, the particular set of metadata that were involved in the generation of this association 
group is not relevant), the examiner may determine one of two things: 
1. the documents in the association group all belong to one principal author; or  
2. the documents in the association group belong to multiple different authors all of 
whom have co-authored with the principal author on different documents. 
7.8 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I evaluated the Metadata Association Model on word processing documents. I 
discussed the identification of metadata pertaining to the four metadata families as identified in 
Chapter 5. I grouped large collections of documents based on the metadata associations identified 
in a manner that facilitated document analysis.  
In the next chapter, I summarize the research challenges addressed and my research outcomes in 
this thesis. I present a discussion on the scope of this research and identify areas for future work. 
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“An expert is one who knows more and more about less and less 
until he knows absolutely everything about nothing.” 
- Nicholas Murray Butler 
 
 
 
8. Conclusions and 
Future Work 
Digital forensics concerns the analysis of electronic artifacts to reconstruct events such as 
cybercrimes. Rapid technological advances during the last decade have resulted in a proliferation 
of digital devices. Besides this, it is becoming increasingly common for individuals to own 
multiple digital devices; today, any individual chosen at random is likely to possess a workstation, 
a laptop, mobile phone, a couple of USB flash drives, and a GPS receiver, not to mention online 
user profiles depicting their personal information. During a digital investigation, such 
heterogeneous devices have to be forensically examined and analyzed. Therefore, contemporary 
digital forensics is forced to contend with such heterogeneity. Two major challenges surface as a 
result, viz., diversity and volume. To address the diversity and the volume challenges, I identified 
associations among digital artifacts across heterogeneous sources of digital evidence that represent 
the syntactic and semantic relationships. I used metadata as the instrument to determine these 
associations (based on metadata value matches). 
This research produced a framework to support forensic analyses by identifying associations in 
digital evidence using metadata. It showed that metadata based associations can help uncover the 
inherent relationships between heterogeneous digital artifacts thereby 
aiding in the reconstruction of past events by identifying artifact dependencies and time 
sequencing. It also showed that metadata association based analysis is amenable to automation by 
virtue of the ubiquitous nature of metadata across forensic disk images, files, system and 
application logs and network packet captures. The results prove that metadata based associations 
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can be used to extract meaningful relationships between digital artifacts, thus potentially 
benefiting real-life forensics investigations. 
8.1 Research Objectives & Contributions 
We developed a framework for automatically identifying source metadata-based associations in 
digital evidence and for grouping the related artifacts. I have shown experimentally that my 
approach can be used for answering the six forensic questions of who, what, when, where, how 
and why posed by Casey [32]. 
8.1.1 Objectives of this Research 
In accordance with the goals and objectives stated in Chapter 1, the following objectives were 
targeted in this research. 
1. To develop an understanding for the treatment of metadata in digital evidence by different 
forensic and analysis tools and to integrate the functionalities of different existing tools for 
analyzing digital evidence. 
2. To develop an understanding of how to generate metadata associations based on syntactic 
and semantic relationships between digital artifacts, using metadata matches across 
arbitrary types of digital artifacts. 
3. To develop an understanding for the semantics linked to metadata associations and their 
interpretation in a forensic context, to allow us to produce intuitive groupings of digital 
artifacts, of both homogeneous and heterogeneous natures, for forensic analysis. 
8.1.2 Contributions from this Research 
Based on the understanding arising out of achieving the goals and objectives of this project, the 
following were the salient contributions from this research: 
1. We conducted a review of contemporary forensic and analysis tools to abstract the 
different functionalities supported to analyze different sources of digital evidence. This 
review culminated in the design of the functional Forensic Integration Architecture which 
consolidated these functionalities and defined a new layer to group artifacts based on 
metadata associations. I developed a prototype toolkit called AssocGEN analysis engine 
based on the f-FIA architecture which spans over 20000 lines of Java code and consists of 
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multiple modules. The modules are pluggable at runtime and can access and parse files 
and folders from most common file systems such as FAT32, NTFS, EXT2, EXT3 and 
HFS+, web page visitation and cache logs on browser applications and network packets 
contained within packet captures. 
2. We conducted experiments to elicit the syntax and semantics associated with metadata 
associations which were determined through the identification of metadata matches. I 
generalized my findings which resulted in the Metadata Association Model (MAM) for 
identifying metadata-based associations across the digital artifacts from multiple sources 
of digital evidence. I also developed the associated theory to study the formation of 
metadata based matches across heterogeneous sources of digital evidence and algorithms 
to identify specific artifact relationships that can be of interest during forensic analysis. 
3. The identification of data items from homogeneous and heterogeneous sources, whether 
regarding files, log records or network packets, to discover the higher-order associations 
or relationships via the metadata. This was demonstrated by the successful grouping of 
digital image files and word processing documents belonging to different file formats and 
discussed the formation of association groups across multiple source classes by 
determining metadata matches between them.  
a. We studied the use of the Metadata Association Model to analyze collections of 
digital image files and demonstrated two methods of grouping the related digital 
images. I illustrated the use of digital image file relationships to determine 
instances of image downloads and identify the origin of these downloads. 
b. We studied the use of the Metadata Association Model to analyze collections of 
word processing documents and demonstrated two methods of grouping the related 
documents. I illustrated the use of word processing documents relationships to 
determine instances of document doctoring during analysis. 
4. The development of the Provenance Information Model (PIM) to provide timestamp 
resilience in metadata for interpretation. I developed a prototype toolkit called UniTIME 
unified timelining tool based on the f-FIA architecture which spans over 6000 lines of 
Java code and consists of multiple modules. The modules are pluggable at runtime and 
can access and parse timestamps from files and folders on file systems such as FAT32, 
NTFS, EXT2, EXT3 and HFS+, web page visitation and cache logs on browser 
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applications and network packets contained within packet captures. I demonstrated the 
execution of this tool to generate unified timelines using contemporary case studies 
involving FAT32 file systems and ZIP file formats and validating event consistency 
across heterogeneous sources. 
8.2 Limitations & Future Directions 
The Metadata Association Model (MAM) developed in this thesis has explored the realms of 
representing the interdependencies between digital artifacts on one or more sources of digital 
evidence. In view of the goal of digital forensics which attempts to develop a scientific method to 
reconstruct past events, I indicate future directions for my research in this section. 
Exploring Domain Heuristics for Computational Benefit. The metadata association model is a 
novel way to look at digital artifacts and their interdependencies as similarity pockets and 
association groups based on metadata value matches. Even though I used deterministic algorithms 
to elicit artifact relationships, one may have to contend with exponentially large number of 
associations as the volume of digital evidence increases. It is worthwhile exploring whether 
heuristics based on domain specific information are likely to yield computational benefits and aid 
in the identification of targeted analysis. This, in the author’s opinion, is likely to open new vistas 
in digital forensics. 
Uniform Representation for Digital Artifacts. In my research I explored the analysis of digital 
artifacts such as files, log records and network packets based on the associations identified using 
respective metadata present in them. It may be worthwhile to look at the development of standards 
to unify the creation of metadata and the identification of metadata based value matches to aid in 
the forensic reconstruction process. While doing so, one may develop a mapping between 
semantically equivalent metadata values to identify metadata associations and progressively 
establish an up-to-date ontology of digital artifacts across contemporary sources of digital storage. 
8.3 Conclusion 
Metadata represents an important component of a digital artifact and contain contextual and 
situational information. I showed that metadata can be invaluable during analysis and can aid in 
the identification of key relationships across heterogeneous sources of digital evidence. I believe 
that my framework and the metadata association model are inherently capable of absorbing future 
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growth in metadata both in relation to context and situations. I believe that, in time, my Metadata 
Association Model could be integrated into mainstream forensic toolkits for use in day-to-day 
investigations. I hope that my research has provided the necessary stimulus to achieve unified 
forensic analyses. 
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